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c Understanding the risks, links and consequences of climatic events, 
conflict and migration: Perceptions from asylum seekers in Germany 
 
Abstract 
Over the last several decades, climatic events, conflict and migration have – 
independently and symbiotically – significantly impacted global politics, sparking turmoil 
among policy makers and garnering attention among academics across all disciplines. 
The purpose of this study is to advance understanding of the risks, links and 
consequences of each – climatic events, conflict, and migration – their relationships and 
aftermath on human, national and international security. In particular, it seeks to provide 
evidence on migrants’ perceived drivers for international migration to Europe and 
insights about if and how perceived climatic events have influenced people’s decision to 
migrate or conflict, or both. 
To this end, existing related scientific literature was scrutinized and complemented with 
an in-depth empirical study, exploring individual’s experiences, perceptions and 
decisions, of 100 asylum seekers from 17 countries hosted in German facilities. Given 
climate’s unequivocal and unprecedented economic and social burdens on modern 
populations, the first article of this thesis seeks to increase understanding of how climatic 
events – such as temperature, droughts, and storms – impact societies and shape social 
outcomes. It does so by developing an analytical framework that can be applied across 
countries and allows for a theoretical conceptualization of the ways by which climatic 
events interact with societies. It emphasizes that there is no mechanic link in the climate-
human interaction that causes the same social response across regions and that climate’s 
impacts depend on the type of climatic event, the complex societal context and 
vulnerability of each affected entity. The second article uses empirical evidence to depict 
a complex pattern of drivers of international migration to Germany. While results show 
that the majority of interviewees - regardless of their background - were able to explain 
how changing climate conditions were perceived or how they affected their daily lives in 
their place of origin, climatic events were not perceived as driver for migration. This 
paper strengthens existing claims that armed conflict and concerns of safety take 
precedence over economic woes, and it uncovers widespread religious and ethnic 









comparison of the three top European migrant destinations, the article shows that a 
country’s welfare or asylum support system are weak drivers for migration. The third 
article puts forth the “conflict-induced resource scarcity theory”, a novel approach to 
advancing understanding by addressing the inherent uncertainty across scientific research 
fields on the complex linkages between climatic events, conflict and migration. It 
elaborates on the novel theory to shed light on the conflict in Syria and provides new 
insights on the use of resource scarcity as a weapon during conflict. This thesis by 
publication emphasizes the importance of evidence-based information, while avoiding 
simplistic and sensationalist conclusions on each - climatic events, conflict and migration 
- independently and the relationships between them. The results, novel theory and the 
presented drivers for migration and recommended policy responses about the “migrant 
crisis” provide important considerations for civil society, policy makers, and academia, 
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Over the last several decades, each of the natural and social science research areas – climatic 
events, conflict1 and migration – and the connections of these concepts have significantly 
impacted world politics, sparked turmoil among policy makers and garnered attention among 
academics across disciplines. Specifically, the interactions between the three areas of climatic 
events, conflict and migration are complex, and are characterized by inherent uncertainty 
across scientific research fields. Furthermore, the current discussion and understanding of 
their interactions are not verified with robust data and studies given their major actual and 
potential implications on human security and international peace. While climate’s impacts on 
societies have been a subject of academic study for many centuries, today, the effects of 
climatic events in combination with migration or conflict separately and the nexus of these 
research areas is a hot topic. This is due mainly to the accelerated pace of climate change and 
the widespread fear surrounding the unprecedented flow of migrants2 into European countries 
and beyond. 
As the top European destination for migrants, Germany has witnessed a surge in asylum 
seekers since 2009, reaching 745,545 asylum applications – or 57 per cent of the total 
applications received in the European Union (EU) – by the end of 2016. Against this 
backdrop, policy makers, civil society, and academics across disciplines have engaged in a 
polarizing debate about the recent great wave of migration to Europe. The so-called “migrant 
crisis”, which peaked in 2015 became a key global challenge that has given rise to conflicting 
public perception about migration, pressured policy makers to seek solutions, given urgency 
to migration research in academia, and affected international cooperation and peace. To date, 
European policy responses to mounting irregular migration are often based on reactive 
mitigation attempts, guided by media-inflated perceptions, which trump facts and lead to 
emergency-driven policy approaches tackling the “symptoms” of the current “migrant crisis”, 
                                               
 
1 This study either uses the term “conflict” broadly to encompass violence at the interpersonal, intergroup, and 
international levels or specifies the conflict type based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). 
2 This study follows the United Nations’ definition of “international migrant”, which comprises “any person who 
changes his or her country of usual residence” (United Nations, 1998) and the term “migrant” is used broadly 
including all people who have left their habitual place of residence, irrespective of legal status, causes for the 
move, duration of the stay, and nature of the movement as voluntary or involuntary. 
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such as containing migrant smuggling, rather than dealing with the underlying drivers of this 
phenomenon. 
While academia provides a mounting body of research on migration in general, inconsistent 
data on international migration and recent research on the causes and possible solutions to the 
“migrant crisis” have often led to conflicting results (Cummings et al. 2015). In light of the 
political upheaval concerning migration and the recent “migrant crisis,” the EU agenda on 
migration, among others, highlights the need to improve the management of migration by 
addressing the drivers and structural factors that impede people from building and 
maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their country of origin and therefore seek a future 
elsewhere (Migali et al., 2018).  
Today, understanding the drivers and patterns of migration is a central international concern 
in academia, politics and policymaking (ibid.). Debates about terminologies concerning 
migration, such as “drivers”, “root-causes” and “factors”, and labels, such as “refugee”, 
“migrant” and “environmental migrants”, are flourishing in academia. In fact, the drivers for 
migration have often been analyzed under the push versus pull theory in scientific literature 
(Hoffmann et all., 2019). Despite the mounting research and discourse on the topic, existing 
literature and the multiple migration theories neglect analyzing the individual migration 
decisions and mostly focus on aggregated socio-economic data about the complex human 
behavior (ibid.). The empirical shortcoming in migration studies, including those concerned 
with conflict and the environment or climatic events as driver for migration, stems on the one 
hand from the lack of theoretical work and data and, on the other hand, from the emphasis on 
analyzing which individuals migrate rather than why they migrate (Koubi et all., 2016). 
This research focuses on individual migration decisions, as it investigates the experiences and 
perceptions of 100 asylum seekers in Germany with semi-structured interviews. In the present 
study, Germany was chosen as an example of a European country, which is at the center of 
the discourse about migration and has considerable global influence on the topic. Based on 
the perceptions of asylum seekers and an in-depth analysis on related scientific literature, this 
study seeks to advance the understanding and exploration of the risks, links and consequences 
of climatic events, conflict, and migration – both independently and symbiotically – and 
offers novel perspectives and frameworks to determine their consequences on human, national 
and international security. Moreover, it seeks to foster the management of migration by 
providing a thorough evidence-based picture of what determines international migration in the 
first place and insights about if and how perceived climatic events have influenced people’s 
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decision to migrate or conflict, or both. Moreover, it offers concise answers to tackle the 
complexity of migration for policy makers to create effective and durable policies. 
 
0.1 Background 
The pace of warming of the climate system, influenced by anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases causing widespread impacts on human and natural systems, is unequivocal 
and unprecedented. The interchangeable concepts of “climate change” and “global warming” 
are familiar to almost everyone and cannot be mentioned without sparking a heated debate. 
Furthermore, despite existing scientific data, climate change denial still exists, even among 
the highest political ranks. 
Throughout the past 650,000 years, there have been seven cycles of glacial advance and 
retreat, and the end of the last ice age about 14,000 years ago marked the beginning of the 
modern climate era. Hence, the earth’s climate, meaning the characteristics of the atmospheric 
conditions, has always been subject to change (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017). Climate 
change can be identified by a shift in the mean or variability of its properties, or both, that 
persists for an extended period (IPCC, 2014). On the one hand, the earth’s natural climate 
variability is part of climate change, which implies that it evolves from the interaction 
between the atmosphere, the ocean, and land, as well as changes in the amount of solar 
radiation reaching our planet. On the other hand, human activities causing emission of 
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen oxides, and 
chlorofluorocarbons into the atmosphere have significantly contributed to climate change 
(Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017). As of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) climate report, published in 2014, anthropogenic factors are extremely likely to have 
caused more than half of the observed increase in the average global temperature over the last 
60 years. Since the preindustrial period, the average surface temperature has risen by about 
1oC, though local climatic effects differ considerably across regions (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 
2017). For instance, in many parts of the world, changes in extreme climate-related events 
tend to follow mean temperature changes, leading to proportional changes in cold and warm 
extremes (Kharin, 2007; Rummukainen, 2012). Consequently, there is an increase in the 
number of warm days and warm nights and, inversely, a decrease in the number of cold days 
and cold nights (Zhang, 2011). Global warming is further increasing the amount of water in 
the global atmosphere, thereby inducing changes in the overall hydrological cycle, including 
increasing levels of global precipitation; whereas high latitudes and some tropical regions 
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witness an increase in precipitation, subtropical regions see a decrease (Berlemann & 
Steinhardt, 2017; Kharin, 2007; Rummukainen, 2012; Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017). The 
increases in heavy precipitation are accompanied by a reduction in the probability of wet 
days, implying more extreme future climate with higher probabilities of droughts and 
increased rainfall-related floods (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017; Kharin, 2007). 
Climate change has long-standing, recurring and sweeping occurrences, though, and while 
climate change has evident ecological effects (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017), the effects and 
dangers of the climatic events on societies are less tangible, visible and predictable (Geddes & 
Scholten, 2016). Changes are inevitable and are expected to increase, however climate change 
involves complex interactions and fluctuating likelihoods of diverse impacts (IPCC, 2014), 
scientific research is not aligned on where and when changes will occur (Burrows & Kinney, 
2016) and the extent to which human systems are and will continue to be affected (Berlemann 
& Steinhardt, 2017). However, the body of literature reveals that there is consensus around 
the fact that changing climate will affect human security across the globe and while climate is 
not the only factor influencing social and economic outcomes, it is a major factor that impacts 
societies on numerous dimensions and at many scales (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
Since the 1990s, the spread of alarmist declarations depicting climate change as a human 
security threat have spurred the COP 21 and the important 2015 Paris Climate Conference, 
leading to a universal agreement between 196 nations to curb global warming at 1.5°C. 
Adopted in December 2015, the Paris Agreement on climate change calls for action on both 
the causes and consequences of climate’s impact. While the causes are to be addressed 
through a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (Fankhauser, 2016), its 
consequences require actions based on a robust scientific understanding of the interaction 
between the environment and society. The social impact of climate has been a subject of 
academic study for many centuries. For instance, already in the 18th century, Montesquieu 
argued that climate can impact the nature of men and societies and determine its structure and 
prosperity (Montesquieu, 1746). The questions of whether and how climate affects people’s 
lives, as well as how much and why it matters, continue to be studied (Carleton & Hsiang, 
2016). Furthermore, over the last several decades, these questions have emerged to become a 
major concern of contemporary geopolitics, and climate change impacts on societies are 
garnering greater attention from both policy makers and researchers (Carleton & Hsiang, 
2016). Despite the prominence of the subject and the urgency for better conceptual models of 
the dynamics at play, comprehensive analytical climate-human frameworks remain scarce in 
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scientific literature and there has been limited focus on theorizing explicitly on this nexus, and 
even fewer with an empirical research approach (Morrissey, 2013). 
Recent research is moving beyond using purely meteorological indices by integrating the 
notion of vulnerability to examine the impacts of climate change and literature highlights that 
the impact of climate change on human beings and societies is shaped by the vulnerability 
specific to each affected entity (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Scheffran et al., 2012). The 
concept of vulnerability is a decisive mechanism and crucial tool to map the complex 
interrelation, because it neither denies nor promotes a linear causality between climate change 
and its effects on social systems (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). Vulnerability encompasses a 
variety of concepts and elements and the field of vulnerability studies is fragmented between 
disciplinary and professional understandings (IPCC 2014; Busby 2014). The IPCC released in 
2014 describes vulnerability broadly as the propensity or predisposition to be adversely 
affected and presents the concept imbedded in the context of risk and hazard research and 
assessments. However, this research prefers to adopt the IPCC 2007 description, where 
vulnerability to climate impacts may include exposure and sensitivity to climate change, as 
well as adaptive capacity. 
Climatic events have very different impacts on different segments of societies (Berlemann & 
Steinhardt, 2017) and generally, vulnerability is heavily shaped by social, demographic, and 
institutional factors including gender, age, culture, education, ethnicity, and financial assets 
(Otto et al., 2017). For instance, households and firms are expected to adapt to climate 
impacts by adjusting their behavior; though, their vulnerability also depends on public policy 
on the national level to overcome market failures, correct policy distortions and incentivize 
private adaptation. Moreover, a household’s or society’s response depends on economy-wide 
choices about economic diversification, spatial planning, urban design and infrastructure; and 
as climate change is global, system-wide aspects of adaptation also affect the vulnerability of 
households and societies (Fankhauser, 2016). 
At the same time, when climate change was increasingly proclaimed as a security threat, 
predictions started to surge of large numbers of migrants3 in the 1990s. In response, 
                                               
 
3 This research follows the United Nations’ definition of ‘international migrant’, which comprises ‘any person 
who changes his or her country of usual residence’ (United Nations 1998) and the term ‘migrant’ is used 
broadly, including all people who have left their habitual place of residence, irrespective of legal status, causes 
for the move, duration of the stay, and nature of the movement as voluntary or involuntary. 
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researchers began to analyze how environmental factors shape migration decisions, mainly 
motivated by bold, scientifically untested projections of so-called ‘climate refugees’ – 
projections reaching between 150 and 300 million for the time until 2050 – which has pegged 
migration to be considered the main human security risk of climate change (Berlemann & 
Steinhardt, 2017; Brown, 2008; Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Myers, 2005). To date, the 
climate-migration relation remains an emergent area of research (McLeman, 2014) and 
authors who emphasize multilevel contextual drivers call for greater attention to the 
complexity of the climate-migration relationship and the numerous factors at the different 
scales (Black et al. 2011; Hunter et al., 2015; Morrissey, 2013). There exists a large body of 
scientific literature analyzing the environmental and climatic impacts on internal and 
international migration using macro-level (Beine & Parsons, 2015; Coniglio & Pesce 2015; 
Marchiori et al., 2012; Black et al., 2011) or micro-level (Kelley et al., 2015; Bohra-Mishra et 
al., 2014; Mueller et al. 2014; Gray & Mueller, 2012) data and applying quantitative methods, 
qualitative research or mixed method approaches. The results of these studies are crucial for 
migration studies and show that migration decisions are highly complex, usually based on 
multiple drivers, and yet, the impact of the environment and climatic events, which inherently 
depends on the vulnerability of social systems, are just one factor influencing population 
movements. Though, the existing set of scientific evidence remains contradictory and overall 
inconclusive (Hunter et al., 2015; IPCC, 2014; Black et al., 2011; Cattaneo & Peri, 2015; 
Raleigh et al. 2008). This empirical ambiguity may stem from the fact, that existing 
theoretical work and data focuses primary on researching about which individuals decide to 
migrate and neglects the analysis on why people decide to migrate (Koubi et al. 2016). 
Secondly, studies researching on the environmental or climate and migration nexus tend to 
focus only on one aspect of environmental change, such as flood, rainfall or drought. 
Moreover, existing studies provide limited understanding on the why impacts of 
environmental and climatic impacts alter between regions and countries (Hunter et al., 2015; 
Black et al., 2011; McLeman, 2014). 
The so-called “migrant crisis” and flow of migrants, as seen over the last decade in European 
countries and beyond, has become a key global challenge, though it is important to keep in 
mind that large-scale global migration is not an unknown phenomenon, nor are mass 
movements of migrants in Europe (Cummings et al., 2015). In fact, media-inflated images of 
horrifying deaths in the Mediterranean and the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers 
taking their journey across Europe via countries such as Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, 
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Hungary and Austria – with Germany often being the preferred final destination – brought the 
discussion on international migration to a climax in 2015. This debate divided those holding 
tight to the so-called European identity that is founded on solidarity and equity and pitted 
against those seeking to secure the borders of EU states, assuming unmanageable flows of 
migrants and threats to security. 
The political repercussion of hosting or refusing to host migrants is regularly debated in 
several European countries and since 2014 the topic of immigration has remained one of the 
most politicized issues in Germany, taking center stage in the 2017 federal election (Talò, 
2017). Among many other European countries, the immigration debate was also thrust to the 
fore in the campaign that led to the vote for “Brexit” of the UK from the EU in June 2016. 
And beyond Europe, it significantly influenced the election of the current Republican US 
President Donald Trump, who since his candidacy has called for the mass deportation of 
immigrants residing unlawfully in the US and the construction of a wall along the US-
Mexican border that would allegedly stem any further inflow of migrants. 
The major incomprehension of this global political upheaval lies in the existing inconsistency 
in data on international migration, still limited empirical research on migration in Europe and 
on the causes and possible solutions to the recent “migrant crisis,” spurring conflicting 
evidence-lacking debates on the subject (Cummings et al., 2015). Moreover, while migration 
is more central to the debate about Europe’s future than ever before (Geddes & Scholten, 
2016), the current policies fail to effectively address the difficulties experienced by migrants 
and governments and belie the complex nature of international migration (Cummings et al., 
2015). 
The alarmist warnings of climate-induced mass migration, also proclaimed by the first 
assessment report of the IPCC in 1990 was later translated into predictions of major conflicts 
in receiving regions and generally, climate change in connection with conflict and migration 
was since then presented as phenomenon causing violence and instability, all of which was 
based on thin scientific evidence (Raleigh, 2010; Reuveny, 2007). Across academic 
disciplines, researchers analyze the extent to which climatic events are responsible for 
interpersonal violence, conflict or non-state conflict and political instability (Hsiang et al, 
2013). Studies show that this phenomenon date back to 10,000 BC, and the evidence shows 
that the association of climate and conflict has been observed across all types of conflict, 
human history, regions of the world, income groups and the various duration of climatic 
events (Ibid.). The literature to date rarely accounts for the complexities that underlie the 
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relationship between climatic events, natural resources, human security and societal stability 
(Buhaug et al., 2014; Scheffran et al., 2012). However, since the beginning of modern 
academic research on the links between climate and conflict in the 1980s, resource scarcity is 
considered to be an important link of the relationship. 
Examples in which resource scarcity, in particular water, were used as a political or military 
tool in conflicts are numerous and date back to over 4,500 years ago and since then, the role 
of water has always been a primary target during conflict (Gleick, 2014). Though, today, 
water resources and systems are of increasing strategic relevance during conflict, as water 
scarcity is rising, accelerated by anthropogenic factors, as freshwater-related risks of climate 
change mount with increasing greenhouse gas concentrations (Gleick, 2006; IPCC, 2014). In 
recent years, there has been an increase in the number of incidents of water-related violence 
around the world, though the research on the linkage between water and international peace 
and security neglects the fact that water is not only considered a factor triggering war but also 
used as a weapon or tool, or both during conflict (Gleick, 2006, 2014). 
During the recent “migrant crisis”, the debate on climate change has ramped up and, in 2015, 
it retook center stage as a “convenient truth,” during Europe’s ongoing struggle to tackle 
incoming flows of irregular migrants, terrorism in Europe and conflict and terrorism in the 
larger Tigris and Euphrates basin (Powell et al., 2017). Moreover, the ongoing conflict in 
Syria, which is characterized by complicated but direct connections to resource scarcity, 
impacting the relationship between climatic events, conflict and migration is intensively 
discussed among academics and policy makers (Gleick, 2014). In these contexts, climate 
change was yet again presented as the driver for conflict and mass migration, causing human 
insecurity, creating a state of emergency and a trilogy of self-reinforcing global challenges 
affecting international peace (Powell et al., 2017).  
Over the last several decades, each of the three research areas of climatic events, conflict and 
migration, and their links have significantly impacted global politics, sparked turmoil among 
policy makers and garnered attention among academics across disciplines. Human insecurity 
may be endangered by each of these natural and social components both independently and 
the relationships between them. However, due to the mentioned shortcomings and complexity 
of the relationship, literature diverges significantly in determining the relative importance of 
climate as a driver or contributor to conflict and the role that migration plays among this 
relationship, relative to other factors (Burrows & Kinney, 2016; Gleick, 2014; De Châtel, 
2014). Despite potentially severe consequences for human, national and international security, 
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the uncertainty about the nexus between climatic events, conflict and migration that 
dominates the literature remains high and there is a crucial need to rigorously explore the 
links between these natural and social science research areas (Burrows & Kinney, 2016). 
Overall, increased understanding of each of the research areas – climate, conflict and 
migration – and their connections and effects on human, national and international security is 
essential for academia, policy makers, civil society and may lead to potentially positive 
repercussions on international cooperation and peace. 
 
0.2 Study aims and research questions 
The purpose of this research project is to foster understanding of the three natural and social 
science research areas – climatic events, conflict, migration – and the connections among 
them. This study moreover seeks to advance scientific knowledge on the potential security 
risks of each research area and their connections. Furthermore, this research explores the 
drivers for international migration to Europe, in particular to Germany, of the so-called 
“migrant crisis”, which peaked in 2015. And it verifies if and how climatic events may have 
affected the daily livers and the decision of the sampled interviewees to migrate or conflict in 
their place of origin, or both. 
This study is an eager response to the call of the Paris Agreement to advance knowledge on 
the consequences of climatic events. Moreover, it encounters the challenge of the EU agenda 
on migration to improve the management of migration by exploring the drivers and structural 
factors of international migration. And it addresses numerous shortcomings in existing 
literature and tests existing theories on this interdisciplinary subject. This research’s ultimate 
goal is to spur scientific research, policy intervention and enhance evidence-based discourses 
among academics, policy makers and civil society on climatic events, conflict, migration and 
their relationships and the wide-ranging consequences on human, national and international 
security and peace. 
This research project primarily explores its research aims based on the perceptions and 
experiences of interviewees and sets the stage with the first article, “Understanding How 
Climatic Events Influence Conflict and Migration across Borders through a Climate-Human 
Analytical Framework.” This article fosters scientific literature with the goal of understanding 
how climatic events – such as temperature, droughts, and storms – impact societies and shape 
social outcomes. Based on a thorough scientific literature review and an empirical research 
approach including economic, social and political structures at multiple spatial and temporal 
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scales, this article seeks to develop a conceptual framework that is applicable across regions 
and allows for a more systematic conceptualization of how the climate interacts with 
societies. The climate-human analytical framework seeks to address, among multiple other 
objectives, the lack of conceptualization on the links between climatic events and migration 
and, separately, climatic events and conflict. Moreover, by exploring and theorizing on the 
complex mechanism at play, it seeks to offer understanding to academia and policy makers on 
how to take responsibility of the consequences of the interplay between climatic events and 
societies. 
This scientific paper will be followed by the second article, “Getting to the Root of the 
International Migrant Crisis: What Moved the Asylum Seekers in Germany to Flee their 
Country,” which investigates the drivers of international migration, the causes of asylum 
seekers to leave their place of origin; and the motivations – if any – to choose their destination 
country. The so-called “migrant crisis” with its potential links to conflict and climatic events 
and its polarizing political debates - accompanied by widespread fear surrounding the 
unprecedented flow of migrants in recent history, as seen in European countries and beyond - 
sits at the core of the research aims of this thesis. This article explores the actual multiplicity 
and detailed drivers of recent migration to Europe using an empirical research approach and 
drawing from individual experiences and decisions of asylum seekers. It is eager to address 
the growing, but still limited research and evidence-based information on the “migrant crisis” 
and provide results that foster a fact-based political and public discourse on migration. 
This thesis will conclude its analysis with the article “Climatic events, Conflict and 
Migration: A Novel Nexus-Theory,” which is committed to advancing understanding of the 
linkages between climatic events, conflict, and migration and suggests a set of novel 
perspectives and theory on their nexus. Based on empirical evidence, this research singles out 
resource scarcity, including the use of it as a weapon and tool during conflict, as an important 
factor between this nexus, and explores potential links between climatic events, conflict and 
migration also in the context of the ongoing Syrian conflict. The nexus-theory is expected to 
provide new insights on the central role that climatic events play as contributor to conflict, the 
impact of conflict on societies and the role that migration plays among the relationship. 
Moreover, this paper addresses the potential human, national and international security risks 
that each – climatic events, conflict and migration - and the connections of these concepts 
cause, sparking turmoil among policy makers across the globe and garnering attention among 
academics across disciplines.  
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While theory and policy implications are highlights in each stand-alone article, this thesis 
presents an analysis of detailed implications for academia, policy makers and civil society in 
appendix 1. 
 
With the three stand-alone articles, this research sought to answer the following overarching 
research questions: 
 
What are the perceived drivers for migration and – if any – the perceptions of climatic events 
determining migration decisions of asylum seekers in Germany during the so-called “migrant 
crisis”, which peaked in 2015? 
1. How did asylum seekers perceive climatic events – if so – in their place of origin and 
how did it affect their daily lives and their decision to migrate? 
2. What were asylum seekers’ perceived drivers for international migration to Europe? 
3. How did asylum seekers perceive resource scarcity in their place of origin and how is 
it associated with conflict, climatic events and migration? 
 
0.3 Methodology 
This research is based on a qualitative phenomenological research approach with individual 
semi-structured interviews and participant observations of migrants who moved to Germany 
via irregular means. The main information about the methods applied are described briefly in 
each article. In the following, important details about the methodology are presented, as they 
are considered important for the reader of this introduction. Moreover, specific 
methodological considerations, limitations and validity are presented in the appendix 2. 
  
Data collection 
The data collection process of this research was undertaken between the end of December 
2016 and mid-April 2017. Each interview lasted between 30 and 75 minutes and took place 
upon prior agreement with the interviewee and the interpreter, regarding date, place and time 
(Appendix 3). The interview was conducted in the language of the respondent’s choice, either 
in their native language, a second language or fluently spoken foreign language (Appendix 3). 
The interviews in Arabic, Kurdish Kurmanji and Sorani, Somali, Persian, Tigrinya, Dari 
Persian, Turkish, and Urdu were conducted with the assistance of experienced interpreters 
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while those in German, English, and French were conducted directly by the principal 
researcher. A total of twelve interpreters, who worked at the different migrant housings and 
one interpreter, who was recruited from the local professional network helped to facilitate the 
interviews. 
To ensure the safety and comfort of the interviewees, the interviews were held either in the 
privacy of the interviewee’s quarters or in an undisturbed location, as agreed upon by both 
parties. Only 15 out of the 100 validated interviews took place in cafés, private apartments or 
the open-air, upon the request of the interviewees or authorities of the migrant housings 
(Appendix 3). Despite the usual unrest in the migrant housings, it was possible to hold the 
interviews in privacy, in an undisturbed place known to the interviewee.  
All interviewees were informed both orally and in writing about the purpose, specifying the 
advantages and disadvantages, and terms of confidentiality of the research project, in addition 
to the voluntary nature of their participation. Both the interviewee and interpreter were asked 
to sign a consent form prior to start of each interview. The consent form for interviewees was 
provided in English, French and German language (Appendix 2) and orally translated into all 
other interview languages. The consent form for interpreters was provided in German 
(Appendix 5). As outlined in the consent form and orally or in writing confirmed to the 
managers of the migrant housings, the names of people and migrant housings will not be 
disclosed in this thesis to protect the study participant’s anonymity and security. 
The individual semi-structured interviews consisted mostly of open-ended questions, grouped 
into four sections including: general information about the interviewee and his life in his or 
her place of origin; information on why the interviewee is leaving his or her place of origin; 
information about the destination; and general opinions of the interviewee (Appendix 6). 
While all collected data form the basis of the three articles of this research, there were specific 
questions in the interview guide (Appendix 6), aimed at answering the research questions of 
each article. The information on why the interviewee is leaving his or her place of origin, in 
particular the impact of possible adverse weather and climate conditions on the interviewee’s 
daily lives provided findings to support the first article, “Understanding How Climate Change 
Influence Conflict and Migration across Borders through a Climate-Human Analytical 
Framework.” The motivations for leaving the place of origin and for choosing Germany as a 
destination country were also inquiring data for the second article: “Getting to the Root of the 
International Migrant Crisis: What Moved the Asylum Seekers in Germany to Flee their 
Country.” And inquiry on resource scarcity, perceived violence, tensions or conflict and 
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inflow or outflow of migrants aimed at providing data for the third article, “Climatic Events, 
Conflict and Migration: A Novel Nexus-Theory.” 
The interview method of individual semi-structured interviews, which were mostly comprised 
of open-ended questions is applied to this research, in order to gather detailed information 
about the migrants’ experiences and perceptions; to maintain a certain flexibility to adapt 
questions during the interview process and along the field work; and create an informal 
interview environment, where the interviewee feels comfortable, willing to talk about 
experiences, views and express openly his or her feelings. This interview method made every 
interview unique and unpredictable, which is also reflected in the difference in duration of the 
interviews. Interviewees were often visibly emotional in sharing their experiences, and many 
were proactive and appeared to be keen on telling their entire migration story, including 
detailed information about their migration journey and difficulties in Germany, which was not 
the scope of this research project. However, this information was useful to understand the 
subject interviewed - the asylum seeker - as well as to better grasp the background of the 
interviewee in his or her country of origin, the contexts in which migration decisions were 
taken and the challenges faced once in the destination country. To be heard as a migrant and 
to be able to share their experiences, views and to release emotions might have even been 
cathartic for some interviewees. 
The interviews were documented following handwritten protocols, which also included 
reflections about the interview content, the interviewee’s behavior and expressions. 
Moreover, notes about participant observations, including informal conversations, 
engagements and participation in events in the migrant housings were documented. To 
analyze the data collected, an explorative thematic analysis was conducted using the NVivo 
software and digital datasheets. The NVivo software was used to store, analyze and code the 
data. For instance, the software’s function of matrix coding - comparing attributes of 
interviewees and defined codes - was used to ask a wide range of questions, including the 
drivers for migration of the interviewees from different geographies. The NVivo software was 
crucial to master the high number of interviews from multiple backgrounds. However, to 
analyze data and prepare tables and figures, also digital datasheets using the Excel software 
were employed. Datasheets support the analysis of the three stand-alone articles. The first 
article, “Understanding How Climatic Events Influence Conflict and Migration across 
Borders through a Climate-Human Analytical Framework,” explores climatic events and 
includes data analyzed in digital datasheets (Appendix 7). Moreover, to analyze the drivers of 
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international migration, the causes of asylum seekers to leave their place of origin for the 
second article, “Getting to the Root of the International Migrant Crisis: What Moved the 
Asylum Seekers in Germany to Flee their Country,” a digital datasheet was used (Appendix 
8). The third article, “Climatic Events, Conflict and Migration: A Novel Nexus-Theory,” 
analyzing the use of resources was also partially supported by digital datasheets (Appendix 
9). The field notes from participant observation and non-verbal communication during the 
interviews were triangulated to support the reflections and analysis. 
 
Study participants 
To capture detailed narratives of the lived experiences, perceptions, and decisions of migrants 
who moved to Germany via irregular means, individual semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 105 migrants from 17 countries, and with one stateless person. However, due 
to missing information of two interviewees, one inexperienced interpreter and two missing 
signatures of the consent form, a total of 100 interviews were validated and analyzed. 
Upon arrival in Germany, migrants need to register and apply for asylum (BAMF, 2017). 
Since 1993, based on the asylum act, § 45 AsylG, asylum seekers are distributed among the 
Federal States and respective initial reception facilities, according to a nationwide electronic 
distribution system called EASY (Erstverteilung von Asylbegehrenden) (BAMF, 2017). The 
quota of asylum seekers for each Federal State is calculated, among other criteria, based on 
the “Königstein key,” a formula that combines the total population of every Federal State and 
the tax revenues to issue an annual quota of asylum seekers to be accepted by each federal 
state. The asylum seeker may move to a follow-up accommodation, administered by the 
Federal states and municipalities, during or after a decision about his or her asylum 
application was made.  
To capture a diverse and comprehensive research sample, interviews were conducted in four 
initial reception facilities and four follow-up accommodations, throughout three Federal 
States in Germany including Berlin, Brandenburg and Hesse. According to the German 
Federal office for Migration and Refugees, Berlin received 27,747 (3.8%), whereas 
Brandenburg 18,112 (2.5%) and Hesse 65,520 (9.1%) of the total asylum seekers in Germany, 
in 2016 (BAMF, 2017). A total of 49 interviews were conducted in Hesse, 25 in Berlin and 26 
in Brandenburg (Appendix 3).  
Purposive sampling was applied to learn about the experiences, perceptions and opinions of 
migrants in Germany and emphasis was placed on including interviewees with diverse 
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backgrounds, age and nationality. Hence, interviewee inclusion criteria were that the 
individual be, in order of priority, at least 18 years old and a migrant in Germany. 
The recruitment process was conducted by the researcher and in some facilities supported by 
social workers and interpreters. Moreover, the “snowball” method boosted the number of 
volunteers who participated in the study. The recruitment of interviewees was stopped once a 
sense of saturation of information was attained. 
 
Research sample 
According to the asylum act (§ 71 AsylG), an asylum application is created when the asylum 
seeker arrives in Germany for the first time. One may apply for a follow-up application in 
case of withdrawal or rejection of the first application (BAMF, 2017). The analysis of 100 
interviews resulted in a rich and diverse research sample (Table 0.1). The majority, or 98% of 
the interviewees are asylum seekers and since all of them came to Germany for the first time, 
it is assumed that they are all first-time applicants in Germany. Only two interviewees had 
already received a permission to stay in the country at the time of the interview. Surprisingly, 
77% of the interviewees applied for asylum in 2016 and only 4% applied before 2015 (Table 
0.1). These figures are approximations, because the interviewee informed about the month 
when he or she left their place of origin and the year of arrival in Germany. However, it is 
important to note that when migrants arrive in Germany, it may be a while before they apply 
for asylum. 
This research sample confirms that the asylum seekers in Germany are a highly culturally 
heterogeneous group, as the resulting research sample of this study is comparable with the 
official annual BAMF report 2016. The comparison of the 77% of the interviewees who 
applied for asylum in 2016 and the results of the official annual BAMF report 2016, show that 
the top three countries represented by asylum seekers in Germany are Syria, Afghanistan and 
Iraq; and Eritrea, Iran and Pakistan are among the 10 most represented countries of both 
datasets (Figure 0.1). 
This research confirms studies reporting that the majority of migrants are male, single and in 
their 20s (Cummings et al., 2015). Nearly one quarter of the total research sample were 
unmarried males, aged between 18 and 28 years old. In fact, 64% of interviewees were male 
and they prevailed in three out of four age groups, whereas in the age group 51 to 61 years, 
more female interviewees abounded (Figure 0.2). Accordingly, in 2016, the BAMF published 
that 65.7% of asylum seekers were male, and males prevailed in all age groups, except the age 
  
20 
group of migrants older than 65 years old (BAMF, 2017). Moreover, the BAMF reported that 
73.8% of asylum seekers are younger than 30 years old, while in the research sample of this 
thesis 74% of interviewees were younger than 40 years old. Moreover, the majority (59%) of 
interviewees had children (Table 0.1). 
The literature claims that migration flows, and outcomes are shaped by the migrant’s 
resources, which are determined by the socio-economic background (Van Hear, 2014). 
Interviews conducted with for instance a Syrian doctor and a Pakistani economist demonstrate 
that their decision to move across borders, their choice of transportation and conduct in 
Germany were planned and goal-oriented. However, since findings have shown that the array 
of socio-economic backgrounds of migrants are broad - represented in this study by the 
migrant’s occupation, rather than schooling, due to the multiplicity of backgrounds and 
schooling systems in the different countries (Table 0.1) - this research argues that channels for 
international migration are not exclusive for specific classes of people. The gender distinction 
of the research sample shows remarkable differences between men and women in their socio-
economic background and motivations to migrate internationally. The majority of interviewed 
women were housewives or unemployed, which is consistent with existing literature, that 
identifies that by far, the prevalent motivation for women to migrate is as “trailing spouse” 
(Heering et al., 2004). In fact, only 6% of higher-educated women of this research sample, 
had clear-cut motivations for leaving their place of origin and also for choosing Germany as 
destination country. 
 
Table 0. 1 Demographic profile of interviewees 
                  
  
Demographic characteristics n=100 (%)  Demographic characteristics n=100 (%) 
  
                 
  Gender      Religion       
    Female  36%    Christian 14%   
    Male 64%    Muslim (Ahmadi, Alawit, 
Shia, Sunni) 
48%   
          
  Age of interviewee      Hindu 1%   
    18-28 44%    
No religious or ethnic 
affiliation 1%   
    29-39 30%    Unassigned 36%   
    40-50 22%       
    51-61 4%  Number of children     
        0 41%   
  Country of origin (or residency, if 
more than 10 years) 
     1 12%   
       2 15%   
    Syrian Arab Republic 34%    3 13%   
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    Iraq 12%    4 9%   
    Afghanistan 11%    5 5%   
    Eritrea 6%    6 1%   
    Iran (Islamic Republic of) 5%    8 1%   
    Somalia 5%    10 2%   
    Kenya 5%    11 1%   
    Turkey 4%    Pregnant 4%   
    Ethiopia 3%       
    Cameroon 3%  Years away from location of origin (or 
residency, if more than 10 years) 
    
    Pakistan 3%      
    Egypt 2%    0.1 month - 12 month 26%   
    Yemen 2%    13 months - 24 months 39%   
    Chad 1%    2.1 years - 4.0 years 16%   
    Sudan 1%    4.1 years - 6.0 years 8%   
    Russian Federation 1%    > 6.0 years 11%   
    Jordan 1%          
    Stateless 1%  
Year when interviewee applied for 
asylum (approximated value)     
        2017 4%   
  Marital status      2016 77%   
    Married 57%    2015 15%   
    Single 36%    2014 1%   
    Widowed 4%    2012 1%   
    Divorced 3%    2009 1%   
        2003 1%   
  Main occupation          
    Housewife 17%       
    Shopkeeper 12%       
    Student at university 9%       
    Student at school 7%       
    Corporate employee 7%       
    Unemployed 6%       
    Construction worker 5%       
    Mechanic 4%       
    Teacher 4%       
    Farmer 3%       
    Security guard 3%       
    Hairdresser 3%       
    Truck driver 2%       
    Carpenter 2%       
    Baker 2%       
    Soldier 2%       
    Metalworker 2%       
    Shepherd 2%       
    Taxi driver 2%       
    Hotel owner 1%       
    Shoemaker 1%       
    Water and soda seller 1%       
    Electrician 1%       
    Doctor of medicine 1%       
    Cook 1%       
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Figure 0.2 Age group and gender of the research sample 
0.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis by publication contains three stand-alone scientific research papers, that relate to 
the study objectives outlined above. The article one, “Understanding How Climatic Events 
Influence Conflict and Migration across Borders through a Climate-Human Analytical 
Framework,” is presented in chapter 1, including its supporting materials and references. It 
has been reviewed and rejected by the journal called Weather, Climate and Society, with an 
impact factor of 2.03, received in 2017 and is currently in revision following the reviewer’s 
comments. The second article called “Getting to the Root of the International Migrant Crisis: 
What Moved the Asylum Seekers in Germany to Flee their Country,” is presented in chapter 
2 of this thesis, including its supporting materials and references. In February 2019 the article 
was accepted by the Migration Conference 2019, held in Bari, Italy and presented in June 
2019. The third article, “Climatic Events, Conflict and Migration: A Novel Nexus-Theory,” is 
presented in chapter 3, including its supporting materials and references. In March 2019 it 
was submitted to the journal Research in Globalization and it is currently in resubmit status. 
In section seven of this thesis, a conclusion of the research project is presented. The 
conclusion of the thesis is followed by a detailed appendix that includes methodological 
considerations, limitations and validity; important implications for academia, policy makers 
and civil society; and supporting materials and data of this research project. The reference list 
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Abstract 
Climatic events impose significant economic and social burdens on modern populations and 
are increasingly pressuring policy makers to acknowledge climate as a security issue. This 
research contributes to efforts to understand how climatic events – such as temperature, 
droughts, and storms – impact societies and shape social outcomes. To this end, related 
scientific literature was scrutinized to identify the neglect of environmental factors in 
mainstream migration research, a lack of conceptualization on the links between climatic 
events and migration and, separately, climatic events and conflict, and a lacuna on how 
people’s perception of climate’s impact relates to migration decisions. This research fills 
these gaps by empirically exploring the individual experiences, perceptions and decisions of 
100 asylum seekers from 17 countries hosted in German facilities. Existing literature and 
interviews were used to develop an analytical framework that is applicable across countries 
and allows for a theoretical conceptualization of how the environment interacts with 
societies and influences migration and conflict. The results depict a mixed picture of the 
links between climate and migration, and climate and conflict, highlighting that the impacts 
of climate depend on the type of climatic event and the complex societal context and 
vulnerability, including adaptation strategies of each household or society. The climate-
human analytical framework and findings help to inform academia and policy makers on 






Climatic events are a major concern of contemporary geopolitics, and their impacts on 
societies are garnering greater attention from both policy makers and researchers. The 
unprecedented pace of change in earth’s climate imposes significant economic and social 
burdens on modern populations, and has spurred policy makers and media sources to 
increasingly recognize and proclaim climate as a security issue (Burrows & Kinney, 2016; 
IPCC, 2007, 2014). Today, the threat of climatic events in combination with migration or 
conflict is a hot topic among policy makers (Burrows & Kinney, 2016), mainly due to the 
widespread fear surrounding the unprecedented flow of migrants in recent history, as seen in 
European countries and beyond. 
The Paris Agreement on climate change, adopted in December 2015, calls for action on both 
the causes and consequences of climate’s impact. While the causes are to be addressed 
through a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (Fankhauser, 2016), its 
consequences require actions based on a robust scientific understanding of the interaction 
between the environment and society. The interchangeable concepts of “climate change” and 
“global warming” are familiar to almost everyone, and the diverse impacts of climatic events 
on societies and possibly-linked phenomena such as migration and conflict are vastly 
discussed in scientific literature (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016; Piguet et al., 2011). These are 
long-standing, recurring and sweeping occurrences, though, and while climatic events have 
evident ecological effects (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017), the effects and risks of the 
climate’s impacts on societies are less tangible, visible and predictable (Geddes & Scholten, 
2016). 
This research takes as its starting point the insights gleaned from scientific literature aimed at 
understanding how climatic events – such as temperature, droughts, and storms – impact 
societies and shape social outcomes (Black et al., 2011; Carleton & Hsiang, 2016; Hunter et 
al., 2015). Existing quantitative measures reveal that climate is not the only factor influencing 
social and economic outcomes, though it is a major factor, impacting societies on numerous 
dimensions and at many scales (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). Recent research is moving beyond 
using purely meteorological indices by integrating the notion of vulnerability to examine the 
impacts of climatic events. The concept of vulnerability is integral to the hazard field and is 
used to map the complex interrelation between and among climatic events and societal 
context (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). Moreover, the analysis of adaptation strategies, which is 
an inherent part of vulnerability assessments, is considered one of the greatest empirical 
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challenges in contemporary climate change literature (Auffhammer & Schlenker, 2014). 
Exploring existing adaptation gaps is crucial, as the absence of adaptation strategies may 
reinforce existing global inequalities, destabilize societal equilibrium and potentially lead to 
undesired outcomes such as state failure, conflict and migration (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
This research recognizes that there is usually more than one driver that leads a person to 
migrate, and that it is rarely possible to identify specific so-called “environmental migrants” 
or “climate refugees” (Black et al., 2011). Based on the United Nations’ definition of 
“international migrant”, this paper uses the term “migrant” broadly including all people who 
have left their habitual place of residence, irrespective of legal status, causes for the move, 
duration of the stay, and nature of the movement as voluntary or involuntary (United Nations, 
1998). In migration research, authors who emphasize multilevel contextual drivers call for 
greater attention to the complexity of the climate-migration relationship and the numerous 
factors at the micro-, meso-, and macroscales (Black et al., 2011; Hunter et al., 2015; 
Morrissey, 2013). Yet, existing scientific evidence remains contradictory, as authors claim 
that the science of the climate-migration relationship is still characterized by wide-ranging 
methodologies, limited theoretical development and a myriad of geographic foci (Black et al., 
2011; Carleton & Hsiang, 2016; Hunter et al., 2015). Migration studies are a largely-theorized 
social process with diverse approaches and perspectives on factors and consequences of 
human mobility. However, environmental factors still remain neglected within mainstream 
migration research (Hunter et al., 2015) and, overall, the climate-migration relation remains 
an emergent area of research (McLeman, 2014). Hunter et al. (2015) highlight an existing 
empirical gap in the climate-migration literature concerning how people perceive and 
interpret their environment and how it shapes migration decisions. Local power structures and 
the social construction of knowledge – meaning the possession of knowledge and knowledge 
exchange on climatic events – may influence social segments, divided by race, class and 
gender differently (Hunter et al., 2015). Hence, varying levels of knowledge on the climate’s 
impact may influence households or society-wide responses.  
Also, conflict of any kind rarely, if ever, is attributed to a single cause (Gleick, 2014), and 
existing research results on the climate-conflict link remain ambiguous (Adger et al., 2014; 
Scheffran et al., 2012; Zografos et al., 2014). The research to date is not aligned on a specific 
and direct link between climate and conflict (Buhaug et al., 2014). Existing studies face the 
major challenge of finding adequate climate data, fail to distinguish between various types of 
conflict and rarely account for the complexities that explain the relationship between climatic 
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events, natural resources, human security and societal stability (Buhaug et al., 2014; Scheffran 
et al., 2012).  
Morrissey claims that a comprehensive climate-migration theory remains elusive and there 
has been limited focus on theorizing explicitly on this nexus, and even fewer with an 
empirical research approach. In 2011, Black et al. developed an important conceptual model 
by building on Scoones’ research, published in 1998, to show how human mobility embedded 
in the broader contextual determinants operate at a variety of scales. Scheffran (2012) 
highlights the importance of theorizing on the multiple pathways and feedbacks between 
climate, natural resources, human security and societal stability and provides a framework 
linking these variables. However, despite the prominence of the subject and the urgency for 
better conceptual models of the dynamics at play, a comprehensive climate-human analytical 
framework seems to be lacking in scientific literature. 
In line with the emerging research agenda aimed at understanding how climatic events shape 
social outcomes today, this research explores the interaction of adverse climate conditions 
with societies, based on an empirical research approach including economic, social and 
political structures at multiple spatial and temporal scales. It aims to provide an analytical 
framework that is applicable across regions and allows for a more systematic 
conceptualization of how the climate interacts with societies and shapes outcomes such as 
migration and conflict. This research pursues this goal by drawing from existing scientific 
literature and the experiences and perceptions of asylum seekers, which were collected during 
individual semi-structured interviews with 100 migrants from 17 countries that were 
conducted in eight different migrant housing centers and local networks located across three 
German federal states. The selective sampling method was used to learn from a diverse 
sample of adult migrants. This paper sought to answer the following questions: how did 
asylum seekers perceive climatic events – if so – in their place of origin and how did it affect 
their daily lives and their decision to migrate; what is the societal context within which 
changing climate conditions are felt; and how do climatic events affect outcomes such as 
migration and conflict. 
 
1.2 Theory - Developing the climate-human analytical framework 
Based on major theories of an extensive interdisciplinary research field, the climate-human 
analytical framework will be presented in order to analyze how climatic events are linked to 
different aspects of societies and, ultimately, to explore how climatic phenomena translate 
  
29 
into social outcomes such as migration and conflict. The climate-human analytical 
framework, presented in Figure 2.1, was based initially on existing scientific literature in the 
planning phase of this research project, and was later significantly adapted to account for the 
empirical research results presented in this article. 
The outermost circle of the climate-human analytical framework represents the various 
climatic events and their impacts on the environment. Then, the concepts of vulnerability and 
adaptation are introduced. The effects of climatic events, vulnerability and adaptation 
strategies are moreover analyzed within five dimensions – political/institutional, economic, 
environmental, demographic, and social – that represent the pillars of society, as captured in 
the second circle. It is important to note that the five dimensions rarely act in isolation, as they 
are strongly interlinked and intertwined, as depicted by the arrows in Figure 2.1. The center of 
the framework is comprised of possible outcomes of the climate-human interplay, including 






Figure 1.1 Climate-human analytical framework 
Climatic events 
The social impact of climate has been a subject of academic study for many centuries. In 
1748, Montesquieu argued that climate can influence the nature of men and societies and 
determine its structure and prosperity (Montesquieu, 1746). The questions of whether and 
how climate affects people’s lives, as well as how much and why it matters continue to be 
studied (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). Over the last decade, researchers have made advances in 
answering these questions with a mostly quantitative approach, mixing data and methods 
from the climate, social, and statistical sciences and leveraging the power of machine learning 
(Ibid.). 
Climatic events, including slow-onset climate change such as droughts and land degradation 
and suddenly occurring extreme weather and climate-related events such as floods and storms 
affect natural and human systems in numerous ways (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017). Early 









important contextual factors that impact societies and interact with the environment. 
However, researchers today are increasingly pondering over how climatic events and other 
contextual factors influence the rate of migration (Hunter et al., 2015) and spur conflict 
(Scheffran et al., 2012). 
 
Vulnerability - and adaptation strategies - to climatic events 
Existing literature suggests that the impact of climatic events on human beings and societies 
is shaped by the specific vulnerability of each individual, household and society (Brzoska & 
Fröhlich, 2015; Scheffran et al., 2012). Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts 
(IPCC, 2014) and the field of vulnerability studies is fragmented between disciplinary and 
professional understandings (Busby et al., 2014). Broadly speaking, vulnerability to climate 
impacts may include exposure and sensitivity to climatic events, and adaptive capacity 
(Scheffran et al., 2012; IPCC, 2007). Therefore, vulnerability is measured by analyzing an 
entity’s adaptive capacity to and the impact of climatic events. 
The impacts of climatic events vary across different segments of society (Berlemann & 
Steinhardt, 2017), with the poorest and socially marginalized generally being the most 
vulnerable (Otto et al., 2017). Vulnerability is heavily shaped by social, demographic, and 
institutional factors including gender, age, culture, education, ethnicity, and financial assets 
(Otto et al., 2017). For instance, households and firms are expected to adapt to climate 
impacts by adjusting their behavior; though, their vulnerability also depends on public policy 
at the national level to overcome market failures, correct policy distortions and incentivize 
private adaptation. It also depends on national choices about economic diversification, spatial 
planning, urban design and infrastructure; and due to the global scope of climatic events, 
system-wide aspects of adaptation also affect the vulnerability of households and societies 
(Fankhauser, 2016). Existing adaptation failures are a result of their high cost (Berlemann & 
Steinhardt, 2017), poor access to credit to finance them, incorrect or limited information about 
their benefits, weak government institutions and perverse political incentives, and limited 
access to technology (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
 
The five dimensions of society: political/institutional, economic, environmental, 
demographic, and social dimension 
The impacts of climatic events are more pronounced in less developed countries that have 
weak institutional capacity (Millock, 2015) and where negative economic shocks trigger 
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regime changes (Kim, 2014). Climate challenges require effective governance structures and 
planning for adaptation to reduce society’s overall vulnerability to climatic events. These 
broadly include three areas of government action, namely providing a policy framework that 
incentivizes private adaptation, constructing climate-resilient public goods such as 
infrastructure, and assisting vulnerable groups, that cannot adapt sufficiently themselves 
(Fankhauser, 2016). 
Research on the impact of climate on economic outcomes began in the agricultural sector, 
where the effects of climatic events are more pronounced (Auffhammer & Schlenker, 2014). 
Solar radiation, temperature, and precipitation are the main drivers of crop growth. For 
instance, droughts and floods impact agriculture as they decrease crop yields or destroy them 
with the occurrence of weed, insect pests and plant diseases (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017). 
To date, the richest empirical evidence is known of private adaptation efforts in the 
agricultural sector (Fankhauser, 2016), which include adjusting cultivars, shifting in planting 
dates, and even moving entire areas where crops are grown (Auffhammer & Schlenker, 2014). 
Moreover, traditional technologies - such as rainwater harvesting in the Semi-Arid region of 
Brazil - are retrieved and adapted to contemporary water scarcity by rural farmers (Lindoso et 
al., 2018). In the short-term, farmers may adjust by adapting the size of their farm or moving 
temporarily into non-farm activities or in more developed markets, and farmers may have 
access to weather insurance (Fankhauser, 2016). 
Extreme temperatures may have direct economic consequences, including a decrease in gross 
domestic product and overall social welfare in both the short- and long-run, and include 
damage to human health, reductions in labor productivity and supply, and possible reduction 
in the rate of human capital accumulation (Heal & Park, 2016). Hence, trade is also affected, 
as high temperatures that reduce productivity diminish the quantity of goods exported from a 
country, and especially extreme weather and climate-related events tend to reduce national 
incomes and decrease the capacity to import (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). The macro-economy 
is impacted by climatic events across regions and different contexts; each 1°C-increase in 
temperature lowers economic production by roughly 1 to 1.7 percent (Ibid.). Though, the 
overall social welfare impact always depends on existing or emerging possibilities of 
adaptation, such as outdoor labor supply shifts to cooler hours of the day during heat waves 
(Heal & Park, 2016). Moreover, the direct relationship between climate and energy merits 
mentioning as increasing temperatures provoke demand surges. For example, households 
adjust their energy consumption and demand for associated products like air conditioning in 
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response to climate impacts (Fankhauser, 2016). Energy is the largest contributor to 
anthropogenic climate change, though energy systems moreover represent an adaptation 
strategy, enabling cooling, heating, irrigation, trade, and so forth (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
Climatic events affect societies in every dimension, including the environmental dimension 
with its ecosystem goods and services. The human-environment relation affects every 
important social and cultural aspect ranging from human settlement to human’s attachment to 
a specific place (Black et al., 2011). Climatic events reduce renewable surface water and 
groundwater resources significantly in most dry and tropical regions, which generally 
intensifies competition over water in the entire climate-human interaction (IPCC, 2014). 
Droughts may significantly decrease water resources in urban areas, causing electricity 
shortages in areas where hydropower is a source and increasing the risk of water-related 
diseases due to widespread use of contaminated water (Ibid.). Overall, the vulnerability of 
households and societies increases where the dependence on renewable natural resources for 
survival is direct and high (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). 
The population structure and growth are also impacted by climatic events because climatic 
events may more acutely affect marginalized subgroups such as women or low-income 
segments. For instance, the demographic structure of a society may alter when 
disproportionate migration of wealthy older individuals and young and low-income 
individuals may be leaving simultaneously a region hit by climatic events (Deryugina, 2012). 
Moreover, rapidly-changing shifts in population trends can increase the strain on renewable 
water availability and increase a society’s vulnerability to climate impacts (Gleick, 2014). 
The climate exerts significant influence over human systems on numerous social scales, 
including migration and conflict. Though, social effects moreover concern mortality and 
health as climatic events increase health inequalities and disproportionately aggravate the 
health of people living in poverty and those with preexisting health limitations (Costello et al., 
2009; Otto et al., 2017). Climatic events have lasting impacts on fetuses and infants as they 
alter early development, long-run health and well-being, which could be due to rainfall-
related reduction in agricultural income and reduced nutrition (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
Moreover, hot and cold environmental temperatures increase death rates significantly (Ibid.). 
Research in sub-Saharan Africa brought to light deteriorating economic conditions that 
resulted from rainfall-related income shocks. Most notably, increasing rates of the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection were observed in rural areas because women engage 
in “transactional” intercourse to compensate for income shortfalls during periods of drought. 
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Specifically, droughts result in a seven to ten percent loss in annual income, leading to an 
11% increase in HIV infection risk for both men and women (Burke et al., 2014). 
 
Possible outcomes - migration and conflict - of the climate-human interplay 
Human mobility is a global and ancient phenomenon with an ever-changing complexity 
(Cummings, 2015). Migration can be understood as an epiphenomenon, occurring as a result 
of underlying factors that are changing constantly and simultaneously (Geddes and Scholten 
2016). These underlying factors broadly include global economic inequalities, conflict, 
demographic change, and environmental factors (Black et al., 2011; Geddes & Scholten, 
2016). 
Migration decisions can include drivers such as climatic events, socio-economic, political, 
environmental and demographic processes of society. And, they may also depend on 
individual and household characteristics such as age, marital status and intervening obstacles 
and facilitators that include political and legal framework and social network in sending and 
receiving locations (Hunter et al., 2015). Environmental factors or climatic events are usually 
merely a contributing factor among multiple motivations that influence an individual’s 
decision to migrate, unless made in the wake of an extreme weather and climate-related event 
(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). 
Migration studies have witnessed tremendous progress in the understanding of the 
environment over the past 20 years (Hunter et al., 2015; Cattaneo & Peri, 2015). In the 1990s, 
researchers began to analyze how environmental factors shape migration decisions, mainly 
motivated by bold, scientifically untested projections of so-called “climate refugees” (Myers, 
2005). While all types of climatic events may impact societies and contribute to human 
mobility, the literature highlights that, due to the slow-onset processes of climate change, 
migration is driven by more diverse factors and is expected to be more extensive than human 
mobility resulting from extreme weather and climate-related events (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 
2015; Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009). Climate-related extreme events present a much smaller 
impact, especially on permanent migration than temperature and precipitation (Bohra-Mishra 
et al., 2014). However, slow-onset events such as droughts, may fuel both long- and short-
term movement in a variety of settings (Hunter et al., 2015). Despite this evidence, the policy 
response to date tends to favor sudden-onset events such as floods, where relief efforts have 
precedence and can be targeted (Mueller et al., 2014). 
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Scientific evidence has emerged on the relationship between climatic events and international 
migration, as changes in precipitation induce international migration from poor to rich 
countries (Coniglio & Pesce, 2015). The rate of international migration increases when 
mounting temperatures hit crop-damaging levels and moisture declines, especially in 
agriculturally-dependent areas (Bohra-Mishra et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2016). Moreover, 
research findings show that international migration could be caused by local amenities, such 
as environmental quality and health conditions, or by an increased rural-urban migration that 
leads to a downward trend in urban wages (Berlemann & Steinhardt 2017; Marchiori et al., 
2012). In fact, in sub-Saharan Africa, emigration to urban areas and international migration 
show responsiveness to weather (Marchiori et al., 2012), but cross-border migration from 
urban Mexico to the United States does not alter due to climate effects (Nawrotzki et al., 
2015). Literature shows even more mixed results concerning the link between extreme 
weather and climate-related events and international migration. Authors suggest that weather-
related disasters cause international migration (Coniglio & Pesce, 2015; Reuveny, 2007), 
however, similar quantitative studies did not find evidence for the effect specifically in 
middle-income and poor countries (Beine & Parsons, 2015; Cattaneo & Peri, 2015). 
Literature presents a somewhat similarly ambiguous picture on internal migration. Robust 
empirical evidence highlights that in general, climatic factors such as precipitation and 
temperature tend to influence internal migration; and most studies find that rainfall deficits 
especially increase permanent internal migration (Henry et al., 2003; Berlemann & Steinhardt, 
2017). The agricultural sector is the main transmission channel in numerous studies, where 
the link between temperature and internal migration was detected (Dallmann & Millock, 
2017; Mueller et al., 2014) and only a few studies fail to establish the connection (Bilsborrow 
& Henry, 2012; Di Falco et al., 2011). There is general consensus amongst researchers today 
that extreme climatic events lead to short-term internal migration (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 
2017). However, in regard to medium- and long-term migration, results remain mixed as 
some research find systematic effects and others do not (Bohra-Mishra et al., 2014; Goldbach, 
2017). 
Based on the presented literature, migration decisions seem to result from two opposing 
influences of climate and society, specifically deteriorating economic conditions and a lack of 
safety may instigate migration, while the same conditions simultaneously may diminish 
household resources and hence may reduce migration (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017; 
Kleemans, 2015). Accordingly, households may use migration as a coping strategy after 
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sudden negative income shocks, such as agricultural crop loss due to a drought and send a 
household member elsewhere to earn additional income; or as an investment strategy to 
increase future expected income and benefit from higher wages elsewhere (Kleemans, 2015). 
These strategies strengthen affected communities through remittances (Scheffran et al., 2012), 
though the latter requires an initial investment, which might not be possible for households 
that face liquidity constraints (Kleemans, 2015). The impact of climate depends on the 
vulnerability of households and societies and based on this idea, Cattaneo claims that a 
decline in agricultural productivity in middle-income countries drives people to move away 
from rural areas and a long-run increase in temperature, which has a negative effect on the 
agricultural income of rural population in very poor countries generates a “poverty trap” and 
decreases the probability of migration and eventually leads to immobility. 
Migration decisions are complex, usually based on multiple drivers and yet, migration is just 
one possible outcome of the climate-human interaction. For instance, a farmer challenged by 
a drought could seek to escape, join an insurgency group and hence enter into a conflict, 
adjust cultivars or move temporary into non-farm activities. Therefore, climatic events may be 
a contributing factor to migration and conflict, as of other, no less important phenomena 
(Carling & Talleraas, 2016). 
Across academic disciplines, researchers analyze to what extent climatic events are 
responsible for interpersonal violence, conflict or non-state conflict and political instability 
(Hsiang et al., 2013). Studies on this phenomenon date back to 10,000 BC and evidence 
shows that the association of climate and conflict has been observed across all types of 
conflict, human history, regions of the world, income groups and the various duration of 
climatic events (Ibid.). However, the physiological effects linking climate to conflict remain 
unknown and while some long-term studies tend to find coincidence, recent research are less 
conclusive on the links between climate and conflict (Scheffran et al., 2012). 
Existing evidence shows a positive correlation between rising temperatures, decreasing 
precipitation, and aggressive or violent behavior (Hsiang et al., 2013). The interpersonal 
violence ranges widely from horn-honking while driving (Kenrick, 1986), antisocial behavior 
and domestic violence within households (Card, 2011) to violent crimes such as assault and 
rape (Hsiang et al., 2013). Carleton claims that the relationship between higher temperatures 
and increasing collective violence in diverse settings is linear, with violence increasing 
roughly 11% per standard deviation in temperature. There exist some causal associations that 
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lead to the claim that, in some contexts, changes in climate also increase the likelihood of 
escalating tension between groups (Hsiang et al., 2013). 
Today, a major policy preoccupation is that climatic events may increase security risks 
through alterations in the hydrological cycle and the quantity, quality and variability of water 
resources (Zografos et al., 2014). Resource scarcity is considered an important link to the 
relationship between climate and conflict. In fact, climatic events contribute to the likelihood 
of conflict if it coincides with other conflict drivers such as ethnic polarization, weak political 
structure and low levels of economic development (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Homer-Dixon, 
1994). In different low-income settings, political instability was associated with low water 
availability or extreme temperatures (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012). Moreover, where climatic 
events increase actual or perceived inequality in a society, conflicts may arise from attempts 
to redistribute assets (Mehlum et al., 2006). Similarly, increases in the price of food due to a 
drought can be linked to conflict, as riots may erupt as a result of the government’s perceived 
inability to maintain stable prices stable and food affordable (Zhang et al., 2011). Moreover, 
especially in low-income agricultural settings, rainfall extremes and El Niño adversely affect 
agricultural income, which increase interpersonal violence, property crime and intergroup 
conflict (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
 
1.3 Methods 
A qualitative phenomenological research approach with individual semi-structured interviews 
and participant observations was applied to capture detailed narratives of the lived 




Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted in German migrant housings with 105 
migrants from 17 countries, and with one stateless person. However, due to a number of 
challenges, including missing information of interviewees, one inexperienced interpreter, and 
unsigned consent forms, a total of 100 interviews were validated and analyzed. The data 
collection process was undertaken between the end of December 2016 and mid-April 2017. 
Each interview lasted between 30 and 75 minutes, and was conducted in the language of the 
respondent’s choice. The interviews in Arabic, Kurdish Kurmanji and Sorani, Somali, 
Persian, Tigrinya, Dari Persian, Turkish, and Urdu were conducted with the assistance of 
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experienced interpreters while those in German, English, and French were conducted directly 
with the principal researcher. To ensure the safety and comfort of the interviewees, the 
interviews were held either in the privacy of the interviewee’s quarters or in an undisturbed 
location, as agreed upon by both parties. All interviewees were informed orally and in writing 
about the purpose, specifying the advantages and disadvantages, and terms of confidentiality 
of the research project, in addition to the voluntary nature of their participation. Both the 
interviewee and interpreter were asked to sign a consent form prior to starting each interview. 
The approval to conduct interviews in the different migrant housings was sought from the 
directors of the facilities and, in specific cases, from the federal government’s regional board.  
The individual semi-structured interviews consisted of open-ended questions that addressed 
general information about the interviewee’s place of origin and the motivations for leaving it. 
Moreover, the impact of possible adverse weather and climate conditions on the interviewee’s 
daily lives were questioned, followed by an inquiry on resource use, food availability, 
perceived tensions or conflict and inflow or outflow of migrants. The interviews were 
documented following handwritten protocols, and were later transcribed into a digital 
datasheet. To make sense of the collected data, a thematic analysis was conducted using the 
NVivo software while field notes from participant observation and non-verbal communication 
during the interviews were triangulated to support the reflections and analysis. 
 
Study participants 
To capture a diverse and comprehensive sample of interviewees, the interviews were 
conducted in four initial reception facilities and four follow-up accommodations located 
throughout the federal states of Hesse, Berlin, and Brandenburg. Purposive sampling was 
applied to obtain a large and diverse research sample, for which the criteria were that 
interviewees be migrants in Germany who were at least 18 years of age. The popularity of the 
sports classes offered by the researcher and the ‘snowball’ method helped to recruit a larger 
number of migrants who volunteered to participate in the study and created the opportunity to 
observe daily interactions. The recruitment of interviewees was stopped once a sense of 
saturation of information was attained. The study population resulted in a highly-cultural 
heterogeneous group as the demographic profile of interviewees in table 0.1 of this thesis 
shows (Table 0.1). 
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Methodological considerations and limitations 
The recruitment process proved to be a major challenge because many migrants were reticent 
or anxious to participate, most likely because they did not want to relive past trauma. The 
consent form presented an additional hurdle, as some migrants were apprehensive about 
signing it while others were visibly ashamed of being illiterate. Identifying qualified 
interpreters was also demanding, especially because the interviews were set to be conducted 
in nine languages. The gender and cultural background of the interpreters put forth an added 
challenge, as manifested by the reluctance or refusal of male interviewees to participate with 
female interpreters. 
While great effort was put into finding qualified interpreter for each interview, one cannot 
conclusively state that all potential misunderstandings and misinterpretations were avoided. 
The identity of the interviewer – a white European woman and outsider of the migrant 
housing communities – represented a further limitation, as language, gender, and cultural 
barriers were likely to have influenced the content and amount of data shared. However, an 
attempt to balance these limitations was made through careful attention to the interview 
context and extensive dialogue with the interviewees. Moreover, in response to the feedback 
provided by the first round of interviewees who explicitly refused to be recorded, a recording 
device was not used to document the interviews. This research recognizes its one-sided focus, 
as it solely includes migrants that already moved to Germany. Why some people stay in one 
place whereas others choose to leave is a crucial question to understanding the decision to 
migrate and should be contemplated in future studies. 
Given the aforementioned limitations, as well as the relatively small research sample size of 
100 interviewees, this research does not claim to be representative of the overall migrant 
population in Germany. 
 
1.4 Results 
The findings of this empirical research illustrate people’s perception of climatic events, 
differences in vulnerability to climatic events across countries and the impact of local 
government and public policies on the climate-human interaction and outcomes. Reported 




Perception of climatic events 
Findings of this research reveal that climatic events were either perceived or even affected the 
living conditions of more than half of interviewees (56%) in their place of origin (Figure 1.2). 
Interviewees who ‘perceived’ changes in climate or weather-related conditions mainly 
reported about increases in temperature, droughts and floods that impacted their relatives or 
acquaintances in their place of origin. However, interviewees who had to adapt their 
professional or personal daily lives due to climate impacts were considered to be directly 
‘affected’. Many interviewees were well-aware of the changing climate in their region and 
provided details as for instance an Ethiopian shop owner from Kebri Dahar explained: 
"because of the droughts, livestock suffered and died and therefore there was less milk 
available and prices of milk, vegetables and fruits increased.” 
Nearly half (44%) of interviewees reported no changes in climate or weather conditions in 
their place of origin. While some African interviewees did not perceive any changes, nearly 
all reported about water shortages and they considered a recurring or even constant lack of 
water to be normal. If at all existent, climatic events represented for many interviewees 
merely a subtle unperceived factor and other societal dimensions overshadowed a possible 
perception of climate’s impact, as the statement of an Iraqi demonstrates: “in my town there 
are only murderers and no changes in weather.” 
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Vulnerability to climatic events 
Drawing from a large array of narratives from interviewees, results show that while climatic 
events are felt across regions and countries (Figure 1.3), households and societies differ with 
respect to their vulnerability to it and therefore climate affected their well-being and 
productivity differently. Especially farmers, pastoralists and interviewees from rural poor 
societies were most impacted by climatic events. For instance, ten out of 34 Syrian 
interviewees, who worked in the agriculture sector were affected by climatic events in their 
everyday lives. However, it is important to note that ten other Syrian interviewees who did 
not perceive climatic events lived in urban centers (Figure 1.4). An interviewee from the 
surroundings of Aleppo explained that her family only survived the droughts, because they 
had groundwater and a river that ran through their property, which had little water, but still 
enough to feed their cattle. As she explained, the existence of the river made her entire village 
less vulnerable to climate’s impact, compared to a nearby village that was heavily affected by 
droughts.  
The drastic impact of droughts and rainfall-related floods was further depicted by 
interviewees from rural and poor regions in Africa. A young interviewee from Mandera 
explained that the entire population in his region is impacted by recurring droughts and 
therefore today, there is nearly no agricultural activity anymore, many pastoralists gave up 
their profession as their cattle died or was stolen. He particularly recalled the drought in 2007, 
because his father lost all his cattle and they survived only with the help of the church. He 
said that the majority of the population is poor and relies on aid agencies, the church or they 
even started hunting again. Interviewees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya explained 
that the effects of climate are particularly strong on farmers and pastoralists as these segments 
of societies have less access to alternative job opportunities. 
A Syrian interviewee from Tartus recalled how farmers adjusted to the altering climate. His 
region was known for exporting apples, but today they cultivate kaki, kiwi and oranges, 
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Figure 1.4 Impact of climatic events on interviewees from Syria 
Local government and public policies 
While all Iranian interviewees perceived climatic events, none was affected or knew someone 
who was. They explained that farmers only survived the significant decrease in precipitation 
and droughts between the year 2002 and 2003, due to the abundance of groundwater, because 
some farmers had weather insurance and the Iranian government provided financial support to 
those farmers who lost their crops. Syrian interviewees also recalled the regional 
government’s financial support for some farmers that lost their crops during droughts. 
However, many who suffered from climate’s impacts had to rely on support from family 
members or seek other adaptation strategies. Kenyan and Pakistani interviewees reported 
about annually-recurring floods and consequent landslides in their respective cities, which 
have devastating consequences for the effected population, though all complained about a 
lack of government support.  
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Moreover, worse than an absent government are harmful policies or government actions. 
Syrian and Iranian interviewees reported that their local governments ordered the 
deforestation of large regions of the country. In the case of Syria, the deforestation had the 
goal to facilitate fighting during the conflict. Moreover, interviewees reported about the 
obstruction of discourse and information exchange on climatic events. A Syrian interviewee 
from Damascus explained, that the Assad regime did not allow anyone to talk about the 
droughts in Syria and an Iranian from Malayer mentioned the following: “once the Mullah 
said that the climate gets drier, because the women do not wear properly their headscarves.” 
 
Climatic events, human mobility and conflict 
All African interviewees complained about decreasing quality and quantity of well water, and 
completely dry wells during droughts and in the summers. Kenyans reported that since 2010 
the dry season extended to four months, in contrast to three months. An interviewee from a 
village near Dekemhare recalled, that between 2008 until 2015 it nearly never rained. Syrian 
interviewees who worked in the agricultural sector mentioned significant water scarcity and 
continuous reduction in groundwater since 1997. Overall, water scarcity was reported by the 
majority of interviewees and adaptive strategies such as investing in a generator for 
electricity, which was also used to pump up water from the well, buy expensive water in 
bottles or use the river water, were mentioned. 
A Kenyan interviewee described the society in Mandera as ‘trapped’, because the continuous 
droughts have impoverished the region significantly and only a few rich people have the 
resources to move to neighboring villages during the driest months of the year. However, he 
explained that moving is dangerous because migrants are chased by the receiving 
communities that are from different ethnicities. He highlighted cattle raids that increased 
during periods of drought and mentioned the desperate situation, when he recalled a friend, 
who committed suicide, because all his cows died, due to the drought. 
International migration was mainly reported by Syrian interviewees. Especially those working 
in the agricultural business in the northeastern Al-Hasakah governorate were severely 
impacted by the three years of consecutive droughts between 1999 until 2000. They explained 
that during this period, those who had the financial means moved to Europe or the United 
States, or they sent their children abroad; those with less financial means moved to Syrian 
urban centers. An interviewee from Qamishli recalled, that due to their family’s serious 
financial challenges during the droughts, her husband wanted to move as well, however, as he 
  
45 
was the oldest son of his family, his mother did not allow him to leave. While different Syrian 
interviewees narrated about the dire straits during the droughts, they also mentioned a 
significant increase in violence. 
Interviewees from Kenya, Pakistan and Syria reported about temporary internal migration, 
due to recurring severe rainfall-related floods. An interviewee from Kawangware reported 
about multiple floods that she witnessed throughout her life, “it always started with heavy 
rains that carry away houses. In 2009 my parents sent us children to our grandmother and in 
2015 we moved for six months to Kabete. Once the flood is over, we always move back to the 
remaining of our house […] lots of people die during the floods.” 
A farmer’s wife from Al-Malikiyah, in northeast Syria explained, that her family suffered the 
most in the three years of consecutive droughts between 2006 and 2008. She disclosed, “as 
many other farmers in our region, we were not able to resist the drought in 2008 as our 
livestock died and we lost our entire crops. […] Our serious financial challenges forced me to 
sell our house and land for a symbolic price and we moved to Damascus.” Multiple 
interviewees from different regions in Syria reported about the dire straits during the droughts 
that started in 2006 and remembered family members, friends and acquaintances that moved 
to urban areas to find a job. 
 
1.5 Discussion 
Narratives of this research point to the fact that climatic events are perceived in diverse 
manifestations across regions. Regardless of the background, 56 interviewees were able to 
explain how changing climate conditions were perceived or affected their daily lives in their 
place of origin. Yet, nearly half (44%) of interviewees did not perceive climatic events, 
however, reported resource shortages. This is not surprising, as in part, shifts in climate may 
take decades to be clearly understood and assimilated, and they are embedded in cultural and 
economic practices and oftentimes perceptions and actions only occur when a crisis is acute 
(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). Moreover, narratives highlight that climatic events often only 
represent a subtle factor impacting societies, as other societal challenges, such as the lack of 
job opportunities, overshadow the climate’s impact. It remains debatable to what extent 
inequalities in local power structures and access to knowledge on climatic events, influenced 
interviewee’s perception, though presented narratives highlight, that irrespective of the 
individual’s background, climatic events may impact peoples’ decisions and behavior. 
Analyzing the perception of climatic events fills an existing research gap (Hunter et al., 2015) 
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and fosters understanding of the climate-human interaction, highlighting climate’s significant 
influence on the political and social dimensions of society. 
In line with existing scientific literature, the narratives of interviewees depict a mixed picture 
on the link between climate and human mobility, highlighting that every decision to migrate 
is unique (Black et al., 2011; Morrissey, 2013). The experiences and perceptions of asylum 
seekers show that climate may lead to a ‘poverty trap’, cause migration as an investment 
strategy, a coping strategy or climate even constitutes a risk to survival, forcing people to 
migrate as a choice of last resort. Moreover, interviewees reported increased violence during 
droughts, though, it was mentioned in combination with other societal challenges such as 
ethnic polarization, weak political structure and low levels of economic development. This is 
in line with existing literature that climatic events are considered to contribute to conflict, if 
coinciding with other conflict drivers (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Homer-Dixon, 1994). 
Overall, it is very difficult to isolate the effect of climate phenomena on migration and 
conflict, as it depends on the type of climatic events, its interaction with the dimensions of 
society and the vulnerability of the impacted household or society. 
The empirical results of this research strengthen existing literature on the fact that the specific 
type of climate impact needs to be evaluated and addressed, as both extreme weather and 
climate-related events and slow-onset processes of climate change and variability exert 
remarkable influence over societies (Buhaug et al., 2014; Scheffran et al., 2012;). Moreover, 
it further validates that there is no mechanic link in the climate-human interaction that causes 
the same social response across regions and while climate is not the only factor, it is certainly 
an important one, influencing societies in numerous dimensions and at many scales (Carleton 
& Hsiang, 2016). Results show that even among neighboring villages with similar 
characteristics, climate’s impact on households, the nature of societies and the performance of 
economies alters depending on the vulnerability specific to each entity. Climatic events show 
considerable local variations, with varied impacts on different segments of society, as in this 
research, especially farmers, pastoralists and interviewees from rural poor societies were 
significantly impacted. Moreover, findings confirm existing research that adaptation strategies 
across sectors and regions show great dissimilarities, though their analysis is essential, 
because they alter the overall effect of climatic events (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
It is important to keep in mind that the vulnerability and adaptation strategies are important 
elements of the climate-human interaction and that, as indicated by the Paris Agreement, the 
consequences of climatic events should be mitigated by reducing vulnerability and improving 
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adaptive capacities. Vulnerability to the effects of climatic events commonly increases where 
the dependence on natural resources for survival is direct and high; this was evident as 
farmers and pastoralists were particularly vulnerable, since they depend on rainfall, existing 
groundwater and functioning wells for their livestock and harvests. Moreover, narratives 
support the case that in less developed countries the infrastructure, social safety nets and 
economic resources needed to support vulnerable groups hit by climate impacts are, in many 
instances, insufficient (Otto et al., 2017). The different distribution of climatic impacts across 
regions and segments of society lead to different distributions of outcomes, which can be 
considered an important source of inequality.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to efforts at understanding the interplay between climatic events and 
society. To this end, it has examined existing related scientific literature and explored the 
individual experiences, perceptions and decisions of 100 asylum seekers from 17 countries 
hosted in German facilities. From this, a conceptual framework has been generated, which 
depicts the complex interaction of the climate-human interplay. To the last point, this study 
sought to explore how climatic events are perceived and embedded within societies across 
countries and regions and how climate phenomena interact with migration and conflict. 
While the semi-structured interviews with asylum seekers thought to be valuable as a 
contribution to existing related literature, the paper’s principal value lies in its attempt at 
elaborating a climate-human analytical framework applicable on the presented context. This 
framework is thought useful for describing and analyzing how climate impacts households 
and societies. It depicts theories and mechanisms at the macro level to think through how 
climatic phenomena might translate into social outcomes such as migration and conflict. The 
climate-human analytical framework is useful for academia, as it accounts from numerous 
findings in literature and explains them in a consolidated system, seeking to contribute to a 
major research gap by focusing on exploring and theorizing on the complex mechanism at 
play. Moreover, considering the wide-ranging impacts of climate, outlined in this research 
and the midst of contemporary climate change, environmental considerations should play a 
more central role in mainstream migration studies. The conceptual framework could also be a 
helpful tool for policy makers, development workers, NGOs and security analysts who are 
concerned with the societal impacts of climatic events. Results of this study highlight the 
importance of the role of the local government and its public policies in implementing 
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successful adaptation strategies as the comparison of narratives of Iranian interviewees and 
those of primary Syrians demonstrate.  
Researchers and policy makers have an important role in addressing the entire spectrum of 
climatic events and responding to existing adaptation gaps with mechanisms to cope with the 
community strain and strategies for capacity building, technical assistance and support. 
Reported local government’s lack of support during climatic events or even obstruction of 
knowledge on climate change points to the urgent need, that policy makers take responsibility 
to protecting the most vulnerable populations by providing emergency services and social 
safety nets in aiding post-disaster recovery and long-term effective response-plans for 
recurring climatic phenomena. If governments do not take responsibility, human security 
including livelihoods, health and standard of living could get jeopardized and lead to 
sociopolitical instability, political unrest, insurgencies and state failure (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 
2015). 
Until present, the interplay of climatic events and societies seems to remain unpredictable to 
some extent, as climate’s impact depends on the type of climatic events, the multiple 
dimensions of society and vulnerability to climate change, including adaptation strategies. 
Moreover, the significant economic and social burdens caused by climate’s impact on modern 
populations are expected to increase in the future and adaptation to climate change is a long-
term, iterative process that will extend over many decades (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
Therefore, scientific research and policy intervention is required now, if climate’s impacts are 
to be dealt with in a way which does not lead to increased suffering, but facilitates reductions 
in inequality and improvements in well-being. 
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Abstract 
The current “migrant crisis” has become a key global challenge, giving rise to conflicting 
public perception about migration, pressuring policy makers to seek solutions, and giving 
urgency to migration research in academia. The purpose of this study is to explore the 
drivers of international migration by drawing from individual experiences and decisions of 
asylum seekers to leave their place of origin; and the motivations, if any, for choosing their 
destination country. This research pursues this line of analysis with an empirical approach 
in the German context by conducting 100 semi-structured interviews in eight migrant 
housing centers. The findings point to a complex and dynamic pattern of drivers of 
international migration that strengthens existing claims whereby armed conflict and 
concerns of safety take precedence over economic woes. They also bring to light the 
multiplicity and details of these drivers, and highlight current trends such as widespread 
religious and ethnic discrimination, which was one main driver for 50 per cent of 
interviewees. The intricacies of the subject also stem from the interrelation of drivers as, 
for instance, religious discrimination is tied with political and social oppression in non-
secular states like Iran. Moreover, the research demonstrates that, the perceived benefits of 
choosing Germany as a destination country have little or no bearing on the initial decision 
to move across borders. The presented root causes and recommended policy responses 
provide evidence-based considerations for civil society, policy makers, and academia, with 




In 2016, Germany reached its record high of asylum applications since the establishment of 
the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in 1953 (BAMF, 2016). As the top European 
destination for migrants, Germany has witnessed a surge in incoming asylum seekers since 
2009, reaching 745,545 asylum applications – or 57 per cent of the total applications – in the 
European Union (EU) by the end of 2016 (BAMF, 2016). Against this backdrop, policy 
makers, civil society, and academics across disciplines have engaged in a polarizing debate 
about the so-called “migrant crisis”. 
The media has played a significant role in exacerbating the negative portrayal of migrants 
during the recent “migrant crisis”. However, it is important to keep in mind, that since the 
1970s, hyperbolic images of migrants jumping over fences and floods of people crossing the 
Mediterranean in crammed ships while dead bodies wash ashore have served to reinforce 
conflicting public perception towards migrants (Pastore et al., 2006). Today, on the one hand, 
positive attitudes towards immigration seem to be increasingly emerging in western European 
countries such as Germany, Italy, and Belgium (Talò, 2017). On the other hand, the narrative 
that migrants take advantage of generous welfare benefits rather than flee violence or 
persecution is crafted to shape public opinion (Robinson & Segrott, 2002). In reality, the 
public perception of migration often seems to diverge from the truth; for instance, the Italian 
public perceives that 30 per cent of its population are foreign born, while in fact this figure is 
closer to 7 per cent (Achilli et al., 2016). This may be rooted in speculative media coverage 
and poorly-backed arguments that paint an apocalyptic image of an ‘exodus’ of ‘desperate’ 
migrants in search of the European ‘El Dorado’ (De Haas, 2008). The image of the “migrant 
crisis” seems to be especially crystalized and sensationalized when the media conflates 
terrorism with migration, as it did in the Paris terrorist attacks on November 13, 2015 
(Cummings et al., 2015).  
Migration is a global and ancient phenomenon with an ever-changing complexity (Cummings 
et al., 2015), and migration flows have again reached Europe at break-neck speed. The initial 
EU’s response to the increase in irregular migration was focused on maintaining security 
through increased border control (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). In 2015, Hungary was one of 
several countries to construct a fence on its borders to impede the entry of refugees; Germany 
reinstalled temporary border checks while continuing to welcome asylum seekers. Among the 
28 European States, Germany distinguished itself as receiving the highest number of asylum 
requests in the EU between 2012 and 2016 (BAMF, 2016). Germany is the country with the 
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highest immigration rate in Europe, as in 2016, 22.5 per cent of the German population had a 
migrant background1 and the foreign-born population included 12.1 per cent of the population 
(Statistische Bundesamt, 2018). Since 2014, the topic of immigration has remained one of the 
most salient issues in Germany (Talò, 2017), taking center stage in the 2017 federal election 
during which the anti-immigration party Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) entered the 
German Bundestag by gaining 12.6 per cent of the votes (Bundeswahlleiter, 2017). In fact, 
the recent rise of Eurosceptic and anti-immigration populist parties across Europe reflect 
many European citizens’ disillusion with the EU and their respective national politics 
(Geddes & Scholten, 2016). The notion of managing migration through addressing ‘root 
causes’ regained momentum in 2015 after having been part of European policy since 1980 
(Carling & Talleraas, 2016). On various occasions – and most recently in her first speech after 
winning the 2017 federal elections – German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed the need to 
tackle irregular migration by addressing its root causes (Merkel, 2017; Schweiger, 2017). 
While migration is more central to the debate about Europe’s future than ever before (Geddes 
& Scholten, 2016), the current policies in place fail to recognize the complex nature of 
international migration and do not effectively address the difficulties experienced by migrants 
and governments (Cummings et al., 2015). As a response to the ‘migrant crisis, the EU 
agenda on migration, among others, highlights the crucial need to improve the management of 
migration by addressing the drivers and structural factors that impede people from building 
and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their country of origin and therefore seek a future 
elsewhere (Migali et al., 2018). 
Geddes explains that international migration can be understood as an epiphenomenon, 
occurring as a result of underlying factors that are changing constantly and simultaneously.  
These underlying drivers broadly include global economic inequalities, armed conflict, 
demographic change, and environmental factors (Black et al., 2011; Geddes & Scholten, 
2016). Literature points only to a highly broad consensus that the decision to migrate is a 
complex process and the patterns of migration to Europe are continually evolving (Cummings 
et al., 2015; De Haas, 2011). Academia provides a mounting body of research on migration in 
                                               
 
1 As of the Statistische Bundesamt, persons with a migration background are all foreigners 
born in Germany and all persons born in Germany who have at least one parent who 
immigrated into the country or was born as a foreigner in Germany.  
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general, though inconsistent data on international migration and recent research on the drivers 
and possible solutions to the “migrant crisis” have often led to conflicting results (Cummings 
et al., 2015). Although there exist studies that specifically analyze the migrant’s agency and 
multiple factors influencing the choice of their destination country during earlier migrant 
flows (Robinson & Segrott, 2002; Brekke & Aarset, 2009), it is surprising that there exists a 
limited number of empirical studies in recent literature, such as the one undertaken by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Italy, that explore in-depth the drivers of 
the current wave of migration to Europe. In fact, inconsistency and limited research in 
existing migration literature stem on the one hand from the lack of theoretical work and data 
and on the other hand from the emphasis on analyzing which individuals migrate rather than 
why they migrate (Koubi et all., 2016). Furthermore, the research to date fails to establish the 
relative importance of a destination country’s welfare system, asylum support provision, and 
national policies as factors influencing immigrants’ initial decision to move across borders 
(Cummings et al., 2015; Brekke & Aarset, 2009). 
For decades, European asylum policy was founded on a paradox. Seeking asylum in European 
territory has become ever more difficult or even impossible despite the fact that European 
countries have committed to granting protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention (Carling 
& Talleraas, 2016). Thus, evidence-based knowledge on the actual drivers of ongoing 
international migration to Europe is essential for policy makers to create effective and durable 
policies that address the drivers and root causes of the phenomenon (Cummings et al., 2015), 
rather than maintaining a reactive and emergency-driven policy approach (Achilli et al., 
2016). It is important for civil society to have access to fact-based information to mitigate 
perceived widespread insecurity and the rise of populist sentiments. It is also incumbent upon 
academia to produce greater up-to-date research on the changing patterns of migration and to 
fill the existing knowledge gaps.  
With these insights in mind, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the drivers of 
international migration based on the experiences, perceptions and decisions of asylum seekers 
to leave their place of origin; and the motivations – if any – to choose their destination 
country. This research draws from participant observations and individual semi-structured 
interviews with 100 migrants that were conducted in eight different migrant housing centers 
and local networks located across three German federal states. The selective sampling method 
was used to learn from a diverse sample of adult migrants. This research sought to answer the 
questions: What were asylum seekers’ perceived drivers for international migration to 
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Europe; what trigger drivers force migrants to leave their place of origin; do migrants 
deliberately choose Germany over other possible destinations; what are the drivers 
influencing migrants to choose Germany as their destination country; and to what extent does 
the choice of destination play a role in the overall decision to migrate. 
 
2.2 International migration, a complex epiphenomenon 
International migration is complex, not least because migration is one of many options 
considered by people whose living conditions are drastically and often rapidly altered 
(Carling & Talleraas, 2016). For instance, a person living under the rule of the formally 
organized group of the Islamic State (IS) could seek to flee, join the military service or an 
insurgency group, or pledge allegiance to IS as a means for protection. Therefore, the drivers 
of international migration are also drivers of other, yet no less important, phenomena (Carling 
& Talleraas, 2016), and the choice to migrate depends on the unique experience and context 
of each individual, while drivers may change over time and en route (De Haas, 2011). 
Migration is also intricate because drivers rarely function in isolation. For example, armed 
conflict and political insecurity cannot be considered mutually exclusive from economic 
opportunities and labor market conditions (Cummings et al., 2015; De Haas, 2011). 
Moreover, religious discrimination or marginalization is part and parcel of political and social 
oppression that may occur in non-secular governments.  
The inconsistency in the labelling of people moving across borders complicates research 
efforts even more. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) recently 
reinforced its position that refugees and migrants are ‘fundamentally different’, thereby 
advising that movements of people be referred to as ‘refugees and migrants’ (UNHCR, 2016). 
However, it is inadequate to talk about two kinds of people (Carling, 2015), as measures to 
allow entry to ‘asylum seekers’ or ‘refugees’ and to restrict entry to ‘economic migrants’ 
grossly overlook the individual reasons for which people move. Despite the lack of a 
universally accepted terminology, this paper follows the United Nations’ definition of 
‘international migrant’, which comprises ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual 
residence’ (United Nations, 1998). Hence, the term ‘migrant’ includes all people who have 
left their habitual place of residence, irrespective of legal status, causes for the move, duration 
of the stay, and nature of the movement as voluntary or involuntary. This is not to discredit 
the crucial protection claims that are based on the 1951 Refugee Convention; in contrast, it 
  
59 
seeks to protect human rights, provide equal opportunities to every individual arriving in 
Europe, and facilitate legal protection under EU and international law. 
It is important to distinguish between the terminologies, ‘irregular migrant’ and ‘asylum 
seeker’ (Düvell, 2012). Asylum seekers may enter a country by regular or irregular means; 
and rejected asylum seekers – who stay in the country without authorization – may become 
irregular migrants. Nearly all interviewees (97 per cent) entered Germany via irregular 
channels, and were still asylum seekers at the time their interview was held. Therefore, this 
research is focused on irregular migration rather than on irregular migrants. 
In the literature on migration, the terms ‘root causes’ and ‘drivers’ overlap (Carling, 2016). 
However, this research employs the terminologies ‘drivers’ and ‘factors’ to describe the 
conditions and mechanisms that underlie international migration, and ‘root causes’ are 
considered the reasons that propel the entire cause-and-effect chain thereof. 
 
2.3 Methods 
A qualitative phenomenological research approach with individual semi-structured interviews 
and participant observations was applied to capture detailed narratives of the lived 
experiences, thoughts, and behavior of migrants who moved to Germany via irregular means. 
 
Data collection 
Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with 105 migrants from 17 countries, 
and with one stateless person. However, due to a number of challenges, including missing 
information of two interviewees, one inexperienced interpreter, and two unsigned consent 
forms, a total of 100 interviews were validated and analyzed. The data collection process was 
undertaken between the end of December 2016 and mid-April 2017. Each interview lasted 
between 30 and 75 minutes, and was conducted in the language of the respondent’s choice. 
The interviews in Arabic, Kurdish Kurmanji and Sorani, Somali, Persian, Tigrinya, Dari 
Persian, Turkish, and Urdu were conducted with the assistance of experienced interpreters 
while those in German, English, and French were conducted directly with the principal 
researcher. To ensure the safety and comfort of the interviewees, the interviews were held 
either in the privacy of the interviewee’s quarters or in an undisturbed location, as agreed 
upon by both parties. All interviewees were informed orally and in writing about the purpose, 
specifying the advantages and disadvantages, and terms of confidentiality of the research 
project, in addition to the voluntary nature of their participation. Both the interviewee and 
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interpreter were asked to sign a consent form prior to starting each interview. The approval to 
conduct interviews in the different migrant housings was sought from the directors of the 
facilities and, in specific cases, from the federal government’s regional board.  
The individual semi-structured interviews consisted mostly of open-ended questions that 
addressed general information about the interviewee’s place of origin, motivations for leaving 
the place of origin, their specific drivers of international migration, inflow or outflow of 
migrants, and their motivations for choosing the country of destination. 
The interviews were documented following handwritten protocols, and were later transcribed 
into a digital datasheet.  
To make sense of the collected data, an explorative thematic analysis was conducted using the 
NVivo software. The NVivo software was used to store, analyze and code the data and was 
crucial to master the high number of interviews from multiple backgrounds. Field notes from 
participant observation and non-verbal communication during the interviews were 
triangulated to support the reflections and analysis. 
 
Study population 
To capture a diverse and comprehensive sample of interviewees, the interviews were 
conducted in four initial reception facilities and four follow-up accommodations throughout 
the federal states of Hesse, Berlin, and Brandenburg. Purposive sampling was applied to 
obtain a large and diverse research sample, for which the criteria were that interviewees be 
migrants in Germany who were at least 18 years of age (Table 1). The popularity of the sports 
classes offered by the researcher and the ‘snowball’ method helped to recruit a larger number 
of migrants who volunteered to participate in the study and created the opportunity to observe 
daily interactions. The recruitment of interviewees was stopped once a sense of saturation of 
information was attained. The study population resulted in a highly culturally heterogeneous 
group. Approximately one-third (34 per cent) of the interviewees originate from Syria, 12 per 
cent from Iraq, and 11 per cent from Afghanistan (Table 0.1). These results are consistent 
with the annual BAMF Report 2016; the comparison of the 77 per cent of interviewees who 
applied for asylum in 2016 and the results of the BAMF Report shows that the top three 
countries represented by asylum seekers in Germany are Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, while 





Methodological considerations and limitations 
In accordance with the promulgation of the asylum act, § 45 AsylG in 1993, asylum seekers 
are distributed among the German federal states and respective initial reception facilities 
using a nationwide electronic distribution system before being assigned to follow-up 
accommodations within the municipalities (BAMF, 2016). An equal distribution of asylum 
seekers across federal states is therefore assumed. However, observations confirm that, in 
addition to the significant differences in regulations and guidelines in the single premises, the 
distribution of migrants within Germany do not follow a uniform procedure (Müller, 2013). 
Therefore, the interviews were held in eight different migrant facilities in multiple locations in 
Germany to obtain a diverse and comprehensive sample of interviewees. 
The recruitment process proved to be a major challenge because many migrants were reticent 
or anxious to participate, most likely because they did not want to relive past trauma. The 
consent form presented an additional hurdle, as some migrants were apprehensive about 
signing it while others were visibly ashamed for being illiterate. Identifying qualified 
interpreters was also demanding, especially because the interviews were set to be conducted 
in nine languages. The gender and cultural background of the interpreters put forth an added 
challenge, as manifested by the reluctance or refusal of male interviewees to participate with 
female interpreters. Furthermore, interviewees – and more prominently African interviewees 
– expressed their reservations about engaging with an interpreter who was not born in their 
country of origin. While great effort was put into finding qualified interpreter for each 
interview, one cannot conclusively state that all potential misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations were avoided. The identity of the interviewer – a white European woman 
and outsider of the migrant housing communities – represented a further limitation, as 
language, gender, and cultural barriers were likely to have influenced the content and amount 
of data collected. However, an attempt to balance these limitations was made through careful 
attention to the interview context and extensive dialogue with the interviewees. Lastly, in 
response to the feedback provided by the first round of interviewees who explicitly refused to 
be recorded, a recording device was not used to document the interviews. 
Given the aforementioned limitations, as well as the limited research sample size of 100 
interviewees, this research does not claim to be representative of the overall migrant 





This section outlines the reported drivers, which resulted in a complex distribution among 
interviewees and nationalities (Figure 2.1). The reported drivers for international migration 
have been categorized into four drivers and eleven sub-drivers, using an explorative thematic 
approach to analyze the data collected during the interviews and based on participant 
observations (Table 2.1). Only 39 per cent of interviewees reported one sub-driver, 45 per 
cent indicated two sub-drivers, and 16 per cent reported as many as three sub-drivers for 
leaving their place of origin. This research also explores the trigger driver that prompted 
migrants to leave their country of origin (Figure 2.2). Lastly, the underlying motivations for 
deliberately choosing Germany as their host country are presented (Figure 2.3), along with the 
decision-making process of those who did not choose a destination country when leaving their 
























Table 2.1 Pattern of drivers of international migration 
        
  Driver Sub-driver   
        
  
1. Violence, armed 
conflict* and non-
state conflict** 
Violence (torture and killings), occupation (lack of water, 
electricity, food and deteriorated economy, infrastructure, 
health-and education system) and persecution by formally 
organized groups*** 
  
  Extreme violence (bombings, torture, rape, detention, 
kidnapping), deteriorated economy, infrastructure, health-
and education system 
  
  Forced military service   
  
2. Religious, ethnic 
and family issues  
Religious and ethnic marginalization, discrimination, 
violence and persecution 
  
  Family issues, persecution and reunification   
  Repressive ethnic and cultural norms and traditions   
  3. Political, 
institutional and 
social issues  
Political and social oppression and lack of freedom and 
safety 
  
  Persecuted or convicted by local justice system   
  To seek better education in the country of destination   
  4. Economic issues  
Unemployment and lack of economic opportunities   
  Poverty   
        
  *As of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), armed conflict is a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results 
in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.  
**As of the UCDP, non-state conflict implies the use of armed force between two 
organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. 
***As of the UCDP, a formally organized group is any non-governmental group of 
people having announced a name for their group and using armed force. 
  















Figure 2.1 Drivers and sub-drivers for international migration, distributed by 
nationality of interviewees 
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Figure 2.2 Main driver for international migration, distributed by nationality of 
interviewees 
 
Violence, armed conflict and non-state conflict 
Slightly more than half (56 per cent) of interviewees comprised the first driver, declaring their 
exposure to violence, armed conflict and non-state conflict2 as their main drivers for fleeing 
their country of origin. 
 
Violence, occupation, and persecution by formally organized groups 
This sub-driver was reported predominantly by Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan and Somali 
interviewees, though Kenyans, Ethiopians, and one Pakistani interviewee also identified this 
as a sub-driver. Among the 100 individuals interviewed, 22 per cent considered their exposure 
to formally organized groups as their trigger driver for fleeing their homes. An Iraqi 
interviewee recalled the conditions he and his family endured over the course of one year of 
living under the IS occupation of Mosul, wherein, IS built a little government with different 
ministries and they introduced their rules by distributing flyers. They pronounced for 
example: ‘you are not allowed to smoke, to shave, to talk to other women than your wife; 
women need to wear a vail; men need to wear long dresses.’  
Other interviewees recounted IS’ brutal public killings of those who did not follow their rules 
and how IS occupied schools and taught children how to use weapons. Many interviewees 
detailed their fear, especially that of their children being raped, killed or forced to join IS. In 
                                               
 
2 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), a non-state conflict implies the use of armed force 
between two organized armed groups – neither of which is the government of a state – resulting in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in a year. 
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fact, many young men decided to move across borders because IS had forced them to fight on 
their behalf. The Syrian interviewees also cited the occupation, violence, and forced 
recruitment efforts of other formally organized groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) as 
sub-drivers. 
Primarily Somali interviewees described the brutal recruitment methods of the organized 
group Al Shabaab. For instance, an interviewee from Mogadishu had his arms tied behind his 
back for refusing to join Al Shabaab in their fight against the government until he was finally 
forced to capitulate. A former security guard of government officials, who survived a car 
bomb explosion caused by Al Shabaab, explained that the group specifically targets people 
who work for the government. However, as one Kenyan interviewee from Mandera 
explained, differentiating a member of Al Shabaab from an ordinary civilian is incredibly 
difficult. A 21-year-old Somali reported that he witnessed his parents being murdered by 
members of Al Shabaab after his father had made a comment related to the group while sitting 
with his friends earlier in the day. The interviewee was later brought to an Al Shabaab 
training camp, where he suffered daily beatings and witnessed men and children being 
brainwashed. 
Seven out of the eleven Afghani interviewees were threatened by the Taliban, who targeted 
people who worked for the government, a foreign company, or the Khan. The Taliban – 
similarly to other formally organized groups – forcibly recruits young men, controls public 
spaces, and spreads fear to assert their power. A farmer from Herat, for instance, had to give 
up his profession because the Taliban controlled or closed the food markets in his village. 
In Ethiopia, the atrocities committed by the formally organized group Ogaden National 
Liberation Front have forced interviewees to flee the country. Moreover, an interviewee from 
Pakistan left her country because she constantly was being controlled and monitored by the 
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front who was after her husband, who never fought with them for 
the freedom of Kashmir, but had contact with the formally organized group.  
 
Extreme violence, deteriorated economy, infrastructure, health-and education system  
The interviewees from Syria, Iraq, and Turkey comprised the only group to recount specific 
atrocities and problems that were caused by an armed or non-state conflict. Many 
interviewees not only bared witness to bombings and missile attacks, but also lost family 
members and friends due to the violent conflicts. A young interviewee from Iraq described 
life in Mosul as lawless, ‘where everyone killed and got killed, it was the rule of the jungle’. 
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Syrians reported witnessing severe atrocities in cities across the country, and many recalled 
the demonstrations and violent clashes between civilians and the military. A Syrian 
interviewee revealed how violence was covered up in the aftermath of the demonstrations and 
riots in Latakia: ‘they collected all dead people from the street and did mass graves in small 
parks, like the one close to our home.’ 
The risk of being kidnapped or the experience thereof was considered a main driver to leave 
the country for many interviewees. Various interviewees from Syria also described witnessing 
acts of violence targeting women such as beatings and rape, which were practiced particularly 
by the Shebiha, al-Assad’s army. Moreover, Syrian interviewees who were arrested outlined 
the brutal circumstances they underwent in prison. A truck driver from Turkey who was 
imprisoned various times described how he was threatened by the Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê (PKK) because they wanted him to transport goods and, in turn, the government 
accused him of colluding with the PKK. Despite attempts to remain neutral during the armed 
conflict in their countries, many of the interviewees ended up being caught in between parties. 
Syrian interviewees reported experiencing threats after being falsely accused of serving as 
spies or traitors by IS, the FSA, the Shebiha, and the Kurdish army.  
Some interviewees explained that while they were not directly affected by violence, they were 
forced to flee the country due to major financial difficulties brought on by the armed conflict. 
These included the lack of work, supplies, resources, as well as the country’s deteriorating 
infrastructure, health, and education system. For instance, a farmer reported,  
‘it was difficult to sell products, because of the war and after some time, I couldn’t repair my 
machines, because spare parts were not available and there was a lack of diesel.’ 
 
Military Service 
A group of interviewees from Syria and Eritrea, and one from each Somalia and Turkey, fled 
their countries mainly due to the forced conscription imposed by the ruling regime. Syrian 
interviewees explained that since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, even men who had 
already completed their military service were obligated to serve again. A 31-year-old man 
disclosed how he managed to escape the military service as follows: ‘I was recruited into the 
military against my will. After some time, I offered my superior $350 USD to take a leave and 
during this period I fled the country.’ A young Eritrean interviewee reported that his mother 
hid him in the house when the soldiers came to recruit him by force into the military. He 
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revealed that some friends from his village were murdered most likely due to their refusal to 
enter the military service. 
 
Religious, ethnic and family issues 
Overall, 50 per cent of interviewees identified religious, ethnic or family issues as one of their 
major drivers influencing their decision to leave their country of origin. 
 
Religious and ethnic marginalization, discrimination, violence and persecution 
State-sanctioned discrimination and violence was a common theme among interviewees of 
nearly all nationalities whereby many interviewees faced socio-professional difficulties due to 
religious divides in their place of origin. A Sunni from Diyala explained that after the U.S. 
military withdrew its troops from Iraq, every Sunni became a target and was treated as a 
terrorist. A group of Shiites killed his elder brother, attacked his younger brother, shot and 
paralyzed him, and murdered his father shortly after. A Syrian Sunni described the severe 
difficulties he endured in the city of Tartus, where the majority of people were Alawits and, 
similarly, a Syrian Alawit reported that he felt as though he was under constant surveillance 
by Sunni Muslims in Otseia. 
Moreover, interviewees who had converted their religion endured challenges so severe that 
they were forced to leave their country. For instance, an Iranian interviewee from Rasht 
decided to leave the country with her family after receiving constant threats for having 
converted to Christianity. Furthermore, Kurds from Syria and Turkey detailed their decision 
to leave because of the lifelong discrimination they suffered. In addition, interviewees from 
the Al-Hasakah governorate in Syria stated that IS specifically targeted and killed Kurds 
during the armed conflict. 
Two interviewees left Pakistan solely due to their fear of persecution for being Ahmadi after 
having suffered severe discrimination. The economist from Sialkot explained: ‘laws do not 
hold for Ahmadis in Pakistan, especially not for women. […] When the bank where I worked 
announced that all Ahmadi should be killed, I decided to leave.’ 
In addition, both Somali interviewees who have been migrants in Yemen for most of their 
life, were persecuted and discriminated against because of their status as migrants, who are 
viewed as being part of the opposition group in Yemen. The father of a young Eritrean was 
imprisoned and killed because he was a pastor who preached the bible and followed 
Pentecostalism, which has been banned in Eritrea since 2002. A Somali interviewee from the 
  
69 
Gaboye tribe cited that when his girlfriend got pregnant, the ethnic tensions became very 
clear:  
‘my girlfriend was from the Ogaden tribe, who govern our village. Gaboye are poor and are 
not allowed to marry women from other tribes. […] When the parents of my girlfriend heard 
about us, they wanted to kill us. […] My girlfriend died because we tried to abort, and I fled.’ 
 
Family issues, persecution and reunification 
Religious tension within families was frequently mentioned as a main reason for breaking 
families apart, especially among Iraqi, Iranian, and Pakistani interviewees. For instance, the 
parents of an interviewee from Iraq repudiated their son because he decided to not partake in 
any religious practices. One Pakistani interviewee had to flee her country because she failed 
to inform her family-in-law of her adherence to the Ahmadiyya religion before marrying her 
husband. 
Property and inheritance were also major sources of family conflict. An interviewee from 
Cameroon fled her country when the police told her to leave in order to ‘save her skin’ from 
the family members who threatened her after finding out that she inherited land from her 
father. An Afghani interviewee suspects that his uncle’s wife threw acid on his head out of 
envy of the inheritance he had received from his father. 
Family reunification was mentioned as a major driver to move to Europe solely by women, 
mainly Syrians who moved to Germany to join their husbands. Two female interviewees from 
Kenya and one from Cameroon also left their country to join their partner. 
 
Repressive ethnic and cultural norms and traditions  
Interviewees from Iraq, Kenya, and Afghanistan were forced to leave their country to escape 
harmful repressive ethnic and cultural norms and traditions. Different female interviewees 
from Kenya admitted that female genital mutilation (FGM), which is the partial or total 
removal of the external female genitalia for cultural or other non-medical reasons – is still a 
widespread practice in their country. The parents of a young interviewee from Kenya’s 
Maasai and Kikuyu tribes consider FGM the mandatory path to maturity for every girl. 
Despite knowing the risk of being shunned and sometimes even killed for refusing to undergo 
FGM, the interviewee from Kawangware disclosed that she got pregnant to avoid the 
procedure after her sister died while undergoing FGM.  
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Bacha bazi, literally ‘boy play’ in Persian, is another highly-discriminating practice that 
prompted an entire family to leave Afghanistan. It is a centuries-old tradition in many parts of 
Afghanistan and a form of sexual slavery and prostitution, where prepubescent boys are 
recruited, or rather ‘stolen’ from poor families as an interviewee from the Baghlan province 
stated, for dance and sexual entertainment. 
 
Political, institutional, and social issues 
Only 15 interviewees, mainly Iranians and Eritreans, considered political and social 
oppression, legal challenges, and poor education system in their country as their main driver 
to move internationally. 
 
Political and social oppression 
This driver overlaps with factor two on religious and ethnic marginalization because many 
interviewees fled from non-secular states or regions. In a non-secular state such as Iran, or in 
occupied regions by religiously motivated groups such as IS in Syria and Iraq, political and 
social oppression may be tied with religious discrimination or marginalization. Many Iranians 
described the lack of freedom in their country in the way a young man from Tehran stated 
that, ‘there is no freedom because of the religious government. […] Religious minorities have 
no rights in Iran.’ All interviewees from Eritrea mentioned some form of political oppression. 
An Eritrean university student from Asmara explained that he was imprisoned for five months 
on account of violating the government’s travel ban after driving to a neighboring village to 
visit his grandmother. After his release, he was forced into military service and told that 
school had finished for him.  
The lack of women’s rights contributed to the decision of families from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to leave their country of origin. A woman from Pakistan pointed out that women 
have no freedom of movement, with the law going so far as to forbidding women from riding 
a bicycle. Moreover, an interviewee from Afghanistan reported the Taliban barred his wife 
from working as a teacher. 
 
Persecuted or convicted by local justice system 
Only three interviewees were politically persecuted. One Iranian woman was imprisoned, 
beaten and, until this day, continues to be politically persecuted because in the 1970s she 
distributed flyers that were deemed radical. Moreover, an Ethiopian interviewee who escaped 
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from prison was convicted and persecuted by the state because his murdered father was a 
political activist. 
 
To seek better education in the country of destination 
The desire to seek education was mentioned specifically by four interviewees as one of their 
drivers, albeit none considered it to be their main driver for migration. An Eritrean explained: 
 ‘my life was meaningless and spoiled as soldier in the lifelong military in Eritrea. I 
wanted to go to Europe, because I want peace, continue my education, and have a future.’ 
 
Economic issues 
Only five interviewees considered poverty or unemployment and lack of economic 
opportunities as the main driver to move internationally. 
 
Poverty 
Only four interviewees were living below the poverty line of their respective countries, which 
contributed to their decision to move across borders. For instance, a young man from Sudan 
had lived on the streets of Khartoum since he was four years old. A Bedouin who lived in the 
deserts of Kuwait only lived off either donations or sporadic work as a shepherd, cleaner, or 
gardener. 
 
Unemployment and lack of economic opportunities 
Only two interviewees reported unemployment as a main driver for international migration. 
This figure does not include those interviewees who lost their job or faced financial 
difficulties due to armed conflict. A young man from Chad and a 49-year-old Egyptian moved 
to Europe because they did not see a future in their respective countries. 
 
The destination choice 
More than half (55 per cent) of interviewees deliberately chose Germany as their destination 
country and mentioned multiple drivers, which were clustered into five groups (Figure 2.3). 
Overall, the attractiveness of Germany, is however weak because most interviewees chose 
Germany mainly to join their family members who were already there. A substantial share of 
interviewees based their decision also on their search for security, freedom, democracy, and 
human rights. Twelve interviewees envisioned a better future, education, health system, 
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economic opportunities, and good conditions to raise their children when moving to 
Germany. Moreover, only eight interviewees chose Germany also due to its asylum policy. 
For a minority of interviewees (11 per cent), evidence was found to suggest that they chose to 
leave their country of origin also because of the perceived benefits of living in Germany. 
These included interviewees who specifically researched the advantages and disadvantages of 
European countries and who defined clear-cut goals that they sought to achieve – such as 
education – once in Germany. 
The remaining 45 per cent of interviewees either did not have a specific destination country in 
mind or went to Germany as a second choice. The majority of those interviewees who moved 
to Germany by chance simply wanted to reach Europe or any other safe haven. Many 
interviewees explained that they started to think about their destination country only once 
they reached Europe. They remained for some time in so-called ‘transit’ countries, as this 
interviewee from Eritrea explained, ‘When I arrived in Italy, I heard that it is good in 
Germany, so I moved on.’ Several migrants also reported experiencing hostility, hardship, and 
a lack of support from authorities in countries such as Italy, Greece, Turkey and Serbia, which 
prompted them to continue their journey. Moreover, multiple interviewees initially moved to 
bordering or culturally-similar countries before travelling to Europe. For instance, a Syrian 
interviewee first moved to an Arab country with her husband, but then decided to move to 
Europe after having been robbed. Several interviewees explained that their choice for a 
destination country depended on their financial means, and cited insufficient funds to pay 
migrant smugglers as a major struggle en route. For instance, an Ethiopian interviewee 
explained that he was held hostage and beaten daily in Libya for nearly two years because he 
could not pay for his trip from Somalia to Libya. Moreover, it is important to note that among 
the 45 interviewees who moved to Germany by chance or second choice, nine had a family 
member living in Germany. Only four interviewees explained that Germany was their second 








Figure 2.3 Motivations of 55% of interviewees who deliberately chose Germany as 
their destination country 
2.5 Discussion 
The analysis of the interviews has been organized into two subjects. First, reflections focus on 
the complexity of the drivers and sub-drivers of the discovered pattern of drivers of 
international migration. Second, an analysis of the host country unveils the dynamic nature of 
migration to Europe. 
 
The pattern of drivers of international migration 
A major finding of this research is that the drivers of international migration are numerous; 
nearly two-thirds (61 per cent) of interviewees were motivated by two or three sub- driver to 
leave their place of origin. Therefore, rigid and dubious categories to which migrants are 
assigned – such as ‘economic migrant’ and ‘refugee’ – often do not reflect the complex nature 
of international migration because they tend to overlook the individual’s numerous drivers for 
crossing borders. 
Among the 100 migrants interviewed, 56 per cent considered driver one – armed and non-
state conflict – as their trigger motivation for moving internationally. This finding strengthens 
existing evidence that migration is primary motivated by the need for secure livelihood 
opportunities (Cummings et al., 2015; De Haas. 2011) and the general consensus that war of 
any type forces people to flee their home (Adhikari, 2012). However, narratives have 
demonstrated that exposure to violence varies significantly across countries, regions, and for 
each individual and, therefore, it is imperative to analyze the actual perceived exposure and 
sub-drivers of each individual. The detailed analysis of drivers brought to light that 15 men 
left their country primarily to avoid the national military service; others faced extreme 
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of resources and deterioration of education facilities and infrastructure, all of which were 
caused by armed conflict.  
The second driver – religion, ethnic and family issues – was indicated as one of the drivers by 
50 per cent of interviewees for moving across borders. Results confirm a study conducted by 
the IOM in Italy, which also found that 50 per cent of interviewed migrants considered 
discrimination as a main driver for their flight (Achilli et al., 2016). This finding is 
noteworthy because this driver cross-cuts the range of cultures represented in this research, 
showing that religious and ethnic persecution and discrimination is a major driver for 
international migration, and is likely to increase, as it is not confined to one country or region. 
The connection between religion and migration is not a new phenomenon. The Jewish 
diaspora is an eloquent example. However, during the current “migrant crisis” it seems to be 
overlooked and underestimated by academia and policy makers. As presented, the specific 
religious, ethnic, and family issues of interviewees are highly diverse and rooted in culture 
and society such as FGM and bacha bazi, forcing entire families to leave their country of 
origin. It is highly concerning that ancient traditions like bacha bazi are still widespread in 
Afghanistan despite being considered a severe human rights violation (Saramad et al., 2014).  
Reported political, institutional and social issues overlap with driver one and two in multiple 
aspects. Narratives of Syrian and Iraqi interviewees demonstrate that armed, non-state 
conflict, and political insecurity cannot be considered in isolation from the wider impact they 
can have on the daily lives of people, economic opportunities, and the labor market. 
Moreover, 18 per cent of interviewees reported armed and non-state conflict jointly with 
religious, ethnic and family issues as, for instance, religion is a central motivation of formally 
organized groups such as IS and Al Shabaab. Furthermore, Iranians and Eritreans left their 
countries because they suffered religious discrimination, which goes hand-in-hand with 
political and social oppression in non-secular countries or regions. 
In addition, the idea that poverty is a key driver for migration was already discarded in the 
1990s (Van Hear et al., 2014), and this research demonstrates that unemployment and poverty 
was a main driver for only a minority of interviewees. Hence, the widespread public belief 
that migrants come from poor countries and take advantage of generous welfare benefits and 




The importance of the destination country 
This research demonstrates that asylum seekers in Germany are a highly culturally 
heterogeneous group as shown in Table 1. An important finding that emerged from this 
research is that 45 per cent of interviewees did not choose a destination country when they left 
their country of origin. Interviewees were simply in search of safety and decided on their 
destination country along the course of their journey. This result supports the existing claim 
of Collyer in 2007, who describes migrants as transients in search of opportunity, without a 
linear logic of their choice of destination country. The narratives of migrants emphasize, that 
the cost of the journey plays a key element in determining migration flows and outcomes 
(Van Hear, 2014), as do migrant smugglers often direct migration towards or away from 
particular countries (Robinson & Segrott, 2002). Moreover, interviewees experiences 
strengthen existing research by Collyer on the crucial role of transit countries, where poor 
conditions instigate onward migration and where in ‘spontaneous social networks’ new 
information is exchanged, which often is the only basis by which migrants decide on their 
destination country en route. 
This research highlights, that the deliberate choice of the destination country is the result of a 
multitude of driver, of which the degree of importance can differ across origin countries as 
well as across individuals from the same place of origin. As many authors already explored, 
the existing network in the destination country, plays a crucial role in the migrant’s choice of 
host country (McAuliffe, 2013; Brekke & Aarset, 2009). The results of this research 
strengthen this evidence, as 42 per cent of interviewees had an existing network in Germany 
and 33 per cent of the total of interviewees moved to Germany, also due to this motivation. 
The results on the migrants’ drivers to choose Germany as a destination country are 
comparable with studies by Robinson and Segrott 2002, and Brekke and Aarset 2009 on 
migrants choosing the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway, respectively, as their destination 
country. The comparison of three top European migrant destinations highlights the central 
drivers for migration to Europe because, as for the British and Norwegian perspectives, safety 
and security, as well as the presence of a family network, are central for the German case 
during this “migrant crisis”. While language and cultural ties did not factor into the decision-
making process of migrants moving to Norway and Germany, they were paramount for those 
moving to the UK. Generally, reaching the UK as a destination country had far less 
importance for migrants than their drivers for leaving their homes (Robinson et al., 2002). 
Similarly, only 11 per cent of interviewees chose Germany as their host country based on a 
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clear idea of the potential benefits that the country may offer them, hence, only in these cases 
one may suggest that the destination country may have played a role in their initial choice of 
migration. Therefore, findings support the claim, that the importance of Germany’s or any 
other country’s welfare, asylum support system and national policies are weak drivers for 
migration (Cummings et al., 2015). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
International migration is a key global challenge and the current “migrant crisis” has sparked 
conflicting public perception about migration, pressuring policy makers to seek viable 
solutions and fostered the importance of migration research in academia. To the last point, 
this study sought to explore the drivers for international migration based on the individual 
experiences, perceptions and decisions of 100 asylum seekers from 17 countries hosted in 
German facilities to leave their place of origin; and the drivers, if any, to choose their 
destination country. 
Transnational migration will continue to be a key issue in international politics (Geddes & 
Scholten, 2016). In the German agenda, one can perceive the need for effective policies to 
overcome the era of the “migrant crisis”, to respond to the expectations of civil society, 
containing the escalation of the political debate, and to keep in check anti-immigration parties 
such as the AFD to prevent future crises. To date, public discourse and, to an extent, policy 
responses about migration, have been based on limited research and evidence (Koser & 
McAuliffe, 2013) and reactive mitigation attempts seemed to be guided by media inflated 
perceptions, which trump facts and lead to emergency driven policy approaches such as 
closing entry points to Europe that are likely to result in further turmoil and deaths, as people 
will search for alternatives and possibly more dangerous entry channels to Europe. 
In 2015, a total of 3,771 deaths were reported in the Mediterranean (Geddes & Scholten, 
2016) and, to date, the EU response to the “migrant crisis” focuses on the ‘symptoms’ of 
international migration – such as containing migrant smuggling – rather than dealing with the 
underlying root causes of this phenomenon. As demonstrated in this paper, drivers for 
migration can differ between countries and are rooted in history, governance, and the 
dynamics of the society, thus, an interdisciplinary and multi-causal approach is required to 




The results highlight the argument that the choice of the destination country has little or no 
bearing in the migrant’s initial decision to move to Europe and Germany’s attraction as a 
destination country is weak, since migrants mainly choose their destination country based on 
an existing family network and the desire for safety. Therefore, focusing on the drivers and 
root causes that motivate people to leave their place of origin may help to avoid the 
destination country bias concerned only with the challenges for European countries (Geddes 
& Scholten 2016). This research sought to increase understanding on climatic events as a 
possible driver for migration. However, this study highlights, that the decisive drivers of the 
current “migrant crisis” include driver one - armed conflict and non-state conflict, and two, 
religious, ethnic and family issues. When policies target less relevant factors or address only 
the ‘symptoms’ of the root causes, migration may get blocked and people might be more 
inclined to choose alternative outcomes that are less desirable, such as joining a violent 
movement. Policies should aim at effectively addressing the drivers of migration that people 
explicitly face in their countries of origin, with an integrated policy approach, involving 
cooperation and accountability among the involved parties. 
The findings and suggestions of this research were based on the experiences, perceptions and 
decisions of asylum seekers in Germany in order to uncover the actual drivers for 
international migration of those, who unleashed the “migrant crisis” and ultimately fuel 
evidence-based discourse and responses. Disentangling the drivers and detailed sub-drivers of 
an individual’s decisions is crucial to understanding the motivations of international 
migration, though, the complexity of the subject also lies in the fact that reported drivers 
cannot be analyzed in isolation. Presented up-to-date trends and multiple findings supporting 
existing research provide a nuanced understanding of the current pattern of international 
migration to Europe and should serve policy or any program seeking to influence irregular 
migration to address the actual drivers and root causes with a long-term and evidence-based 
sustainable migration management approach and development policies at both national and 
international levels, in Germany, Europe, transit countries and migrant’s countries of origin. 
This research highlights that international migration is a global epiphenomenon and its 
complex and numerous drivers require increased attention by academia to fill existing 
knowledge gaps and to keep track of the evolving patterns of migration to Europe, as 
migration is likely to continue over decades to come. Evidence-based studies may foster a 
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Abstract 
Since the 1990s, the complex connections between the triad of climatic events, conflict and 
migration have impacted world politics, continuing to spark turmoil among policy makers 
and garnering attention among academics across disciplines. This research aims to advance 
the understanding of the causal linkages between climatic events, conflict and migration, 
exploring a new perspective on this nexus. For this purpose, existing related scientific 
literature was scrutinized and complemented with an in-depth empirical study of 100 
asylum seekers from 17 countries hosted in German facilities. A “conflict-induced 
resource scarcity theory” is suggested, where conflict – in particular the use of resources as 
weapon in warfare – increases society’s vulnerability to climatic events, which may 
contribute to conflict and migration. To demonstrate the plausibility and usefulness of this 
theory, this paper elaborates on the conflict in Syria as a microcosm of the problem and 
provides suggestions on how climatic events may have affected recent migration flows to 
Europe. The results show that 81% of interviewees reported resource scarcity in their place 
of origin, of whom 36% were negatively impacted by it only after conflict broke out. This 
highlights the risks of mounting climatic pressure on resources and the increasing use of 
resource scarcity as a weapon during conflict. This analysis points towards a complex 
interrelation between climatic events and conflict-driven vulnerability to counter the 
popular narrative that peddles simple and sensationalist conclusions. The research findings 
may inform policy makers on the strategic importance to protect and provide resources in 
conflict zones, especially to the most vulnerable populations, implement precautious 
actions to reduce the risks of conflict and conflict-induced resource scarcity, and address 





Since the 1990s, each of the three research domains of climatic events, conflict and migration, 
and the connections of these concepts have significantly impacted world politics, sparking 
turmoil among policy makers and garnering attention among academics across disciplines. 
The interactions between climatic events, conflict and migration are complex, as they are 
characterized by inherent uncertainty across scientific research fields, a lack of consistent 
data, and of tremendous political visibility and importance. Moreover, given the severity of 
the actual and potential consequences for human security and international peace, it is 
essential to conduct further research and foster understanding on causal linkages between 
these phenomena. 
To unpack the complex relationship between climatic events, conflict and migration, it is 
imperative to consider existing scientifically tested mechanisms and mediating factors 
between the phenomena. Firstly, the liaison among climatic events, conflict and migration is a 
non-linear relationship with numerous combinations (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016) and human 
insecurity almost never has single causes (IPCC, 2014). Furthermore, conflict of any kind, is 
rarely, if ever, attributed to single motives (Gleick, 2014), as there is usually more than one 
driver that leads a person to migrate (Black et al., 2011) and therefore, climatic events are just 
one among many important factors contributing to conflict, migration and endangering human 
security (IPCC, 2014). The existing scientific evidence highlights that the impact of climatic 
events on human beings and societies is shaped by the vulnerability specific to each affected 
entity (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Scheffran et al., 2012). Lastly, this research underscores 
the important mechanism outlining that conflicts increase societies’ vulnerability to climatic 
events in multiple forms (Buhaug et al., 2014; Scheffran et al., 2012). The mediating factors 
concern five dimensions of society – which include political/institutional, economic, 
environmental, demographic, and social factors – that impact the relationship between 
climate, conflict and migration on numerous dimensions and at multiple scales. Research on 
climatic events and their consequences on human security recently regained momentum, 
building on earlier research on resource scarcity (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015), an important 
mediating factor that this paper will single out with a special focus on water and electricity 
scarcity. 
Resource scarcity is considered an important link in the relationship between climate and 
conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Hsiang et al., 2013; Scheffran et al., 2012;). Furthermore, the 
potential for increased migration, which is among the most frequently cited links between 
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climatic events and conflict, is based on the conviction that climatic events lead and increase 
resource scarcity, which might drive migration as well as conflict (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; 
Burrows & Kinney, 2016). Debates remain vibrant on the effects of climatic events on 
resource scarcity and on the question of how the scarcity and changes of distribution of 
natural resources increase vulnerability to climatic events and affect human security (Homer-
Dixon, 1994; Hsiang et al., 2013; Scheffran et al., 2012). For instance, climate change 
increases the scarcity of water and related risks such as the potential for triggering conflict 
and, as water is a scare and irreplaceable resource, with increasing level of warming in the 
twenty-first century, human security will be incrementally endangered (Berlemann & 
Steinhardt, 2017; IPCC, 2014). Recent years have witnessed a global upward trend in 
incidents of water-related violence and while water-related conflicts occur in many forms, 
research on the linkage between water and international peace and security, as well as the 
relationship between water and armed conflict, often neglects the role of water in not only 
being a trigger for war, but also in its use as a weapon. For instance, it has been used in 
combat or as a tool to oppress the enemy or civilians, or both during conflict (Gleick, 2006, 
2014; Tignino, 2010). 
The ongoing conflict in Syria is characterized by multiple mechanisms and mediating factors 
that impact the relationship between climatic events, conflict and migration, and is a widely 
discussed example of a conflict with complicated but direct connections to resource scarcity, 
in particular water (Gleick, 2014). However, due to the complex relationship between climatic 
events, conflict and migration, there is little consensus in the literature on the relative 
importance of climate as a driver or contributor to conflict and the role that migration plays in 
this relationship relative to other factors (Burrows & Kinney, 2016; De Châtel, 2014; Gleick, 
2014;). There remains great uncertainty in literature on the nexus between climatic events, 
conflict and migration due to the inherent complexity of climatic events projections, 
challenges in identifying the outbreak of conflict, a lack in accuracy in projecting population 
growth and no reliable database for sound migration estimates (Burrows & Kinney, 2016; 
Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). 
The potential link among climatic events, conflict and migration has been discussed in 
academic literature based on qualitative research (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Burrows & 
Kinney, 2016; Reuveny, 2007; Withagen, 2014) and, to a lesser extent, on quantitative 
research (Ghimire et al., 2015; Cattaneo & Bosetti, 2017). So far, the body of knowledge on 
the relationship between these phenomena focuses entirely on a possible security risk that 
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migrants, who are motivated by climatic reasons, pose on receiving locations. In fact, the 
research at present continues to concentrate exclusively on environmental factors as drivers 
for migration, neglecting other possible connections among climate, conflict and migration, 
despite a so-far limited theoretical basis for and empirical evidence of the proposition that 
climatic events will lead to migration and that migration movements will cause conflict 
(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). 
Since the 1990s, the claim that migration is by climatic events has often been considered the 
main human security risk of global warming (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017; Brzoska & 
Fröhlich, 2015; Brown, 2008; Myers, 2005). This notion was spurred by the alarmist 
warnings of climate-induced mass migration, proclaimed by Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climatic Change in its first assessment report (IPCC, 1990). This claim was later used to 
justify predictions of major conflicts in receiving regions and generally, climatic events in 
connection with conflict. Since then, migration was presented as a phenomenon that causes 
violence and instability despite a thin base of scientific evidence (Raleigh, 2010; Raleigh et 
al., 2010; Reuveny, 2007). Since then, the debate on climatic events has ramped up and in 
2015 retook center stage as a “convenient truth” during Europe’s reconcile with large inflows 
of irregular migrants, terrorism in Europe and conflict and terrorism in the Tigris and 
Euphrates basin (Powell et al., 2017). Climatic events were again presented as the driver of 
conflict and mass migration, causing human insecurity, creating a state of emergency and a 
trilogy of self-reinforcing global challenges affecting international peace (Ibid). Therefore, the 
scientific and political discourse on climate’s impacts on human and national security and the 
advancement of knowledge on the relationship among climatic events, conflict and migration 
continue to have significant consequences on international relations and peace.  
This paper argues that when analyzing the relationship among climatic events, conflict and 
migration and exploring new possible linkages, it is crucial to consider existing scientific 
concepts and evidence – the mechanisms and mediating factors - between the phenomena. To 
analyze the causal linkages among the three scientific research areas and in an attempt to offer 
a distinct perspective between climatic events, conflict and migration, this research draws 
from existing scientific literature, participant observations and individual semi-structured 
interviews with 100 migrants from 17 countries that were conducted in eight different migrant 
housing centers and local networks located across three German federal states. The selective 
sampling method was employed to learn from the experiences, perceptions and thoughts of a 
diverse sample of adult migrants. This paper sought to explore the following main question, 
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“how did asylum seekers perceive resource scarcity in their place of origin and how is it 
associated with conflict, climatic events and migration? and answer the detailed questions of 
“how is resource scarcity, in particular water and electricity scarcity associated with climatic 
events, conflict, and migration?” and “how is water and electricity scarcity used strategically 
as weapon and tool during conflict?” 
 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
On the one hand, climate change plays a natural role in earth’s variability, while on the other 
hand, anthropogenic factors are extremely likely to have caused more than half of the 
observed increase in the average global temperature, of about 1°C since the preindustrial 
period (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017; IPCC, 2014). Climatic events that are spurred by 
climate change differ considerably across regions and include slow onset environmental 
phenomena such as droughts and land degradation, and suddenly-occurring extreme weather 
and climate-related events such as floods and storms (IPCC, 2014). Yet, while such changes 
are inevitable and expected to increase, climatic events involve complex interactions and 
altering likelihoods of diverse impacts (IPCC, 2014), the scientific research is not aligned on 
where and when changes will occur (Burrows & Kinney, 2016), and the extent to which 
human systems are and will be affected (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017).  
There is consensus in the literature that climatic events pose risks to various dimensions of 
human security (IPCC, 2014). Human security is a highly-contested concept, informed and 
debated by many disciplines and by numerous studies that use diverse methods (IPCC, 2014; 
Inglehart & Norris, 2012; Owen, 2004; Paris, 2001). Moreover, as the conceptual debate on 
climatic events and human security is just starting (Scheffran et. al., 2012a), there are multiple 
definitions that vary according to discipline (IPCC, 2014). According to the IPCC 2014 
(p.759), human security in the context of climatic events can be considered, “a condition that 
exists when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and 
capacity to live with dignity.” 
Human insecurity rarely can be attributed to any single cause. Instead, it emerges from the 
interaction of multiple factors impacting individuals, households and societies, with climatic 
events being just one important factor (IPCC, 2014). The existing literature suggests that the 
impact of climatic events on human beings and societies is shaped by the vulnerability 
specific to each affected entity (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Scheffran et al., 2012). 
Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts (IPCC, 2014) and, broadly speaking, 
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vulnerability to climate impacts may include exposure and sensitivity to climatic events, as 
well as adaptive capacity (IPCC, 2007; Scheffran et al., 2012). The impact of climate depends 
on the specific climatic event (Scheffran et al., 2012), however it has very different effects on 
different segments of societies, as the consequences of climatic events depend on how 
vulnerable social systems are and how they respond to climate’s impacts (Berlemann & 
Steinhardt, 2017; Scheffran et al., 2012). 
Conflict is considered a powerful cause of human insecurity (Barnett & Adger, 2007) and the 
connections between climatic events and conflict have been explored in great detail, 
especially over the last decade (Buhaug et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014). While overall scientific 
research does not conclude on a strong positive relationship between climatic events and 
conflict (Buhaug et al., 2014; Theisen et al., 2013), theories on the potential of climatic events 
to increase conflict are mounting and diverse (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Gleditsch, 2012; 
Scheffran et al., 2012). Scientific research is in alignment on the mechanism, that the 
vulnerability of human systems, especially the sensitivity and the adaptive capacity to 
climatic events can be affected by conflict (Buhaug et al., 2014; Scheffran et al., 2012). For 
instance, conflict increases the vulnerability of social systems because it affects economic 
activity, education, health, food security and overall well-being, which are major drivers of 
vulnerability (Adger, 2013; Raleigh et al., 2012). In addition, it harms assets that facilitate 
adaptation to climatic events including infrastructure, institutions, natural resources, social 
capital, and livelihood opportunities (IPCC, 2014). Yet, if climatic events negatively affect 
these characteristics of social systems, they may increase the risk of humanitarian crises and 
aggravate existing conflicts without directly causing them (Bernauer et al., 2012; Scheffran et 
al., 2012). 
As the connection between climatic events and conflict is not linear, multiple mediating 
factors are at play. Since the 1980s, when the links between climate and conflict was a 
burgeoning area of academic research, resource scarcity has been considered to be an 
important link to the relationship. Today, there exists an intensive scientific debate on how 
the scarcity and changes of distribution of natural resources such as minerals, water, energy, 
fish, and arable land affect conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Hsiang et al., 2013; Scheffran et al., 
2012). In fact, Brzoska and Fröhlich claim that the vulnerability to the effects of climatic 
events commonly increases where the dependence on natural resources for survival is direct 
and high. Gleick (1993; 2006) highlights the importance of water as a contributing factor to 
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conflict and describes that freshwater and water infrastructure are integral to ecological, 
human and economic systems, though unevenly and irregularly distributed across the globe. 
Water-related conflicts occur in many forms, including disputes over access to water and the 
control of water systems, the targeting of water infrastructure and systems during 
conventional conflicts and terrorist actions, and the use of water as a weapon and tool during 
conflict (Gleick, 2014). Examples where water was used as a political or military tool are 
numerous and date back to over 4,500 years. There are many narratives in which water was 
used as a weapon or tool during conflict around 2,700 years ago in the Tigris and Euphrates 
region (Gleick, 2014; Lloyd, 1961). Water has always been a high-value target during conflict 
because there exists no substitute for it (Gleick, 2006, 2014). There is also mounting concern 
about how climatic events may affect energy supply, as it strongly influences economic 
development, health and quality of life (IPCC, 2014). Conflict can surge over hydroelectric 
projects and dams, especially where there exist gross inequities concerning energy supply 
(Gleick, 1993). 
While resource scarcity is considered an important liaison between climatic events and 
conflict, among the most frequently cited links is the potential for increased migration based 
on the conviction that climatic events cause or increase resource scarcity, which might drive 
migration as well as conflict (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Burrows & Kinney, 2016). The 
academic literature on the links between climatic events, conflict and migration is still 
limited, with only a few evidence-based case studies published since the 1990s (Burrows & 
Kinney, 2016). Among the cases that have been more readily studies is the ongoing conflict in 
Syria, which is located in one of the driest regions in the world and has been in moderate to 
severe drought from 1998 through 2009 (Kelley et al., 2015). Between 2006 and 2011, the 
country experienced a multiyear period of extreme drought that contributed to agricultural 
failures, economic dislocations and population displacement to urban areas (De Châtel, 2014; 
Gleick, 2014). The northeastern region was hit hardest by the drought, after already having 
suffered from severely depleted groundwater reserves and the government’s overambitious 
agricultural development projects, which overstretched both land and water resources (De 
Châtel, 2014). Overall, the Syrian conflict has many roots beyond its official start in 2011. Its 
causes are rooted in long-standing political, social and ideological disputes, economic 
dislocations from both global and regional factors, as well as worsening environmental 
conditions impacting a highly vulnerability population to climatic events (Gleick, 2014, 
Kelley et al., 2015). Gleick argues that these key environmental factors include both direct 
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and indirect consequences of water scarcity, ineffective watershed management, the impacts 
of climatic events and the use of resources as weapon or tool during conflict. 
Various targeted attacks on water systems and power plants by the government and 
opposition groups were reported, including the bombing of water resources by the Syrian 
government in Damascus that cut off access to the water supply for 5.5 million people in 2017 
(Miles, 2017). Prior to that, Anti-Assad rebels took over the Tishrin hydroelectrically dam on 
the Euphrates River in late 2012 (Mroue, 2012) and in 2013, the formally organized group1 
called the Islamic State (IS) occupied the Tabqa al-Thawrah dam, which is the largest 
hydroelectric dam in the country (Saad, 2013). The IS employed dams, canals and reservoirs 
as weapons in order to deny water to regions outside of their territories and flooded the route 
of approaching enemy armies (Beach, 2015). In the city of Raqqah, the IS exhausted water 
reserves and disrupted distribution networks, forcing residents to use untreated water 
resources, which led to the spread of waterborne diseases such as Hepatitis A and Typhoid 
(Ibid.). Moreover, they used their partial control over the country’s energy infrastructure as a 
tool to demand payment for utility services and reportedly collected $20 every two months 
from business owners in exchange for electricity, water and security (Beach, 2015; Humud et 
al., 2015) 
Yet, there exists great disagreement over whether climatic events contributed to the conflict in 
Syria and if internal migration from rural to urban centers spurred the conflict (Uexkull et al., 
2016; Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Gleick, 2014). In fact, there exists no theoretical approach 
that adequately represents the relationship between migration motivated by climatic events 
and conflict (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015), and recent quantitative and macro-level empirical 
studies remain ambiguous (Ghimire et al., 2015; Cattaneo & Bosetti, 2017). This does not 
imply that climatic events are irrelevant for future patterns of migration or migration linked to 
conflict. However, while migration studies have witnessed tremendous progress in the 
understanding of the environment over the past 20 years (Cattaneo & Peri, 2015; Hunter et 
al., 2015), authors argue that the climate-migration literature has placed too much emphasis 
on climate as the driving factor of migration (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015).  
Therefore, it is important to explore other possible perspectives and links between climate, 
conflict and migration (Burrows & Kinney, 2016). Novel theories may acknowledge and 
                                               
 
1 As of the UCDP, a formally organized group is any non-governmental group of people having announced a 
name for the group and using armed force. 
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apply existing scientific evidence concerning the mechanisms and mediating factors of the 
nexus, which also form the basis for exploring the following “conflict-induced resource 
scarcity theory.” 
Conflict, including the use of resource scarcity as a tool and weapon during warfare, carried 
out by formally organized groups or governments can significantly increase a society’s 
vulnerability by reducing the availability of resources such as water and electricity. Formally 
organized groups such as the IS, FSA, Taliban, or governments may use the control over 
resources as a weapon or tool to control and oppress the population, or they may use this 
strategy to gain ground in opposition-held regions, or both. Yet, when climatic events hit 
already vulnerable populations that are suffering under resource scarcity caused by conflict, 
the climate impact will be significantly stronger, as the individual’s, household’s or entire 
society’s sensitivity and adaptive capacity to climatic events is weakened. The absence of 
effective governance structure or adaptation efforts ultimately leads to negative effects on 
livelihoods and health, among many other factors of human security. This, in turn, may 
potentially intensify an ongoing conflict or lay the ground for increased sociopolitical 
instability in the form of political unrest, insurgency, state fragility and cause migration 
movements towards more resource-rich regions. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
A qualitative phenomenological research approach with individual semi-structured interviews 
and participant observation was applied to capture detailed narratives of the lived experiences, 
thoughts, and behavior of migrants who moved to Germany via irregular means. 
 
Data collection 
Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted in German migrant housings with 105 
migrants from 17 countries, and with one stateless person. However, due to a number of 
challenges, including missing information of interviewees, one inexperienced interpreter, and 
unsigned consent forms, a total of 100 interviews were validated and analyzed. The data 
collection process was undertaken between the end of December 2016 and mid-April 2017. 
Each interview lasted between 30 and 75 minutes, and was conducted in the language of the 
respondent’s choice. The interviews in Arabic, Kurdish Kurmanji and Sorani, Somali, 
Persian, Tigrinya, Dari Persian, Turkish, and Urdu were conducted with the assistance of 
experienced interpreters while those in German, English, and French were conducted directly 
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with the principal researcher. To ensure the safety and comfort of the interviewees, the 
interviews were held either in the privacy of the interviewee’s quarters or in an undisturbed 
location, as agreed upon by both parties. All interviewees were informed orally and in writing 
about the research purpose, specifying the advantages and disadvantages, and terms of 
confidentiality of the research project, in addition to the voluntary nature of their 
participation. Both the interviewee and interpreter were asked to sign a consent form prior to 
starting their interview. The approval to conduct interviews in the different migrant housings 
was sought from the directors of the facilities and, in specific cases, from the federal 
government’s regional board.  
The individual semi-structured interviews consisted of open-ended questions that addressed 
general information about the interviewee’s place of origin and the motivations for leaving it. 
Moreover, the impact of possible climatic events on the interviewee’s daily lives were 
questioned, followed by an inquiry on resource use, in particular water and electricity, 
perceived tensions or conflict and inflow or outflow of migrants. The interviews were 
documented following handwritten protocols and were later transcribed into a digital 
datasheet and record in the NVivo software. To make sense of the collected data, an 
explorative thematic analysis was conducted while field notes from participant observation 
and non-verbal communication during the interviews were triangulated to support the 
reflections and analysis. 
 
Study participants 
To capture a diverse and comprehensive sample of interviewees, the interviews were 
conducted in four initial reception facilities and four follow-up accommodations located 
throughout the federal states of Hesse, Berlin, and Brandenburg. Purposive sampling was 
applied to obtain a large and diverse research sample, for which the criteria were that 
interviewees be migrants in Germany who were at least 18 years of age. The popularity of the 
sports classes offered by the researcher and the ‘snowball’ method helped to recruit a larger 
number of migrants who volunteered to participate in the study and created the opportunity to 
observe daily interactions. The recruitment of interviewees was stopped once an adequate 
level of saturation of information was attained. In fact, the study population resulted in a 




Methodological considerations and limitations 
The recruitment process proved to be a major challenge because many migrants were reticent 
or anxious to participate, most likely because they did not want to relive past trauma. The 
consent form presented an additional hurdle, as some migrants were apprehensive about 
signing it while others were visibly ashamed of being illiterate. Identifying qualified 
interpreters was also demanding, especially because the interviews were set to be conducted 
in nine languages. The gender and cultural background of the interpreters put forth an added 
challenge, as manifested by the reluctance or refusal of male interviewees to participate with 
female interpreters. While great effort was put into finding qualified interpreter for each 
interview, one cannot conclusively state that all potential misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations were avoided. The identity of the interviewer – a white European woman 
and outsider of the migrant housing communities – represented a further limitation, as 
language, gender, and cultural barriers were likely to have influenced the content and amount 
of data shared. However, an attempt to balance these limitations was made through careful 
attention to the interview context and extensive dialogue with the interviewees. Moreover, in 
response to the feedback provided by the first round of interviewees who explicitly refused to 
be recorded, a recording device was not used to document the interviews. All possible efforts 
were taken to provide a trustworthy atmosphere to the interviewee, though, considering the 
sensitivity of the subject and vulnerability of asylum seekers in a foreign country, one cannot 
be certain if the interviewees always reported the truth. This research recognizes its one-sided 
focus, as it solely includes migrants that already moved to Germany. Why some people stay 
in one place whereas others choose to leave is a crucial question to understanding the decision 
to migrate amid a complex environmental and social context and should be contemplated in 
future studies. 
Given the aforementioned limitations, as well as the relatively small research sample size of 
100 interviewees, this research does not claim to be representative of the overall migrant 
population in Germany. 
 
3.4 Results 
The findings of this empirical research describe interviewees reported resource scarcity, 





Electricity or water scarcity, or both was reported by 81 interviewees (Figure 3.1). Nearly half 
(45%) of the interviewees experienced resource scarcity in their place of origin. However, 
36% of interviewees from Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan reported the beginning or a 
significant increase of electricity or water scarcity, or both, after violence started in their place 
of origin (Figure 3.2).  
Syrian interviewees who worked in the agriculture sector reported observing increasing water 
scarcity and continuous reduction in groundwater since 1997. However, the majority of the 
group of Syrian interviewees reported electricity or water scarcity or both, specifically after 
violence erupted in their place of origin. One of them recounted that “before the war, water 
scarcity was only a problem for farmers as we had two wells in our village. After the war 
started, there was no water and electricity for anyone.” Five Syrian interviewees did not single 
out resource scarcity, possibly because they generally resided in major cities like Damascus 
and Homs. One interviewee from a village explained that there was no water scarcity because 
two rivers ran through his city. 
Five Syrian interviewees, who lived under the rule of the IS or Free Syrian Army (FSA) 
reported that the formally organized groups took control over water and electricity supply in 
their city and cut or reduced it to control and punish the society. Interviewees from Aleppo 
reported that the IS cut telephone lines in their city. An interviewee from the Yarmouk camp, 
a district of Damascus, who lived under the ruling of the FSA, explained that their access to 
electricity was restricted to two hours or less per day and they had little water. Other Syrian 
interviewees explained that after the war started or after their cities or neighboring cities were 
invaded by formally organized groups, the government completely cut or heavily reduced the 
electricity and water supply. An interviewee from Al-Hasakah reported that “Before the war, 
there were no problems, but after the war started, there was suddenly no water and we only 
had one hour of electricity per day. The government claimed that the resource scarcity was 
due to the bombing of factories.” 
Six Iraqi interviewees reported resource cuts or shortages due to the ruling of the IS and the 
Kurdish government. Iraqi interviewees explained that since the IS had entered their cities, 
the water supply was extremely reduced, and electricity supply was reduced to one hour per 
day, or to no electricity at all. Furthermore, an interviewee from Sulaymaniyah explained that 
since the Kurds started governing the region in 1991, electricity was reduced to three hours 
per day and the water supply was strongly reduced. He explained that “not to provide water 
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and electricity is all politics, because the government wants that the people are occupied and 
do not think about politics.” 
An interviewee from Kunduz, Afghanistan recalled that the formally organized group Taliban 
cut electricity lines and pressured telecommunication companies to cease services at night in 
order to control the society. He also explained that as the Taliban had important supporters, 
the government was not able to act upon these aggressions. Moreover, an Afghan interviewee 
from Baghlan reported that he survived an attack perpetrated by Taliban in his university, 
where they poisoned the drinking water and consequently 30 people died. A farmer from 
Herat, Afghanistan explained that the Taliban were in his city because it was rich and had a 
river and a dam; he recalled so-called “water wars” with terrorists from Pakistan and Iran and 
the major problems due to badly managed and distributed water supply. 
Many Syrian and Iraqi interviewees who reported resource scarcity after the conflict started in 
their place of origin, reported about adaptive strategies including investing in a generator for 
electricity, which was also used to pump up water from the well, buy expensive water in 
bottles and multiple interviewees described how people handled the scars water supply by 
using the water of the river since the resource scarcity and violence started. 
More than half (56%) of interviewees reported violence, armed conflict and non-state conflict 
as their main motivation to leave their place of origin (Figure 3.2), out of whom 22 left due to 
violence and persecution by formally organized groups, 19 fled because of the overall 
circumstances of armed conflict, and 15 left their country due to the forced military service. 
This interview sample of 56 interviewees who left the country due to violence, armed conflict 
















45% of interviewees reported
resource scarcity
36% of interviewees reported resource
scarcity after conflict started
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Figure 3.1 81% of interviewees reported resource scarcity in their place of origin 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Main driver for migration 
Climatic events, conflict and human mobility 
A Kenyan interviewee described the society in Mandera as “trapped” because the continuous 
droughts, heat and water scarcity impoverished the region significantly and only a few rich 
people had the resources to move to neighboring villages during the driest months of the year. 
However, he explained that moving is dangerous because migrants are chased by the 
receiving communities that are from different ethnicities. 
Especially Syrian interviewees working in the agricultural business from the northeastern Al-
Hasakah governorate were severely impacted by the consecutive droughts that occurred 
between 1999 until 2000. They explained that during this period, those who had the financial 
means moved to Europe or the United States; those with less financial means moved to Syrian 
urban centers. While different Syrian interviewees of this study narrated about the 
consecutive droughts at the end of the 1990s, they also mentioned a significant increase in 
violence in their home regions. 
Moreover, interviewees from different regions in Syria reported about the dire straits during 
the droughts that started in 2006 and remembered family members, friends and acquaintances 
who moved to urban areas to find a job. A farmer’s wife from Al-Malikiyah reported that her 
family suffered the most in the three years of consecutive droughts between 2006 to 2008. 
During this period, their livestock died, they lost their entire crops, and consequentially were 
forced to sell their property and move to Damascus. 
An interviewee from the surroundings of Aleppo explained that her family only survived the 
multiple droughts over the last several years because they had groundwater and a river that 














February 2016, her village was occupied by the IS and therefore the government had reduced 
the resource supply to a minimum and heavily bombed her village. As she explained, the 
existence of the river made her entire village less vulnerable to the reduction of water supply 
during the conflict and to climatic events, compared to a nearby village that was heavily 
affected by droughts. 
The severe droughts between 2015 and 2016 strongly affected, among others, the family of an 
interviewee from the north of Syria. She explained that the drought intensified existing 
difficulties they were facing since conflict started, which included water and electricity 
scarcity and exorbitant fuel prices, that impeded them to use their well. These challenges, in 
addition to the drought forced the interviewee’s father to give up his agricultural business, 
though unlike her daughter and the majority of his relatives, he did not migrate. The 
interviewee firmly explained that “despite these problems my father did not leave his home, 
because no one leaves his country because of lost crops or a drought, however because of 
war.” 
While interviewees from Somalia, Iraq and Syria reported immigration to urban areas, they 




The results of this research show that resource scarcity is an obviously perceived challenge 
across regions, as 81% of interviewees reported water or electricity scarcity, or both in their 
place of origin. Among these 81 interviewees, the majority of Syrian, Iraqi and Yemeni 
interviewees reported that water and electricity scarcity only began after conflict started and 
when formally organized groups or the local government took control over the supply of 
resources. While resource scarcity was not specifically mentioned as a driver for migration, 
the interviewees highlighted that the scarcity of water and electricity significantly deteriorated 
their living conditions. For these interviewees, resource scarcity aggravated circumstances of 
conflict, hence, increased their vulnerability. Therefore, this research assumes that among the 
49 interviewees who fled their country due to conflict, armed conflict, non-state conflict, and 
also reported resource scarcity, the challenges faced due to resource scarcity may have 
influenced their decision to migrate. 
Empirical results highlight that climatic events can affect the decision to migrate. However, 
other societal challenges remain dominant as main drivers for migration. Shifts in climate take 
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decades to be clearly understood and assimilated, and are embedded in cultural and economic 
practices, and oftentimes perceptions and actions only occur when a crisis is acute (Brzoska & 
Fröhlich, 2015). Thus, it remains difficult to determine under which circumstances and in 
which specific migration decisions climatic events play a role. However, in line with existing 
literature, the results of this research demonstrate that conflict, including the use of resources 
as a weapon and tool during conflict, increase an individual’s, household’s and society’s 
vulnerability to climatic events. The narratives highlight the importance of the rivers in some 
cities which experienced severe resource scarcity and interviewees even precisely reported 
how climatic events exacerbated or contributing to existing difficulties they faced during 
conflict, in particular water and electricity scarcity. Therefore, while conflict increases 
vulnerability of affected entities to climatic events, this research suggests that climatic events 
may have impacted vulnerable societies that were already suffering from conflict-induced 
resource scarcity, and hereby even contributed to the interviewees’ successive decision to 
migrate. 
The “conflict-induced resource scarcity theory,” which attempts to combine the above 
conceptualization can be applied on the conflict in Syria, which is an example of a conflict 
with multiple connected social, economic, political and environmental factors (De Châtel, 
2014), including direct connections to resource scarcity (Gleick, 2014). Water and water 
systems were used as weapons and tools during conflict, as with increasing unrest and 
violence, impacts on urban water distribution systems and intentional attacks on water 
systems, perpetrated by both the government and opposition groups were reported. Syrian and 
Iraqi interviewees highlight how the IS used their control over water, water systems and 
electricity plants as a strategic weapon to oppress enemies and civilians. Interviewees from 
Syria confirm that the Syrian government and formally organized groups drastically reduced 
or cut the supply of water and electricity and how this impacted their daily lives, significantly 
increased insecurity and forced them to adapt to the circumstances. The lack of water and 
electricity increased societies’ vulnerability, including their vulnerability to climatic events, as 
interviewees reported about the impact of droughts during the conflict. 
The presented theory highlights the warfare tactic of conflict-induced resource scarcity, which 
has far-reaching consequences. Today, the strategic relevance of particularly water during 
conflict mounted, as climate change increases resource scarcity, and therefore, the tactic of 
using resource scarcity as weapon or tool during conflict is causing far worse consequences 
(Gleick, 2006; IPCC, 2014; Tignino, 2010). Considering the results of this research, with 45 
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interviewees plainly reporting resource scarcity in their place of origin and additionally 36 
interviewees reporting water or electricity scarcity, or both once conflict broke out, mounting 
climatic pressure on resources is likely to worsen scenarios such as presented in this paper 
and increase human insecurity. The findings confirm the non-linear strong connections 
between climatic events and conflict, as conflict leaves a society more susceptible to climatic 
events, and a society effected by climatic events, increase individual’s and household’s 
vulnerability to conflict (Barnett, 2007). This analysis also demonstrates that the 
consequences of climatic events and conflict present similar circumstance. Therefore, this 
research suggests that conflict may cause climatic event-like circumstance, where conflict and 
the use of resources as weapon and tool cause comparable circumstances as climatic events, 
increasing vulnerability of affected entities, aggravating livelihood- and overall human 
insecurity. 
This research specifically investigates the widely discussed link in literature, where climatic 
events cause rapid mass migration, leading to conflict in receiving areas. However, the 
resulting empirical evidence on this link remains ambiguous and inconsistent, conform to 
existing theoretical and empirical evidence (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). Interviewees reported 
migration across borders or to urban cities, also due to climatic events. However, none 
engaged in conflict over resources in receiving locations or perceived violence among 
migrants or with residents in urban centers. While existing theory should not be discarded, 
this research supports the widespread skepticism on this link and discords based on the 
findings, existing evidence revealing that most migration flows, did not lead to conflict 
(Burrows & Kinney, 2016), and mainly because this theory generally assumes a mono-
causality in migration decisions, which implies that people migrate solely due to climatic 
events, which is rarely the case (Black et al., 2011). Overall, it remains surprising that to date, 
scientific analysis of the relationship between climatic events, conflict and migration still 
primary focusses on the possible security risk that migrants, motivated by environmental 
factors pose on receiving locations. 
To address the urgent need for novel perspectives and pathways linking climatic events, 
conflict and migration (Burrows & Kinney, 2016), the results of this research strengthen 
existing literature, pointing to the importance of assessing the vulnerability of individuals, 
households and societies, when researching on the impact of climatic events and its links to 
conflict and migration (Barnett, 2007). The findings demonstrate that vulnerability to the 
effects of climatic events commonly increases where the dependence on natural resources for 
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survival is direct and high, as farmers and pastoralists are particularly vulnerable, since they 
depend on rainfall, existing groundwater and functioning wells for their livestock and 
harvests; moreover, as conflict-induced resource scarcity leaves affected entities strongly 
vulnerable to climatic events. The consequences of climatic events depend on how vulnerable 
affected natural and social systems are, though, at each stage of any pathway, human 
intervention can influence these systems, for instance through mitigation and adaptation 
strategies to reduce risks, strengthen resilience, and improve sustainability (Scheffran et al., 
2012). Though, the results also confirm the existing literature that the capacity of both, states 
and affected populations to cope with changes and adapt to climatic events is significantly 
reduced during conflict (IPCC, 2014). Interviewees reported about investing in adaptation 
strategies to water and electricity scarcity, however their narratives also highlight that conflict 
and insecurity weaken local populations significantly by deterring investments, triggering 
capital flight, undermining public goods delivery, and causing negative health implications, 
which, as literature highlights, may decrease the population’s ability to cope with increased 
environmental hardship (Uexkull et al., 2016). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Rising political and scientific attention on the potential impacts of global warming on human, 
national and international security and peace, and the persistent complexity and inherent 
uncertainty about the links between climatic events, conflict and migration, have inspired this 
paper. To the last point, this research was committed to advance the understanding of the 
causal linkages among climatic events, conflict and migration and to offer a distinct 
perspective between these phenomena. For this purpose, existing related scientific literature 
was scrutinized and individual experiences, perceptions and decisions of 100 asylum seekers 
from 17 countries hosted in German facilities were explored. 
The “conflict-induced resource scarcity theory” demonstrates how conflict, in particular the 
control over resources used as weapon and tool during conflict, increases the vulnerability of 
affected entities. Consequently, climate’s impact on a vulnerable society is potentially 
stronger and, in the absence of effective governance structure or adaptation efforts, may 
contribute to human and livelihood insecurity, further aggravate conflict and instigate or 
increase population movements. This theory potentially represents one of multiple pathways 
of how climatic events can be linked to conflict and migration and it emphasizes and 
empirically confirms decisive existing scientific insights – mechanisms and mediating factors 
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- which are crucial for any analysis of the relationship between these scientific research areas, 
which include: that climatic events will not undermine human security or affect migration or 
conflict in isolation from other important social factors; that the impact of climatic events 
depend on the vulnerability of social systems and how they adapt to climate stress; that 
conflict increases vulnerability to climatic events; and this research singles out the importance 
of resources, among multiple mediating factors for human security. Overall, in this emerging, 
complex and multidisciplinary research field, there is a tremendous need for considerably 
more understanding, testing and empirical evidence on the mechanisms, intervening factors 
and the “conflict-induced resource scarcity theory” proposed in this paper.  
Based on presented results, this paper suggests that research on the nexus between climatic 
events, conflict and migration may consider a diverse research approach, where conflict 
causes climatic event-like circumstance. In light of the prediction that climate change will be 
an increasingly important driver of human insecurity in the future (IPCC, 2014), the pace of 
gathering knowledge on climate’s impact could be accelerated by considering the non-linear 
relationship and parallels of risks and consequences of climatic events and conflict on human 
security. 
While targeting freshwater and water infrastructure during conflict is as old as war itself, the 
difference today is that the impacts of climate change make the consequences of this strategy 
far worse. Since 2010, the United Nations General Assembly recognizes the human right to 
water and sanitation and that the denial of water to civilians constitutes a war crime. Findings 
of this research on the use of water and electricity as weapon and tool during conflict by both, 
government forces and formally organized groups and its wide-ranging implications should 
persuade policy makers to protecting water resources, based on the UN resolution 64/292 in 
conflict zones and raise global awareness. Furthermore, as conflict, including conflict-induced 
resource scarcity increase vulnerability to climatic events, it becomes decisive for human 
security to improve and implement conflict-sensitive mitigation and adaptation strategies that 
contain conflict, for instance with strategies impeding formally organized groups to gain 
control over water, water systems and electricity supply. Precautious actions to reduce the 
risks of conflict and resource scarcity could be sought through international cooperation, 
effective institutional frameworks, conflict management, and governance mechanisms. 
Moreover, practitioners and NGOs in conflict zones may emphasize the need of resource 
scarcity and provide assistance and information especially among populations at risk. 
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Scientific research has an important role to fill in reversing the current neglect of research on 
the linkages between water and international peace and security and the relationship between 
water and conflict, fostering analysis on how water is used as weapon or tool, or both during 
conflict and not only as factor triggering conflict (Gleick, 2006, 2014; Tignino, 2010). 
Furthermore, with the debate on climatic events ramping up, coinciding with the scientific 
agreement that climate change is real and predominantly driven by humans, academia is 
fundamental in providing policy makers evidence-based information and discourses, while 
avoiding simple and sensationalist conclusions on the relationship between climatic events, 
conflict and migration. Therefore, the climate-migration literature, which emphasizes 
predominantly on climate as the driving factor of migration (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015), 
would benefit in analyzing the main factors for migration, such as conflict and their links to 
climatic events and migration. 
Undoubtedly, the alarmist declarations depicting climatic events as a human security threat, 
since the 1990s, have spurred the UNFCCC’s COP 21 and the important 2015 Paris Climate 
Conference, leading to a universal agreement between 196 nations to curb global warming at 
1.5 C°. However, the majority of EU’s member states responses to the recent so-called 
“migrant crisis” was on maintaining security through increased border control, which was 
possibly also spurred by how climate change risks are communicated or perceived, and how 
climatic events and its links to migration and conflict were used as “convenient truth” by 
policy makers. Therefore, increased understanding on the relationship between climatic 
events, conflict and migration, the framing of climate change risks by the scientific 
community, and the way policy makers are informed and understand the links between 
climatic events, conflict and migration is crucial to sustain and improve human, national and 
international security and peace. 
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This thesis by publication contributes to efforts to advance the understanding and exploration 
of the risks, links and consequences of climatic events, conflict, and migration – both 
independently and symbiotically – and offers novel perspectives and frameworks to determine 
their consequences on human, national and international security. It provides novel data on 
migrant’s perceived drivers for international migration to Europe and insights – if any – on 
the perceptions of climatic events. For this purpose, existing related scientific literature was 
scrutinized, and individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with 100 asylum 
seekers from 17 countries hosted in German facilities. A key strength of the collected data is 
that the experiences, perceptions and decisions of individuals about their drivers for migration 
and climatic events were captured and thoroughly explored. 
The main research question, “What are the perceived drivers for migration and – if any – the 
perceptions of climatic events determining migration decisions of asylum seekers in 
Germany, which peaked in 2015?” is addressed in all three articles of this thesis by 
publication. However, due to the vast and multidisciplinary scientific literature, the 
complexity and inherent uncertainty on climatic events, conflict, migration and their links, the 
researcher was compelled to take a step back and firstly gather understanding on the question, 
“How did asylum seekers perceive climatic events– if so –  in their place of origin and how 
did it affect their daily lives and their decision to migrate?”  
The “climate-human analytical framework” that was developed in the first paper contributes 
to the emerging research agenda aimed at understanding how climatic events interact with 
societies and shape social outcomes today. The framework containing theories and 
mechanisms at the macro level is meant to be applicable across countries and regions and is 
thought useful for describing and analyzing how climate impacts households and societies. 
The results validate, and the framework demonstrates that there is no direct link in the 
climate-human interaction that causes the same social response across regions and while 
climate is not the only factor, it is certainly an important one, influencing societies in 
numerous dimensions and at many scales (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). 
To further foster the main research question of this thesis, it was important for this study to 
gather understanding on the links between climatic events and migration and, separately, 
climatic events and conflict based on existing scientific literature and the developed climate-
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human analytical framework. Overall, the results highlight that it is challenging to isolate the 
effect of climatic events from migration and separately from conflict, as the types of climatic 
events, their interaction with the dimensions of society – explored in the climate-human 
analytical framework – and the vulnerability of the impacted household or society are all 
variables that affect the dynamic. In line with the existing literature, this research reveals 
ambiguous results on the links between climate and conflict, and similarly, the experiences 
and perceptions narrated by interviewees depict a mixed picture on the links between climate 
and human mobility and confirm that every decision to migrate is unique (Black et al., 2011; 
Morrissey, 2013). 
To increase understanding on the links between climatic events and migration, it was 
important to analyze how climatic events are perceived by individuals across regions. This 
focus on the perception of individuals of climatic events fills an empirical gap in scientific 
literature, that was recently determined by Hunter et all. (2015). While results show that the 
majority (56%) of interviewees - regardless their background - were able to explain how 
changing climate conditions were perceived or how they affected their daily lives in their 
place of origin, climatic events often only represent a subtle factor impacting societies, as 
other societal challenges overshadow the climate’s impact. In the first article, this research 
suggests that factors such as the extent of inequalities in local power structures and access to 
knowledge on climatic events may play a role in people’s decision and behavior when 
impacted by climatic events.  
The importance of assessing the vulnerability of individuals, households and societies, when 
researching the impact of climatic events and their links to conflict and migration was 
recognized early on in this study. The findings demonstrate that climatic events reflect 
considerable local variations, with varied impacts on different segments of society and 
climate’s impact on individuals and households alters depending on the vulnerability specific 
to each entity. The results confirm that vulnerability to the effects of climatic events 
commonly increases where the dependence on natural resources for survival is direct and 
high. Moreover, the third article uncovers that conflict, including the use of resources as a 
weapon and tool, increases the vulnerability of an individual, household and society and 
therefore also the entity’s vulnerability to climatic events. As an important element of 
vulnerability assessments, an analysis of the adaptive capacity of individuals, households and 
societies was considered essential in this research because they alter the overall effect of 
climatic events. The findings confirm the existing research that adaptation strategies across 
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sectors and regions show great dissimilarities and that the capacity of both, states and affected 
populations to cope with changes and adapt to climatic events is significantly reduced during 
conflict (IPCC, 2014).  
To gather understanding on the potential relationship between climatic events, conflict and 
migration, this research initially verified the existing scientific literature. It specifically 
investigates, with dedicated interview questions, on the widely discussed link, where climatic 
events cause rapid mass migration, leading to conflict in receiving areas, however, empirical 
results remain inconclusive and hence confirm existing ambiguous theoretical and empirical 
evidence in literature (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). 
The compelling narratives of interviewees from Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan highlight 
how the government or formally organized groups such as IS, FSA and Taliban, or both, 
controlled, cut or contaminated water, water systems and electricity plants to oppress enemies 
and civilians, leading to increased insecurity. Therefore, the third article singles out resource 
scarcity as a crucial mediating factor in the analysis of the nexus between climatic event, 
conflict and migration. The third paper is concerned with the question “How did asylum 
seekers perceive resource scarcity in their place of origin and how is it associated with 
conflict, climatic events and migration?” and specifically scrutinizes the ongoing Syrian 
conflict as it is characterized by multiple mechanisms and mediating factors impacting the 
relationship between climatic events, conflict and migration. Furthermore, the Syrian conflict 
is a widely discussed example of a conflict with complicated but direct connections to 
resource scarcity, in particular water. The results of this research show that resource scarcity 
is an obviously perceived challenge across regions, as 81% of interviewees reported water or 
electricity scarcity, or both in their place of origin. Among these 81 interviewees, for the 
majority of Syrian, Iraqi and Yemeni interviewees, water and electricity scarcity only began 
after conflict started and when formally organized groups or the local government took 
control over the supply of resources. For these interviewees, resource scarcity aggravated 
circumstances of conflict, hence, increased their vulnerability.  
Based on existing literature and empirical results, the “conflict-induced resource scarcity 
theory” was developed, where conflict, in particular, the control over resources used as 
weapon and tool during conflict, increases the vulnerability of affected entities, also to 
climatic events. Consequently, climate’s impact on a vulnerable society is potentially stronger 
and in the absence of effective governance structure or adaptation efforts, it may contribute to 
human and livelihood insecurity, further aggravate conflict and instigate or increase 
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population movements. Therefore, while resource scarcity was not specifically mentioned as a 
driver for migration, it is likely that among the 49 interviewees who fled their country due to 
conflict, and also reported resource scarcity, the challenges faced due to water and electricity 
scarcity affected their decision to migrate. Moreover, while conflict increases the 
vulnerability of affected entities to climatic events, this research suggests, that climatic events 
may have impacted vulnerable societies already suffering from conflict-induced resource 
scarcity, and hereby even contributed, by exacerbating existing challenges of conflict, to the 
interviewees’ successive decision to migrate. 
As the current “migrant crisis” is at the core of the debate and connections of climatic events, 
conflict and migration, analyzing, “What were asylum seekers’ perceived drivers for 
international migration to Europe?” is a central question for this research. As one of the few 
empirical studies about the drivers of international migration conducted in the German 
context, it provides important novel insights on the actual drivers of international migration to 
Europe. This research confirms that migration decisions are highly complex and usually based 
on multiple drivers, as the majority (61%) of interviewees were motivated by two or three 
sub-drivers to leave their place of origin. It is important to note, that none of the interviewees 
reported environmental or climatic events as a perceived driver for migration. The majority 
(56%) of interviewees left their place of origin primarily motivated by armed and non-state 
conflict and the overall need for secure livelihood opportunities. Notably, these included 
many interviewees who faced extreme violence, though they had to migrate mainly due to 
financial difficulties, shortages of resources and deterioration of education facilities and 
infrastructure, all of which were caused by armed conflict. The results moreover demonstrate 
that the driver- religion, ethnic and family issues – was indicated as one of the drivers by 50 
per cent of interviewees for moving across borders and surprisingly, it exhibited the highest 
cultural diversity among all motivations for migration, showing that religious and ethnic 
persecution and discrimination is a major driver for international migration and this research 
suggests that it is likely to increase as it is not confined to one country or region. This 
research also brings to light, that drivers for migration can differ between countries and are 
rooted in history, governance, the dynamics of the society, and especially depend on the 
decision of each individual or household. Therefore, it recognizes that there do not exist 
exclusive drivers or root causes for migration. 
Scientific research on international migration is moreover enhanced in this study by a 
comparison of three top European migrant destinations, which shows, that the central drivers 
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for migration to Europe are safety and security, as well as the presence of a family network. 
Findings support the claim, that the importance of Germany’s or any other country’s welfare, 
asylum support system and national policies are weak drivers for migration and overall, the 
choice of the destination country has little or no bearing in the migrant’s initial decision to 
move internationally to Europe. 
Considering the potential security risks of each - climatic events, conflict, migration - and 
their relationships, this research was keen in advancing understanding and asks, “How did 
asylum seekers perceive climatic events in their place of origin and how did it affect their 
daily lives and their decision to migrate?” The climate-human analytical framework 
developed in this research highlights how climate exerts significant influence and risks over 
every dimension in human systems, as depicted in the framework as the five dimensions of 
society – political/institutional, economic, environmental, demographic, and social – that 
represent the pillars of any society. Furthermore, results show – in particular based on the 
concept of vulnerability and empirical results – that climate’s impact across regions and 
segments of society lead to different distributions of outcomes, which can be considered an 
important source of inequality, deepening international tensions.  
Various academics, policy makers, public institutions suggest that one major consequence of 
climate change is that climatic events force millions of people to migrate permanently or 
temporary. They proclaim, that large-scale migration could lead to additional adverse 
outcomes, such as social unrest and armed conflict (Reuveny, 2007). This widespread 
portrayal of migration as a security risk, especially among policy makers is discussed in this 
research, though evidence on the widely debated assumption on rapid mass migration, leading 
to conflict in receiving areas has not been confirmed. Results confirm that knowledge gaps 
still remain in scientific literature (Koubi et all., 2016), that migration decisions are complex 
and that recent public discourse and, to an extent, policy responses about migration, have 
often been based on limited research and media inflated perception. 
This research enhances analysis on how each of the natural and social science research areas – 
climatic events, conflict and migration – and their links impact human, national and 
international insecurity. Results highlight the importance of the role of the local government 
and its public policies in implementing successful adaptation strategies to reduce risks and the 
dangers of obstruction of knowledge on climate change and the use of scars resources as 
weapon or tool of conflict by local governments, as it reduces human and national security.  
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Moreover, the wide-ranging consequences and international security risks of the nexus 
between climatic events, conflict and migration are presented and how during the recent so-
called “migrant crisis” climate change and its links to migration and conflict was used as 
“convenient truth” by policy makers to reach political goals. The analysis shows, that if 
policy makers primary understand vulnerability to climate change in developing countries as a 
risk to their national security, through migration and conflict, ignoring the actual driver of 
migration, it may lead their responses towards border protection, defense spending and 
international insecurity, as witnessed in recent history, rather than towards sustainable 




















Appendix 1: Implications for academia, policy makers and civil society 
This Ph.D. research is an interdisciplinary project, as the analysis of each research area - 
climatic events, conflict, migration – their links and consequences for human security require 
evidence about social and environmental processes across multiple scales and research areas. 
This research presents existing theories, analyses and connects concepts and problem areas 
from the natural and social sciences and informs with its results academics, policy makers and 
civil society. Results, theories and suggestions enhance scientific research on climatic events, 
migration studies and conflict research, among multiple other related multidisciplinary 
research areas.  
The current EU agenda on migration, among others, urges academia to come up with 
suggestions to improve the management of migration by addressing the drivers and structural 
factors that impede people from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their 
country of origin and therefore seek a future elsewhere (Migali et al., 2018). Understanding 
the drivers for migration is an important contemporary research objective across academic 
disciplines. However, existing research and the multiple migration theories neglect analyzing 
the individual migration decisions and mostly focus on aggregated socio-economic data about 
migration (Hoffmann et all., 201). Koubi et all. (2016) highlight, that current empirical 
shortcomings in migration studies, stem on the one hand from the lack of theoretical work and 
data and on the other hand from the emphasis on analyzing which individuals migrate rather 
than why they migrate. This research attempts to fill this research gap by providing empirical 
evidence on the drivers of migration based on the experiences, perceptions and decisions of 
migrants in Germany. Moreover, its focus on the perceptions of individuals of climatic events 
fills an empirical gap in scientific literature, that was recently determined by Hunter et all. 
(2015). Results of the semi-structures interviews with 100 asylum seekers offer important 
insights for the analysis of each research area - climatic events, conflict, migration – their 
links and consequences and the drivers for migration. 
The climate-human analytical framework, presented in this thesis, is particularly useful for 
scientific research, as it accounts from numerous findings in literature and explains them in a 
consolidated system, seeking to contribute to a major research gap by focusing on exploring 
and theorizing on the complex mechanisms of how climatic events shape social outcomes 
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today. Until present, the interplay of climate and societies seems to remain unpredictable to 
some extent, as climate’s impact depends on the type of climatic events, the multiple 
dimensions of society and vulnerability to climate change, including adaptation strategies. 
The climate-human analytical framework may support academics across disciplines in 
advancing the emerging research agenda aimed at understanding how climate phenomena 
impact and shape social outcomes today and foster systematic conceptualization, addressing 
the entire spectrum of climatic events, considering the entire dimensions of society, analyzing 
vulnerability to climate change and existing adaptation gaps. 
Presented up-to-date trends and multiple findings supporting existing research on migration, 
provide a nuanced understanding of the current pattern of international migration to Europe, 
including the complex and numerous drivers of international migration increase scientific 
literature and foster the still limited research on the “migrant crisis.” This research supports 
academia’s important role by providing evidence-based information on migration in Europe 
and beyond and improve public discourse and, to an extent, policy responses about migration, 
as they have been partially based on limited research and evidence. Based on the analysis of 
the climate-migration relationship, the presented wide-ranging impacts of climate and the 
midst of contemporary climate change, this study suggests that environmental considerations 
should play a more central role in mainstream migration studies. Moreover, as the climate-
migration literature emphasizes predominantly climate as the driving factor of migration 
(Brzoska and Fröhlich 2015), it would benefit from analyzing the main factors for migration, 
such as conflict and their links to climatic events and migration. Multidisciplinary research is 
crucial in this scientific domain and academia has a fundamental role in providing evidence-
based information and discourses, while avoiding simple and sensationalist conclusions on 
the relationship between climatic events, conflict and migration. 
With the “conflict-induced resource scarcity theory” this research enhances the emerging and 
multidisciplinary research field concerned with the links between climatic events, conflict and 
migration and the existing limited knowledge and theories on this relationship. It herewith 
attempts to enhance existing literature, by yielding a novel nexus theory, which advances 
knowledge and new perspectives. 
Moreover, results point to the importance of the concept of vulnerability and foster the field 
of vulnerability studies. The concept of vulnerability is a decisive mechanism and crucial tool 
to map the complex interrelation between climatic events and social entities, because at each 
level of any pathway, human intervention, based on scientific research, can influence these 
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systems. For instance, mitigation, precautious actions and adaptation strategies can serve to 
reduce risks, strengthen resilience, and improve sustainability. Academia is required to 
address climatic events and adaptation to climate change, as it is a long-term, iterative process 
that will span many decades. 
Gathered empirical results about the ongoing conflict in Syria strengthen existing literature by 
highlighting the central role of resource scarcity during the conflict and by providing novel 
impetus to conflict research. This research highlights the importance to reversing the current 
neglect of research on the linkages between water and international peace and security and the 
relationship between water and armed conflict, fostering analysis on how water is used as 
weapon or tool, or both during conflict and not only as factor triggering conflict. 
Moreover, results confirm the none linear connections between climatic events and conflict, 
as conflict leaves a society more susceptible to climatic events, and a society effected by 
climatic events, that increase individual’s and household’s vulnerability, is more susceptible 
to conflict (Barnett, 2007). The analysis demonstrates that the consequences of climatic 
events and conflict present similar circumstance and this research suggests, that conflict may 
cause climatic event-like circumstance, where conflict and the use of resources as weapon and 
tool cause comparable circumstances as climatic events, increasing vulnerability of affected 
entities, aggravating livelihood- and overall human insecurity. Therefore, academia could 
potentially accelerate the pace of gathering knowledge on climate’s impact by considering the 
parallels of risks and consequences of climatic events and conflict on human security. Shifts 
in climate take decades to be clearly understood and assimilated, examining climatic event-
like circumstance may provide new perspectives and insights for climate change research in 
academia. 
Based on existing data and results, this research urges academia to foster research on the 
significant economic and social burdens caused by climate’s impact on modern populations, 
which are expected to increase in the future. This interdisciplinary research provides a step 
forward, as scientific analysis and theories are required now, if climate’s impacts are to be 
dealt with in a way which does not lead to increased suffering but facilitates reductions in 
inequality and improvements in well-being. 
 
The findings of this research also provide important insight for policy makers and civil 
society. Results of this study highlight the crucial role of the local government and its public 
policies. Interviewees from 17 countries reported on diverse impacts of climatic events, local 
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government’s lack of support during climatic events, incapacity to cope with changes and 
adapt to climatic events especially during conflict and even obstruction of knowledge on 
climatic events in their places of origin. Results should help to convince policy makers to take 
responsibility in addressing the entire spectrum of climatic events and responding to existing 
adaptation gaps with mechanisms to cope with the community strain and strategies for 
capacity building, technical assistance and support by protecting the most vulnerable 
populations. Governments are urged to take responsibility, improve human security including 
livelihoods, health and standard of living, because further neglect could lead to sociopolitical 
instability, political unrest, insurgencies and state failure. 
Transnational migration will continue to be a key issue in international politics and in the 
German agenda, one can perceive the need for effective policies to overcome the era of the 
“migrant crisis”, to respond to the expectations of civil society, containing the escalation of 
the political debate, and to keep in check anti-immigration parties to prevent future crises. 
Considering the political upheaval concerning migration and the recent “migrant crisis”, 
today, understanding the drivers and patterns of migration is a central international concern in 
politics and policymaking (Migali et al., 2018). This research fostered understanding of the 
current pattern of international migration to Europe, that should serve policy or any program 
seeking to influence irregular migration to address the actual drivers with a long-term and 
evidence-based sustainable migration management approach and development policies at both 
national and international levels, in Germany, Europe, transit countries and migrant’s 
countries of origin.  
Findings of this research on the use of water and electricity as weapon and tool during conflict 
by both, government forces and formally organized groups and its wide-ranging implications 
should persuade policy makers to protecting water resources, based on the UN resolution 
64/292 in conflict zones and raise global awareness. Results highlight that targeting 
freshwater and water infrastructure during conflict is a widely used and fatal strategy in 
conflict, and that today, the impacts of climate change make the consequences far worse. 
Therefore, collected evidence should enforce the fact, that the denial of water to civilians 
constitutes a war crime with significant consequences and policy makers, practitioners and 
NGOs in conflict zones are urged to enforce the human right to water and sanitation. 
Furthermore, as conflict, including conflict-induced resource scarcity increase vulnerability to 
climatic events, it becomes decisive for human security to improve and implement conflict-
sensitive mitigation and adaptation strategies that contain conflict, for instance with strategies 
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impeding formally organized groups to gain control over water, water systems and electricity 
supply. 
To date, public discourse and, to an extent, policy responses about migration, have been based 
on limited research and evidence. Results should serve policy makers to base their discourses 
on facts and avoid media inflated perceptions and reactive mitigation attempts that lead to 
emergency driven policy approaches such as closing entry points to Europe; and evidence-
based considerations should serve civil society with the goal of enhancing the overall 
European discourse on migration. The more evidence-based information is provided to policy 
makers and civil society, the more difficult it becomes for stakeholders to deny facts and use 
climatic events and its links to migration and conflict as “convenient truth”, to reach political 
goals. Results, presented drivers of international migration and evidence-based theories, 
including the “climate-human analytical framework” and the “conflict-induced resource 
scarcity theory” advance knowledge on the consequences of climatic events, as inquired by 
the Paris Agreement; and may help to prevent, that some policy makers continue primary to 
understand vulnerability to climate change in developing countries as a risk to their national 
security, through migration and conflict. This research encourages investment in the reduction 
of emissions and efforts to foster adaptation to climate change and policy makers responses 
should not be based on media inflated perceptions, reactive mitigation attempts and 
emergency driven policy approaches. 
With the debate on climate change ramping up, coinciding with the scientific agreement that 
climate change is real and predominantly driven by humans, academia and policy makers are 
required to closely cooperate, provide and pronounce evidence-based information and 
discourses reaching civil society, while avoiding simple and sensationalist conclusions on 






Appendix 2: Methodological considerations, limitations and validity 
The major methodological considerations, limitations and validation were briefly mentioned 
under the methodology section in each article. However, further details on methodological 
considerations, limitations and validity of the research project are important to mention and 
may be valuable for consideration in future research. 
 
Data collection and study participants 
The first encountered major limitation of the data collection of this research was to gain 
access and permission to conduct interviews in migrant housings and principally to enter 
initial reception facilities required a difficult and protracted application processes. The 
researcher had to provide documentation about the purpose of the study, was questioned 
during a meeting with the directors of all migrant housings, provided a clearance certificate 
and written agreement on data protection. The final approval to conduct interviews in the 
different migrant housings was sought from the directors of the facilities and, in specific 
cases, from the federal government’s regional board. 
Almost all directors of the contacted migrant facilities were interested in the research project, 
provided support and set clear restrictions concerning the interviewer’s stay in the facility. 
However, it is important to mention that during the application process to access the facilities, 
the purpose of the present research study caused confusion and debate reaching the federal 
government’s regional board. In fact, access to one initial reception center was initially denied 
on the following basis, as was described by e-mail by the migrant housing director, “climate 
change is not an official cause for migration or persecution based on the Asylum act § 3 (§a 
und §b). Therefore, a research concerning this matter and its analysis is under no 
circumstances representative and could lead to irritation”. While the debate on this issue 
continued over months, the federal government’s regional board overruled the facility director 
and finally allowed the researcher to enter the camp to recruit interviewees, however denied 
any assistance from the staff working in the facility, access to the migrant accommodations 
and to conduct interviews in the migrant facility. In three other initial migrant facilities, 
approval was significantly eased, because the interviewer offered to provide a voluntary 
engagement, in the form of sports classes for the migrants, which reportedly helped to create a 
win-win situation between the facility directors, social workers and the researcher. 
Identifying qualified interpreters was demanding, especially because the interviews were set 
to be conducted in nine languages. Many interpreters who worked in the migrant housings 
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had migration background and a few of them came to Germany about five to ten years earlier. 
These interpreters who had been asylum seekers themselves and were known in the migrant 
housings among the interviewees were clearly the most adequate for translating the 
interviews, because they transferred empathy and trust to the interviewee and provided 
valuable additional country specific information to the interviewer. The gender and cultural 
background of the interpreters presented an additional challenge in multiple occasions, as 
manifested by the reluctance or refusal of male interviewees to participate with female 
interpreters. Furthermore, interviewees – and more prominently African interviewees – 
expressed their reservations about engaging with an interpreter who was not born in their 
country of origin. While great effort was put into finding qualified interpreters for each 
interview, one cannot conclusively state that all potential misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations were avoided.  
The identity of the interviewer – a white European woman and outsider of the migrant 
housing communities – represented a further limitation for the data collection, as language, 
gender, and cultural barriers were likely to have influenced the content and amount of data 
shared. For instance, in different occasions during the recruitment process it was obvious that 
male migrants were reluctant to talk to a female interviewer and in a few instances male 
migrants openly disprized the researcher. However, an attempt to balance these limitations 
was made through careful attention to the interview context and extensive dialogue with the 
interviewees. 
The very first few interviewees who explicitly refused to be recorded, including one 
interviewee who started shivering and crying when asked to be recorded, clearly 
demonstrated that using a recording device was counterproductive for data collection in this 
research. Conscious of the fact that handwritten protocols could reduce the attention of the 
interviewer on the content and even risk of losing important information, this research 
believes that the decision not to use a recording device that was made in response to the 
feedback provided by the first round of interviewees, increased trust between the interviewer 
and interviewee and improved the data collection. 
The consent form presented an additional major hurdle, as the majority of migrants were 
apprehensive about signing it while others were visibly ashamed of being illiterate. Even if 
great effort was invested in explaining the purpose of the consent form, highlighting that its 
main purpose is to protect the interviewees’ data and anonymity, many interviewees refused 
to participate in the research, because the form evoked distrust to them. Moreover, a few 
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women, who were willing to participate in the research explained, that their husbands forbid 
them to sign any document in their absence and as the husbands were not available or did not 
agree to be interviewed, the interview could not be held. While the use of a consent form is 
crucial for validity of scientific research and verbal consent forms are widely criticized, the 
challenges faced due to the consent form reduced the possible size of the research sample and 
significantly hampered the interview process.  
The recruitment process proved to be a major challenge because many migrants were reticent 
or anxious to participate, most likely because out of fear of reliving past trauma. Numerous 
migrants rejected the invitation to participate in the research project; many agreed to a 
meeting, though did not appear; or, some even aggressively denied the participation as for 
instance this African interviewee exclaimed: “Why should I talk to you? In any case, you 
don’t help me, no one helps us”. The trauma interviewees experienced in their place of origin, 
during their flight and the stress and challenges faced in Germany as asylum seekers were 
often physically visible and mentally observable during the interviewee recruitment process 
and interviews. Engaging as volunteer in the migrant facilities not only was welcomed by 
most migrants, but the daily interaction facilitated integration, participant observation and 
significantly facilitated the recruitment process. 
The European Commission established for all member states common standards of living 
conditions in accommodations for migrants, however this research confirms that standards 
vary significantly across German initial reception centers (Safouane, 2016) and considerable 
differences between the follow-up accommodations were also observed. For instance, in some 
initial reception facilities families of up to five members shared a single room, however in 
other facilities, multiple families shared huge rooms, which were separated only by bed sheets 
that were used as curtains. Moreover, hygiene was a major problem in different initial 
reception centers. The follow-up accommodations varied highly, however overall, provided 
more privacy and comfort for migrants. 
Germany’s EASY distribution system, the IT application that allocates asylum seekers to 
initial reception facilities and dispatches them quantitatively across the country is certainly 
exemplary among European countries’ migrant administration and integration approaches. 
However, early observations during the fieldwork confirm that the distribution of migrants 
within Germany do not seem to follow common standards (Müller, 2013). For instance, some 
migrant housings were culturally mixed and in others, migrants from only three different 
nationalities were present. Moreover, according to the Asylum act § 3 (§a und §b), the asylum 
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seeker should move to the follow-up accommodation after six months, during or after the 
decision of the asylum application. This research confirms existing literature that there exist 
significant differences in distribution of migrants within Germany and even within Federal 
States and municipalities (Müller, 2013). Numerous interviewees reported to have lived in 
initial reception facilities for over one year and according to social workers, interpreters and 
migrants, it seems rather a matter of luck, where, under which conditions and for how long an 
asylum seeker finds shelter in Germany. Therefore, to capture a diverse and comprehensive 
sample of study participants, it was decisive for this research to increase the planned number 
of migrant housings for the interviews to be conducted to four initial reception facilities and 
four follow-up accommodations throughout three Federal States in Germany. As it was 
almost impossible to anticipate the backgrounds of the migrants in the different housings, the 
selected purpose sampling method was adequate for this research. 
 
Research process and data analysis 
To ensure validity, reliability and soundness of this qualitative research, different 
methodological strategies were applied in the different stages of this research project. In this 
thesis, a rich and thick description of the research procedure, analysis strategies and reporting 
of the findings is presented, which has the goal to transport the readers to the setting of the 
fieldwork and provide a solid framework for anyone interested in transferability of the 
research. The triangulation method, which involves using multiple data sources fosters the 
validity of the data analysis.  
Moreover, the relatively flexible research approach, including semi-structured interviews 
based on purpose sampling and participant observations results in a comprehensive research 
sample. The resulting highly heterogeneous research sample of 100 validated interviews out 
of 105 conducted, which proved to be comparable to the official annual BAMF report 2016, is 
believed to have increased validity, reliability and soundness of this qualitative research. 
However, given the aforementioned limitations, as well as the relatively small research 
sample size of 100 interviewees, this research does not claim to be representative of the 
overall migrant population in Germany. Overall, the thorough integration into the migrant 
facilities was crucial for the interviewer to build trust and increase the soundness of the 
research results. However, this research considers it important for future studies to even 
extend the duration of the data collection, in order to have sufficient time to integrate, build 
trust to the migrants, carefully choose qualified and adequate interpreters and understand the 
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different dynamics in each migrant facility. Future research may consider member checking 
as a further strategy to ensure validity of the findings, which may imply to conduct a follow-
up interview with interviewees. This approach was not applied to this research, due to the 
limited number of interviewers and time constraints. Moreover, this research suggests 
including at least two interviewers - preferably male and female – to conduct the interviews. 
This research recognizes its one-sided focus, as it solely includes migrants that already moved 
to Germany. Why some people stay in one place whereas others choose to leave is a crucial 
question to understanding the decision to migrate amid a complex environmental and social 
context and should be considered in future studies to increase reliability and soundness of the 
collected data. 
The accuracy of the research project was enhanced by the Ph.D. qualification exam on 
November 22, 2016, the university internal preliminary Ph.D. defense on November 28, 2018, 
multiple peer briefings and reviews over the course of research process by experienced 




Appendix 3: Interview date, place, time and language 
















     
  




Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 002 Persian 29/12/16 
13:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 003 Arabic 30/12/16 
11:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 004 German 01/01/17 
16:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 005 Arabic 03/01/17 
15:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 006 Tigrinya 04/01/17 
10:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 007 Tigrinya 04/01/17 
11:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 008 Kurdish 05/01/17 
16:56 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 009 Kurdish 06/01/17 
10:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 010 Arabic 06/01/17 
11:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 011 English 09/01/17 
10:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 012 Kurdish 10/01/17 
14:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 013 Kurdish 10/01/17 
18:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 014 Arabic 11/01/17 
15:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 015 Somali 11/01/17 
16:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 016 Kurdish 20/01/17 
11:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   




Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 018 English 21/01/17 
11:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 019 English 21/01/17 
13:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 020 Somali 23/01/17 
11:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 021 Kurdish 24/01/17 
16:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
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  INTWE 022 Arabic 26/01/17 
15:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 023 Arabic 31/01/17 
12:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 024 Arabic 31/01/17 
13:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 025 Urdu 31/01/17 
14:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   















  INTWE 029 German 02/02/17 
13:00 
Hesse Coffee shop   




Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 031 German 02/02/17 
16:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 032 English 03/02/17 
10:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 033 Arabic 07/03/17 
13:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 034 Arabic 07/03/17 
14:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 035 Arabic 07/03/17 
14:45 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 036 English 07/03/17 
15:30 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 037 Arabic 07/03/17 
16:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 038 Arabic 08/03/17 
12:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 039 Arabic 08/03/17 
12:30 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 040 Arabic 08/03/17 
13:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 041 Arabic 08/03/17 
14:30 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 042 Arabic 08/03/17 
15:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   










































































  INTWE 058 Arabic 18/03/17 
12:00 
Berlin Apartment   


















































  INTWE 069 German 21/03/17 
10:00 
Brandenburg Coffee shop   







  INTWE 071 Arabic 27/03/17 
20:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 072 Arabic 27/03/17 
20:30 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 073 Arabic 27/03/17 
21:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 074 Arabic 27/03/17 
21:30 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 075 Arabic 27/03/17 
22:00 
Berlin Initial reception facility   





  INTWE 077 Arabic 28/03/17 
19:30 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 078 Arabic 28/03/17 
20:15 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 079 Arabic 28/03/17 
20:45 
Berlin Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 080 English 28/03/17 
21:45 
Berlin Initial reception facility   















  INTWE 084 English 01/04/17 
16:00 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 085 German 01/04/17 
16:30 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 086 Turkish 01/04/17 
17:00 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 087 English 04/04/17 
15:00 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 088 English 04/04/17 
17:00 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 089 Somali 05/04/17 
16:00 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 090 Somali 05/04/17 
17:00 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 091 Somali 05/04/17 
17:30 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 092 English 08/04/17 
15:00 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 093 English 08/04/17 
16:30 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 094 English 08/04/17 
17:30 
Hesse Entrance of initial 
reception facility 
  
  INTWE 095 English 08/04/17 Hesse Entrance of initial   
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18:30 reception facility 
  INTWE 096 Kurdish 10/04/17 
10:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 097 Kurdish 10/04/17 
11:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 098 Kurdish 12/04/17 
11:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 099 Tigrinya 12/04/17 
13:30 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  INTWE 100 Tigrinya 12/04/17 
14:00 
Hesse Initial reception facility   
  * To preserve the anonymity of the study participants, the names of interviewees are 
not disclosed. 
** To preserve the anonymity of the interviewees, exact locations of interviews are 
not disclosed. 
  












Appendix 4: Consent form for study participants 
 Consent form for Interviews and the analysis of interview data 
Research Project: Ph.D. concerning migration, climate change and conflict in the Middle East and Africa. 
(Provisional title: The Nexus Between Climate Related Disasters, Migration and Violent Conflict) 
Institution: Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (CDS) / Universidade de Brasília (UnB), Brazil 
Project manager/Interviewer: Christina Kohler (Tutor: Marcel Bursztyn) 
Interview date: 
Description of the research project and consent was done with:  
☐ oral explanation 
☐ written explanation 
 
Dear interviewee, 
I am a student from University of Brasilia (UnB) in Brazil. I would like to ask you, if you would like to 
participate in my study. With this introductory explanation, I will give you all information, so that you can 
decide if you want to participate in the study. You can always ask questions about any aspect of this 
research, like the reasons, goals, risks and advantages. This document is a consent form for an interview and 
the participation in the research project. 
Goal of this Interview and my study: I would like to learn more about your country and about the reasons 
why you had to leave your country. This should help for a better integration for refugees in Europe in the 
future. This conversation will last about 30 minutes. 
Risks and advantages to participate in this study: It could happen, that I ask you difficult and 
uncomfortable questions. Also, in exceptional occasions, such as I lose my bag, it could happen, that your 
data may accidentally fall in the hands of other people. With your participation and statements, you can 
contribute that people in Europe will understand and know more about migrants/refugees and their 
countries. They will understand more about the reasons why migrants/refugees come to Europe. I would 
like to learn from you and hence improve the integration of migrants/ refugees in Europe. Unfortunately, I 
cannot offer you any compensation for your participation in this study. 
Confidentiality/Data privacy: Your information and the confidentiality of your data is very important to 
me. I will write down your information only in handwriting. Only I have your data and will not give it to 
others. I will not use your name in the study, only if you ask me to do so. At no time will your identity be 
revealed. I, herewith assure, that for the analysis of the data, all information that may lead to the 
identification of your person will be changed or deleted. The data you give me, will in parts, probably be 
used as the basis for articles or presentations in the future. I won’t use your name or information that would 
identify you in any publications or presentations. 
The participation in this research and interview is voluntary. At any time, you can interrupt the interview or 







Agree to participate in the research project and the interview. 
☐yes ☐no 
_____________________________________________ 
(Interviewee) first name; name 
_____________________________________________  
Place, date, signature 
____________________________  




Tel: +49 (0) 1577436 1824 
Tel: +55 61 9823 10847 
 
 Formulaire de consentement pour Interview, collecte e traitement des données 
Projet de recherche : Thèse de doctorat sur migration, changement climatique e conflit dans le Moyen-
Orient et Afrique (Titre provisoire : The Nexus Between Climate Related Desasters, Migration and 
Violent Conflict) 
Institution : Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (CDS) / Universidade de Brasília (UnB), Brésil 
Chef de Projet/enquêtrice : Christina Kohler (Tuteur : Marcel Bursztyn) 
Date du Interview : 
Description du projet de recherche de façon :  
☐ oral 
☐ par écrit  
 
Cher Interviewée, 
Je suis étudiante à l’université de Brasilia (UnB), en Brésil. Je voudrais te demander si tu voudrais 
participer dans mon projet de recherche. Avec cette description e divertissement j’aimerai te donner tous 
les informations nécessaires pour te décider. Tu peux toujours demander les raison, objectifs, risque et les 
bénéfices de participé. Ce document est un formulaire de consentement. 
L’objectif de recherche : J’aimerai bien apprendre plus sur ton pays d’origine e comprendre pourquoi tu 
devais fuir jusqu’ici. Mon travail e ton histoire devrai contribuer à une meilleure intégration pour les 
réfugiés en Europe dans le futur. L’interview a une durée de 30 minutes. 
Risques e bénéfices de ta participation : È possible que je te pose des questions difficiles e désagréables. 
Lors de l’entrevue, que le fait de parler de ton expérience t’amène à vivre une situation difficile. 
Deuxièmement, dans le cas exceptionnel, si par exemple je perte mon ordinateur, tes informations seront 
perdues e quelqu’un les voit. Avec ta participation, tu peux contribuer que les personnes en Europe 






apprendre de ton histoire e aider à une meilleure intégration des refugiée en Europe. Malheureusement je 
ne peux pas rémunérer ta participation. 
Protection des données/ confidentialité: La protection de tes données est très importante pour moi. Tes 
informations restent seulement avec moi e je ne vais pas les passer à tiers. Ton nom ne va pas être 
mentionné dans la recherche. Je m’oblige de ne pas utiliser des informations que pourrai t’identifier, je 
vais les modifier ou éliminer. Tous les renseignements recueillis au cours du projet de recherche 
demeureront strictement confidentiels. Afin de préserver ton identité́ et la confidentialité́ de ces 
renseignements, tu ne seras identifié́(e) dans la recherche. Les données du projet de recherche pourront 
être publiées dans des revues scientifiques ou partagées avec d’autres personnes lors de discussions 
scientifiques. Aucune publication ou communication scientifique ne renfermera d’information permettant 
de t’identifier.  
Il est entendu que ta participation à ce projet de recherche est tout à fait volontaire et que tu reste libre, à 
tout moment, de mettre fin à ta participation sans avoir à motiver ta décision ni à subir de préjudice de 
quelque nature que ce soit. Il vous sera toujours possible de revenir sur votre décision (avant l’analyse des 
informations). Maintenant ou après l’interview, n’hésitez pas à poser des questions.  
 




(Personne interviewée) Prenom; Nom 
 
_____________________________________________  
Lieu, date, signature 
 
_____________________________________________  




Tel: +49 (0) 1577436 1824 




 Einwilligungserklärung zur Erhebung und Verarbeitung personenbezogener 
InterviewdatenForschungsprojekt: Doktorarbeit bezüglich Migration, Klimafolgenforschung und 
Konflikte im Nahen Osten und Afrika (Vorläufiger Titel: The Nexus Between Climate Related Desasters, 
Migration and Violent Conflict) 
Durchführende Institution: Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (CDS) / Universidade de Brasília 
(UnB), Brasilien 
Projektleitung/Interviewerin: Christina Kohler (Tutor: Marcel Bursztyn) 
Interviewdatum:  
Beschreibung des Forschungsprojekts (zutreffendes bitte ankreuzen): 
☐ mündliche Erläuterung 
☐ schriftliche Erläuterung  
 
Lieber Interviewpartner, 
Ich bin Studentin an der Universität von Brasilia (UnB), in Brasilien. Ich möchte Dich fragen, ob Du an 
meiner Studie teilnehmen möchtest. Mit dieser einführenden Unterhaltung, möchte ich Dir alle 
Informationen geben, damit Du Dich entscheiden kannst, ob Du an meiner Studie teilnehmen möchtest. 
Du kannst mich jederzeit unterbrechen und Fragen stellen. Du kannst mich jederzeit nach den Gründen, 
Zielen, Risiken oder Vorteilen fragen. Dies ist eine Einwillungserklärung. 
Das Ziel meiner Studie 
Ich möchte mehr über Dein Land erfahren und verstehen, weshalb Du aus Deinem Land fliehen musstest. 
Dies soll, in der Zukunft, zu einer besseren Integration für Flüchtlinge in Europa führen. Diese 
Unterhaltung (Interview) dauert etwa 30 Minuten. 
Risiken und Vorteile in dieser Studie teilzunehmen 
Es kann sein, dass ich Dir Fragen stelle, die unangenehm für Dich sind. Es kann auch in absoluten 
Ausnahmefällen dazu kommen, dass die Informationen, die Du mir anvertraust in die Hände dritter 
gelangen. Du kannst mit Deinen Aussagen dazu beitragen, dass die Menschen in Europa mehr über Dein 
Land erfahren und besser verstehen weshalb Du und andere Flüchtlinge in Europa sind. Ich hoffe von Dir 
zu lernen und somit zu helfen die Integration und Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen in Europa zu verbessern. 
Leider kann ich Dir keine Bezahlung hierfür anbieten. 
Datenschutz 
Deine Informationen und der Datenschutz sind mir sehr wichtig. Ich werde Deine Informationen 
handschriftlich mitschreiben. Zu Deinen Daten habe nur ich Einsicht. Ich werde Deinen Namen in der 
Studie nicht erwähnen, es sei denn, Du bittest mich ausdrücklich darum. Ich verpflichte mich für weitere 
wissenschaftliche Auswertungen, alle Angaben, die zu der Identifizierung deiner Person führen könnten, 
zu verändert oder aus dem Text zu entfernt. In wissenschaftlichen Veröffentlichungen wird unsere 
Unterhaltung nur in Ausschnitten zitiert, um gegenüber Dritten sicherzustellen, dass der entstehende 
Gesamtzusammenhang von Ereignissen nicht zu einer Identifizierung deiner Person führen kann.  
Die Teilnahme an dieser Unterhaltung (Interview) ist freiwillig. Du hast jederzeit die Möglichkeit das 





kannst mich jederzeit bezüglich der Studie kontaktieren. 
Einverstanden, im Rahmen des genannten Forschungsprojekts an einem Interview teilzunehmen. 
☐ja ☐nein  
 
_____________________________________________ 
(Interviewpartner) Vorname; Nachname in Druckschrift 
_____________________________________________  
Ort, Datum, Unterschrift 
_____________________________________________  




Tel: +49 (0) 1577436 1824 
Tel: +55 61 9823 10847 
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Appendix 5: Consent form for interpreters 
 Einwilligungserklärung für Übersetzer für die Mitarbeit bei der Erhebung personenbezogener 
Interviewdaten 
Forschungsprojekt: Doktorarbeit bezüglich Migration, Klimafolgenforschung und Konflikte im Nahen 
Osten und Afrika (Vorläufiger Titel: The Nexus Between Climate Related Desasters, Migration and 
Violent Conflict) 
Durchführende Institution: Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (CDS) / Universidade de Brasília 
(UnB), Brasilien 
Projektleitung/Interviewerin: Christina Kohler (Tutor: Marcel Bursztyn) 
Datum der Einwilligungserklärung: 
Beschreibung des Forschungsprojekts (zutreffendes bitte ankreuzen): 
☐ mündliche Erläuterung 
☐ schriftliche Erläuterung 
 
Lieber Übersetzer, 
Ich bin Studentin an der Universität von Brasilia, in Brasilien. Ich möchte Sie fragen, ob Sie an meiner 
Studie, als Übersetzer, teilnehmen möchten. Mit dieser einführenden Unterhaltung, möchte ich Ihnen alle 
Informationen geben, damit Sie entscheiden können, ob Sie als Übersetzer an diesem Projekt teilnehmen 
möchten. Sie können mich jederzeit unterbrechen und Fragen stellen. Sie können mich jederzeit nach den 
Gründen, Zielen, Risiken oder Vorteilen fragen. Dies ist eine Einwillungserklärung. 
Das Ziel meiner Studie 
Ich möchte mehr über Die Länder der Flüchtlinge in Europa erfahren und verstehen, weshalb Sie aus 
Ihrem Land fliehen mussten. Dies soll, in der Zukunft, zu einer besseren Integration für Flüchtlinge in 
Europa führen. Die Interviews dauern etwa 30 Minuten. 
Risiken und Vorteile in dieser Studie teilzunehmen 
Es kann sein, dass ich Den Flüchtlingen unangenehme Fragen stellen muss, die sie emotional belasten. Sie 
können mit Ihrer Mitarbeit dazu beitragen, dass die Menschen in Europa mehr über die Länder der 
Flüchtlinge erfahren und besser verstehen weshalb sie flüchten mussten. Ich hoffe in diesen Interviews, 
mit Ihrer Hilfe, viel zu lernen und somit zu helfen die Integration und Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen in 
Europa zu verbessern.  
Datenschutz 
Die Informationen und der Datenschutz der Flüchtlinge ist mir sehr wichtig. Es ist wesentlich, dass keine 
Informationen aus diesen Interviews an Dritte gelangen. Nur Ich habe Einsicht in die Daten. Ich werde 






Sie verpflichten sich mit dieser Einwillungserklärung alle Informationen rechtens zu übersetzen und alle 
Informationen die in dem Interview besprochen werden, nicht an dritte weiterzugeben. Selbstverständlich 
können Sie mich jederzeit bezüglich der Studie kontaktieren. 
 
Einverstanden, im Rahmen des genannten Forschungsprojekts als Übersetzer teilzunehmen. 
☐ja ☐nein  
_____________________________________________ 
(Übersetzer) Vorname; Nachname in Druckschrift 
_____________________________________________  
Ort, Datum, Unterschrift 
_____________________________________________  
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Appendix 6: Interview guide 
      
  General information about the interviewee and his life in his/her place of origin   
      
  Where are you from?   
  Tell me about your city or village.   
  With whom did you live?   
  Did you live in a house or apartment?   
  How many children do you have? Are you married?   
  Were you satisfied with your life and job?   
  
What was your main activity? Did you have other jobs? Did you change jobs 
frequently? Was it difficult to find a new job?   
  When did you move for the first time and where to?   
  Reasons for leaving his/her country of origin   
      
  
Do you remember the day when you decided to leave your home? What happened 
that day? What changed and made you want to leave your home?   
  When did these changes start?   
  
Can you tell me the main reason that made your life intolerable and motivated you 
to leave?   
  
Did you perceive any changes in the weather or climate patterns over the last 10 
years?   
  
Did you perceive a resource shortage over the last 10 years? Water, electricity or 
other?   
  
Did you perceive an increase in resource prices? Were there peaks of e.g. food 
prices over the last 10 years?   
  Did you perceive tensions, protest or violence around you or against you?   
 
Did you perceive an inflow/outflow of migrants and/or refugees? How did this 
affect you and your family? If so, when?   
  Information about the destination   
      
  Where were you planning to go to?   
  Is there a special reason for your choice of country?   
  Did you move alone?   
  Do you have family in the country you moved to?   
  Views of the interviewee   
      
  
Do you believe the situation in your home country will improve? How, why or why 
not?   
  Who do you think is responsible for the situation in your country?   
  If the situation improves, do you want to go back?   
  Do you have questions? Anything you would like to add?   







Appendix 7: Impact of climatic events on interviewees in their place of origin 
(detailed) 
            







  Total interviews 15 44 41   
  Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
0 0 5   
  Syrian Arab Republic 10 10 14   
  Turkey 0 3 1   
  Iraq 0 6 6   
  Yemen 0 2 0   
  Sudan 0 0 1   
  Jordan 0 1 0   
  Egypt 0 2 0   
  Total (Middle East) 10 25 26   
  Afghanistan 0 7 4   
  Pakistan 0 1 2   
  Total (Southern Asia) 0 8 6   
  Ethiopia 1 1 1   
  Somalia 1 2 2   
  Eritrea 1 4 1   
  Kenya 2 0 3   
  Total (Eastern Africa) 5 7 7   
  Cameroon 0 3 0   
  Chad 0 1 0   
  Total (Middle Africa) 0 4 0   
  Russian Federation 0 1 0   
  Total (Eastern 
Europe) 
0 1 0   
  Stateless 0 0 1   
  Total Stateless 0 0 1   













Appendix 8: Drivers and sub-drivers of international migration 
              
  
    Violence, armed conflict* and non-state 
conflict**   


















  INTWE Origin 
  
    
  1 Afghanistan  x'     
  
2 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
      
  3 Syrian Arab Republic x' x     
  
4 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
      
  5 Syrian Arab Republic   x'   
  6 Eritrea       
  7 Eritrea   x'   
  8 Turkey x x'     
  9 Iraq       
  10 Syrian Arab Republic x x x'   
  11 Ethiopia       
  12 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  13 Syrian Arab Republic  x' x   
  14 Syrian Arab Republic x' x     
  15 Yemen       
  16 Iraq       
  17 Afghanistan  x'     
  18 Somalia  x'     
  19 Pakistan       
  20 Ethiopia  x'     
  21 Iraq x      
  22 Syrian Arab Republic   x'   
  23 Stateless       
  24 Syrian Arab Republic x  x'   
  25 Pakistan       
  26 Iraq x x'     
  27 Iraq  x'     
  28 Iraq x' x     
  29 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  30 Afghanistan  x'     
  31 Russian Federation       
  32 Syrian Arab Republic  x'     
  33 Syrian Arab Republic x' x     
  34 Iraq       
  35 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
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  36 Afghanistan  x'     
  37 Syrian Arab Republic x x     
  38 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  39 Iraq x'      
  40 Jordan       
  41 Syrian Arab Republic  x'     
  42 Syrian Arab Republic x' x     
  43 Afghanistan       
  44 Syrian Arab Republic x' x     
  45 Syrian Arab Republic x' x     
  46 Afghanistan  x'     
  47 Cameroon       
  48 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  49 Syrian Arab Republic x  x'   
  50 Cameroon       
  51 Chad       
  52 Syrian Arab Republic x' x     
  53 Cameroon       
  
54 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
      
  55 Afghanistan       
  
56 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
      
  57 Kenya  x     
  58 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  59 Syrian Arab Republic x  x'   
  60 Iraq  x'     
  61 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  62 Syrian Arab Republic x x x'   
  63 Syrian Arab Republic x      
  64 Kenya  x'     
  65 Kenya       
  66 Kenya       
  67 Syrian Arab Republic x x x'   
  68 Syrian Arab Republic x  x'   
  69 Somalia  x'     
  70 Sudan       
  71 Egypt       
  72 Egypt       
  73 Syrian Arab Republic x x x'   
  74 Iraq       
  75 Iraq       
  76 Kenya       
  77 Syrian Arab Republic x'  x   
  78 Syrian Arab Republic   x'   
  79 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  80 Afghanistan  x'     
  81 Afghanistan       
  
82 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
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  83 Afghanistan  x'     
  84 Iraq x x'     
  85 Turkey   x'   
  86 Turkey x      
  87 Somalia  x'     
  88 Ethiopia       
  89 Yemen       
  90 Somalia  x' x   
  91 Somalia  x     
  92 Eritrea       
  93 Pakistan  x'     
  94 Afghanistan       
  95 Eritrea   x'   
  96 Syrian Arab Republic   x'   
  97 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  98 Turkey x      
  99 Eritrea   x   
  100 Eritrea       
  TOTAL 
 
35 37 19   
    
 
      
  Main driver (x') 19 22 15   
              
  
*As of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), armed conflict is a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results 
in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.  
**As of the UCDP, non-state conflict implies the use of armed force between two 
organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results 
in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. 
***As of the UCDP, a formally organized group is any non-governmental group of 
people having announced a name for their group and using armed force. 
  
              
 
              
      Religious, ethnic and family issues   



















  INTWE Origin 
  
    
  1 Afghanistan       
  
2 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x' 
     
  3 Syrian Arab Republic       
  
4 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
      
  5 Syrian Arab Republic x      
  6 Eritrea       
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  7 Eritrea       
  8 Turkey       
  9 Iraq   x'   
  10 Syrian Arab Republic       
  11 Ethiopia       
  12 Syrian Arab Republic       
  13 Syrian Arab Republic x      
  14 Syrian Arab Republic       
  15 Yemen x'      
  16 Iraq x  x'   
  17 Afghanistan x      
  18 Somalia       
  19 Pakistan x'      
  20 Ethiopia x      
  21 Iraq x  x'   
  22 Syrian Arab Republic   x   
  23 Stateless       
  24 Syrian Arab Republic       
  25 Pakistan x'  x   
  26 Iraq       
  27 Iraq       
  28 Iraq       
  29 Syrian Arab Republic x      
  30 Afghanistan       
  31 Russian Federation x      
  32 Syrian Arab Republic       
  33 Syrian Arab Republic       
  34 Iraq  x     
  35 Syrian Arab Republic       
  36 Afghanistan       
  37 Syrian Arab Republic       
  38 Syrian Arab Republic       
  39 Iraq       
  40 Jordan x  x'   
  41 Syrian Arab Republic       
  42 Syrian Arab Republic       
  43 Afghanistan   x'   
  44 Syrian Arab Republic       
  45 Syrian Arab Republic       
  46 Afghanistan       
  47 Cameroon   x'   
  48 Syrian Arab Republic       
  49 Syrian Arab Republic       
  50 Cameroon   x   
  51 Chad       
  52 Syrian Arab Republic       
  53 Cameroon x  x'   
  
54 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
      




56 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x 
     
  57 Kenya x  x'   
  58 Syrian Arab Republic       
  59 Syrian Arab Republic       
  60 Iraq   x   
  61 Syrian Arab Republic       
  62 Syrian Arab Republic       
  63 Syrian Arab Republic       
  64 Kenya   x   
  65 Kenya  x'     
  66 Kenya   x'   
  67 Syrian Arab Republic       
  68 Syrian Arab Republic       
  69 Somalia       
  70 Sudan       
  71 Egypt       
  72 Egypt       
  73 Syrian Arab Republic       
  74 Iraq x'      
  75 Iraq x'      
  76 Kenya   x   
  77 Syrian Arab Republic       
  78 Syrian Arab Republic       
  79 Syrian Arab Republic       
  80 Afghanistan   x   
  81 Afghanistan x'      
  
82 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x' 
     
  83 Afghanistan       
  84 Iraq x      
  85 Turkey x      
  86 Turkey x'      
  87 Somalia x      
  88 Ethiopia       
  89 Yemen x'      
  90 Somalia       
  91 Somalia x'  x   
  92 Eritrea       
  93 Pakistan       
  94 Afghanistan   x   
  95 Eritrea   x'   
  96 Syrian Arab Republic x      
  97 Syrian Arab Republic       
  98 Turkey x'      
  99 Eritrea       
  100 Eritrea x      
  TOTAL 
 
29 3 18   
    
 
      
  Main driver (x') 12 2 10   
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      Political, institutional and social issues   











To seek better 
education in 
the country of 
destination 
  
  INTWE Origin 
  
    
  1 Afghanistan       
  
2 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x 
     
  3 Syrian Arab Republic       
  
4 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x' x     
  5 Syrian Arab Republic       
  6 Eritrea x'      
  7 Eritrea x      
  8 Turkey       
  9 Iraq       
  10 Syrian Arab Republic       
  11 Ethiopia  x'     
  12 Syrian Arab Republic       
  13 Syrian Arab Republic       
  14 Syrian Arab Republic       
  15 Yemen       
  16 Iraq       
  17 Afghanistan       
  18 Somalia       
  19 Pakistan       
  20 Ethiopia       
  21 Iraq       
  22 Syrian Arab Republic       
  23 Stateless x x'     
  24 Syrian Arab Republic       
  25 Pakistan       
  26 Iraq       
  27 Iraq       
  28 Iraq       
  29 Syrian Arab Republic x      
  30 Afghanistan       
  31 Russian Federation  x'     
  32 Syrian Arab Republic       
  33 Syrian Arab Republic       
  34 Iraq x'      
  35 Syrian Arab Republic       
  36 Afghanistan       
  37 Syrian Arab Republic   x'   
  38 Syrian Arab Republic       
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  39 Iraq       
  40 Jordan       
  41 Syrian Arab Republic       
  42 Syrian Arab Republic       
  43 Afghanistan       
  44 Syrian Arab Republic       
  45 Syrian Arab Republic       
  46 Afghanistan       
  47 Cameroon       
  48 Syrian Arab Republic       
  49 Syrian Arab Republic       
  50 Cameroon       
  51 Chad       
  52 Syrian Arab Republic       
  53 Cameroon       
  
54 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x' 
     
  55 Afghanistan       
  
56 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x' 
     
  57 Kenya       
  58 Syrian Arab Republic       
  59 Syrian Arab Republic       
  60 Iraq       
  61 Syrian Arab Republic       
  62 Syrian Arab Republic       
  63 Syrian Arab Republic x'      
  64 Kenya       
  65 Kenya       
  66 Kenya  x     
  67 Syrian Arab Republic       
  68 Syrian Arab Republic       
  69 Somalia       
  70 Sudan       
  71 Egypt       
  72 Egypt  x'     
  73 Syrian Arab Republic       
  74 Iraq       
  75 Iraq       
  76 Kenya   x   
  77 Syrian Arab Republic       
  78 Syrian Arab Republic       
  79 Syrian Arab Republic       
  80 Afghanistan x      
  81 Afghanistan       
  
82 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x 
     
  83 Afghanistan       
  84 Iraq       
  85 Turkey       
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  86 Turkey       
  87 Somalia       
  88 Ethiopia  x'     
  89 Yemen       
  90 Somalia       
  91 Somalia       
  92 Eritrea x'  x   
  93 Pakistan x      
  94 Afghanistan       
  95 Eritrea x  x   
  96 Syrian Arab Republic       
  97 Syrian Arab Republic       
  98 Turkey       
  99 Eritrea x'      
  100 Eritrea x'      
  TOTAL 
 
17 7 4   
    
 
      
  Main driver (x') 9 5 1   
              
 
            
      Economic issues   
      Unemployment and 
lack of economic 
opportunities 
Poverty   
  INTWE Origin       
  1 Afghanistan       
  
2 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)       
  3 Syrian Arab Republic       
  
4 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)       
  5 Syrian Arab Republic       
  6 Eritrea       
  7 Eritrea       
  8 Turkey       
  9 Iraq       
  10 Syrian Arab Republic       
  11 Ethiopia       
  12 Syrian Arab Republic       
  13 Syrian Arab Republic       
  14 Syrian Arab Republic       
  15 Yemen       
  16 Iraq       
  17 Afghanistan       
  18 Somalia       
  19 Pakistan       
  20 Ethiopia       
  21 Iraq       
  22 Syrian Arab Republic       
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  23 Stateless   x   
  24 Syrian Arab Republic       
  25 Pakistan       
  26 Iraq       
  27 Iraq       
  28 Iraq       
  29 Syrian Arab Republic       
  30 Afghanistan       
  31 Russian Federation       
  32 Syrian Arab Republic       
  33 Syrian Arab Republic       
  34 Iraq       
  35 Syrian Arab Republic       
  36 Afghanistan       
  37 Syrian Arab Republic       
  38 Syrian Arab Republic       
  39 Iraq       
  40 Jordan       
  41 Syrian Arab Republic       
  42 Syrian Arab Republic       
  43 Afghanistan       
  44 Syrian Arab Republic       
  45 Syrian Arab Republic       
  46 Afghanistan       
  47 Cameroon       
  48 Syrian Arab Republic       
  49 Syrian Arab Republic       
  50 Cameroon   x'   
  51 Chad x'     
  52 Syrian Arab Republic       
  53 Cameroon       
  
54 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) x     
  55 Afghanistan       
  
56 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)       
  57 Kenya       
  58 Syrian Arab Republic       
  59 Syrian Arab Republic       
  60 Iraq       
  61 Syrian Arab Republic       
  62 Syrian Arab Republic       
  63 Syrian Arab Republic       
  64 Kenya       
  65 Kenya       
  66 Kenya       
  67 Syrian Arab Republic       
  68 Syrian Arab Republic       
  69 Somalia       
  70 Sudan   x'   
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  71 Egypt x'     
  72 Egypt       
  73 Syrian Arab Republic       
  74 Iraq       
  75 Iraq       
  76 Kenya   x'   
  77 Syrian Arab Republic       
  78 Syrian Arab Republic       
  79 Syrian Arab Republic       
  80 Afghanistan       
  81 Afghanistan       
  
82 Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)       
  83 Afghanistan       
  84 Iraq       
  85 Turkey       
  86 Turkey       
  87 Somalia       
  88 Ethiopia       
  89 Yemen       
  90 Somalia       
  91 Somalia       
  92 Eritrea       
  93 Pakistan       
  94 Afghanistan       
  95 Eritrea       
  96 Syrian Arab Republic x     
  97 Syrian Arab Republic       
  98 Turkey       
  99 Eritrea       
  100 Eritrea       
  TOTAL   4 4   
            
  Main driver (x') 2 3   










Appendix 9: Resource scarcity in interviewees’ places of origin (only Syrian 
interviewees) 
                






















yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Before the war, 
everything was 
good 
Before the war 
started in 2011, 
they sometimes had 
electricity 
shortages, but 













yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
water After the war 
started, they had 
problems especially 
with water and 
resources decreased 
strongly since 2013 
  







yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Before the war 
started, electricity 
was perfect, only 
slowly reducing 
water/groundwater 
After the start of the 
war there was no 
electricity and 
much less water 
available 
  







yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Before the war, 
there were no 
problems with 
water. 
After the war 
started, there was 
no water and no 
electricity. 
They had to wake 
up at 3AM to use 















yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
electricity Before the war 
there were no 
problems with 
electricity 
After the war 
started, they did not 
have electricity 
anymore 
For 5 years they did 
not have electricity 
and had to use 
generators 
  





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
electricity Before the war, 
there were no 
problems 
After IS invaded the 
village, the state 
strongly reduced 
the electricity 
supply. They only 
had electricity for 2 
hours per day and 
they had to buy a 
generator 
  







yes water There was always 
enough drinking 
water, but not 
enough water for 
agriculture. 
No problems with 
electricity 
  





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Water reduced 
heavily. 
IS controlled half of 
the city and also 
controlled the water 
and electricity 
supply 
She knows that the 
other side of 
Aleppo was 
invaded by other 
groups, who also 












yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
Water With the start of the 
war in 2011 
government 
services started to 
deteriorate. 
And before, 
especially in 2004 
there were 
problems with the 










yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
electricity Only little problems 
before war 
After the war 
started, there was 
no electricity 
available 
IS invaded their city 
But they did not 
have problems with 
water, because there 
was a river very 
close to their home 
  








yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Water and 
electricity were 
normal and ok 
before the war 
Since the Free 
Syrian Army took 
over Jarmuk, they 
only had 2h 
electricity per day. 
And the water was 
extremely dirty and 
polluted. 
  





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both After the war 
started, they did not 
have electricity at 
all 
They pumped water 















yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Before the war, 





They also used 
groundwater.  
After the war, it all 
changed 
Those who had the 









no no     








yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Before IS came into 
the city, there were 
no problems 
After IS entered, 
there was no 
electricity, water or 
telephones anymore 
  







yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both  Before the war, 
there were no 
problems with 
electricity and the 
water supply was 
also ok. 
After the war 
started, there was 
suddenly no water 
and electricity 
available. They had 
only 1h electricity 
per day. 
The state told them, 
that the factory was 
bombed and 
therefore there is no 
electricity. 
  







no no No problems with 
water, because the 
city has two rivers 










yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both yes, since the war 
started 
  





no no     





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
electricity Water was rarely a 
problem, because 
they have lots of 
groundwater 
But after the war 
started, there was 
no electricity and 
water anymore 
  







yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both After the war 
started, electricity 
and water supply 
were very rare 
  





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Only little water 
available since the 
war started and only 
1hour electricity per 
day 
  







no no In Damascus water 
and electricity was 
available. 
  





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Before the war 
started, the water 
supply was normal, 
however they 
always had little 
problems. 
But after the war 













yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Before the conflict, 
water was only a 
problem for 
farmers, because in 
the village there 
were 2 wells. 
After the war 
started, there was 
no water anymore, 
since they did not 
have electricity and 
hence could not pull 
up the water from 
the well. 
After war started 
there were also 
great problems with 
electricity 
  









yes electricity Only 2 hours of 
electricity per day. 
Therefore, they had 
a generator. 
The river was 
nearly dead, 
though, lots of 
groundwater. Hence 
there was water. 
  





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both There were no 
problems with the 
water supply before 
the war. After the 
war started, there 
was no water at all. 
There was no water 
during the war, 
because it was 
under the rule of 
Assad. 
No problems with 
the electricity 
supply before the 
war, but after, there 
were only 3 hours 
of electricity per 
day and in the 
winters maybe 6 









yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both In Al Khamishly 
they had a well, but 
lots of people 
suffered, because 
they did not have 
water.  
Since 2011 they had 
huge problems. 
No heating oil was 
available and no 
electricity during 
war. 
The diesel to use 
pull up water from 
the well was also 
missing. 
  





no no No problems with 
the water supply, 









yes, after the 
conflict 
started 




But rarely had 
problems with 
electricity cuts. 
After the war 
started there were 
problems with the 
electricity supply. 
People started using 
the groundwater. 
Before the war 
started, water and 
electricity were 
administered by the 
state, but now, no 
one knows 
  





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Since the war 
started, there is no 
water available and 
people in his village 
use the water of the 
river. They have 2/3 










yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
electricity Before the war 
there was always 
water and 
electricity. 
After the war 
started, they had 1 
or maximum 2 
hours of electricity 
per day. 
  










yes electricity Yes, there was 
water, but 
sometimes none for 
24 hours. 
Electricity supply 
was very bad 
  





yes, after the 
conflict 
started 
both Before the war 
started there were 
no problems with 
the water supply, 
but after the war 
started, there was 
much less water 
available. Lately, 
before she fled, 
they did not drink 
the water from the 
tab, because it was 
polluted. 
Before the war 
started, there were 
electricity cuts of 
1h/day, but after the 
war started, they 
only had 3h of 
electricity per day 
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